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BUCKNER, JR., KERMIT GEORGE. An Analysis of Chief Justice 
Burger's Influence in Supreme Court Cases Affecting Public 
Education. (1980) Directed by: Dr. Joseph E. Bryson. Pp. 248. 
This historical study has as its purpose an examination 
of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger's influence in Supreme 
Court decisions affecting education. Reviewed in the study 
are Supreme Court cases involving education which were heard 
by the Court from the time Chief Justice Burger assumed 
leadership in 1969 until the end of the October 1978 term. 
The means available to the Chief Justice for influencing 
Court decisions have been examined, and opinions, voting 
patterns, assignment of the duty to write the majority 
opinion, voting blocs, and Court unity have been analyzed in 
order to evaluate Chief Justice Burger's influence on 
education cases. 
The study contains six chapters. Chapter II presents an 
analysis of the historic role played by Supreme Court Chief 
Justices in influencing the Court's decision-making process 
and an analysis of relevant literature addressing Chief Justice 
Burger's leadership record. Chapters III, IV, and V present 
an analysis of the public education cases involving religious 
issues, desegregation issties, and constitutionally guaranteed 
rights issues. Chapter VI presents a summary and conclusions. 
In cases dealing with church and state issues in public 
education, the Chief Justice has supported an accommodationist 
position. Chief Justice Burger seems to have been able to 
influence some decisions by means of the assignment of the 
majority opinion and his ability to vote last in conference. 
Church and state decisions during this period, however, do not 
appear to be consistently affected by Chief Justice Burger's 
efforts to influence. 
In cases dealing with desegregation issues in public edu­
cation, the Chief Justice has supported efforts to desegregate 
public schools as mandated by the Brown decision. Efforts to 
expand the Brown decision through the use of busing and efforts 
to apply Brown to Northern schools have been fought by the 
Chief Justice. In desegregation cases, Chief Justice Burger 
appears to have been successful in influencing some decisions. 
When compared with the record of former Chief Justice Warren, 
however, Chief Justice Burger's record shows that he has not 
been able to bring unity to the Court nor to lead as the former 
Chief Justice had done. 
In cases dealing with constitutionally guaranteed freedoms, 
the Chief Justice has taken a restrictionist stance. The influ­
encing efforts of Chief Justice Burger seem to have been aimed 
at limiting access to the Court for those with claims that their 
rights have been violated. The Chief Justice again has used 
the influencing powers available to hira. in order to win support 
for his position and to split the Court in decisions he does 
not support. 
Chief Justice Burger's efforts to influence the Court in 
education cases have been limited by philosophical splits in 
the Court. The Burger Court has been marked by the formation 
of blocs and split decisions. Since the Chief Justice is the 
member who is traditionally looked to as the Court unifier, 
the division on the Burger Court appears to indicate Chief 
Justice Burger's inability to utilize social and task leader­
ship skills to attract his fellow justices to a position he 
favors and to indicate also his unwillingness to compromise 
when the majority does not support his position. Though 
Chief Justice Eurger has been able to influence a number of 
education decisions by means of his right to assign the 
majority opinion and to vote last in the conference, the 
record shows that he has had limited influence in education 
decisions. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court's Impact on Education 
John C. Hogan has estimated that approximately forty 
thousand state, federal, and Supreme Court decisions, rendered 
between 1789 and 1971, have affected either the organization, 
administration, or programs of the schools in some way. -̂
Federal, including Supreme Court, cases have increased since 
o 
1897, and there has been a sharp increase since 1956. Yet 
education is never directly at issue before the United States 
Supreme Court because neither the Constitution nor its amend­
ments explicitly mention education. 
Two means for obtaining federal court juris­
diction in cases affecting education are: by 
questioning the validity of a state or federal 
statute under the United States Constitution, or 
by alleging that some constitutionally protected 
right, privilege or immunity of the individual 
has been violated.^ 
Ijohn C. Hogan, The Schools, the Courts, and the Public 
Interest (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, T975T7 
p. 6. 
2lbld. 
3lbid., p. 8. 
1 
2 
Supreme Court involvement in education had its beginnings 
4 
in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward. In this case 
the Court, under Chief Justice John Marshall, ruled that the 
state legislature could not alter the charter that had been 
granted by the English crown without the consent of those to 
whom it had been granted. From this beginning the Court's 
involvement in school issues has expanded. 
Initially, the Court maintained what has been called the 
"classical view" of the role of the judiciary in educational 
matters."* The "classical view" endured until about 1950 and 
may be defined as the Court's attitude that education was a 
state and local matter which should get federal attention 
only if, as Justice John M. Harlan noted, there, is a "clear 
and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme 
law of the land."^ The "classical view" resulted from the 
Court's interpretation of the Tenth Amendment which provides 
that all powers not delegated to the United States be 
reserved to the states or the people. 
The five stages in the historical development of the 
Court's role in education matters are the following: 
^Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 
(U.S.) 518 (1819). 
Hogan, p. 11. 
6Ibid. 
3 
I. THE STAGE OF JUDICIAL LAISSEZ-FAIRE. From 
1789 to about 1850 the federal and state 
courts ignored education. Federal courts 
viewed it as a state and local matter, and 
state courts were rarely called upon to 
intervene in a school matter. 
II. THE STAGE OF STATE CONTROL OF EDUCATION. 
During the period from 1850 to about 1950, 
state courts asserted that education was 
exclusively a state and local matter. Few 
cases affecting education were presented to 
the Supreme Court of the United States, and 
consequently a body of case law developed 
at the state level which permitted, if not 
actuallysanctioned, educational policies 
and practices that failed to meet federal 
constitutional standards and requirements. 
III. THE REFORMATION STAGE. Beginning about 
1950 (and continuing until today), the 
federal courts, the Supreme Court in partic­
ular, recognized that educational policies 
and practices as they had developed under 
state laws and state court decisions were 
not in conformity with federal constitu­
tional requirements. This is the period 
of federal infusion of constitutional 
minima into existing educational structures. 
IV. THE STAGE OF EDUCATION UNDER SUPERVISION OF 
THE COURTS. Concurrent with the reform 
stage, there has been a tendency of the 
courts, federal and state, to expand the 
scope of their powers over the schools (e.g. 
intervention in matters affecting the admin­
istration, organization, and programs of the 
schools; retaining jurisdiction over cases 
until their mandates, orders, and decrees 
have been carried into effect.). It is clear 
that a new judicial function is taking place. 
V. THE STAGE OF STRICT CONSTITUTION. Beginning 
March 21, 1973, there has been a further 
development that will affect the role of 
federal courts in education: the landmark 
decision in the school finance case, San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
wherein the Supreme Court of the United States 
declared: "Education is not among the rights 
afforded explicit protection under our federal 
4 
Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for 
saying it is implicitly so protected." The 
"strict construction" posture of the Nixon 
Court is bound to affect the trend of court 
decisions concerned with the organization, 
administration, and programs of the public 
schools which has so clearly marked the 
period since about 1950.7 
During the past twenty years, federal and state court 
decisions have made sweeping changes in the operation of the 
public schools. The power to carry out these changes stems, 
in great part, from the decisions of the Supreme Court since 
g 
1950 which support and sanction public school actions. 
This increase in federal, and especially Supreme Court, 
involvement in public education has been met with mixed 
responses from educators. Some have accused the Court of 
usurping administrative powers formerly held by school boards 
g 
and administrators. One principal reacted to the Tinker 
decision^ in which the Supreme Court ruled that the student 
does not lose his Constitutional rights when he enters the 
school door by saying, "You know, if I cannot make a regula­
tion limiting the length of my students' hair, I don't believe 
^Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
8Ibid., p. 7. 
^Dan L. Johnson, "The First Amendment and Education - A 
Plea for Peaceful Coexistance," Villanova Law Review 17 
(June, 1972), p. 1027. 
•^Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
5 
I have the authority and power to prevent fornication in the 
hall ways of my school."H 
Other educators have welcomed the Court's involvement 
in educational affairs. Many feel the Court is merely call­
ing attention to past abuses which, being unquestioned, were 
accepted as standard administrative practice. Some local 
school boards, being unable to obtain desired reforms in 
any other manner, have resorted to Court action which has 
forced the reforms. In these cases the litigants ended the 
12 judicial process once a favorable decision had been reached. 
The Court itself has stated on several occasions that it 
should not interfere in the resolution of conflicts which 
arise in the daily operation of school systems. Justice 
Hugo L. Black warned of the potential problems involved in 
Supreme Court intervention in public school affairs when he 
stated: 
However wise this Court may be or may become 
hereafter, it is doubtful that, sitting in Washington, 
it can successfully supervise and censor the curricu­
lum in every public school in every hamlet and city 
in the United States. I doubt that our wisdom is so 
nearly infallible.1^ 
Hlbid., p. 1029. 
^Hogan, p. 13. 
13Ibid., p. 12. 
•^Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 114 (2968). 
6 
In 1835 Alexis De Tocqueville made an observation on the 
American political system saying, "Hardly any question arises 
in the United States that is not resolved sooner or later into 
a judicial question.Beginning in the 1950's public school 
officials have come to realize how accurate Tocqueville's 
observation was. As John C. Hogan states: 
A new judicial function is clearly emerging: 
it involves supervision of the schools by the 
courts to assure that Constitutional minima re­
quired by the First and Fourteenth Amendments are 
met.16 
Purpose 
This historical study has as its purpose an examination 
of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger's influence in Supreme Court 
decisions affecting public education. The means available to 
the Chief Justice for influencing Court decisions will be 
examined in order to evaluate Chief Justice Burger's utiliza­
tion of his influencing powers in public school cases. Chief 
Justice Burger's opinions written for the Court, his dissents, 
and his concurring opinions will be reviewed. Voting patterns, 
the assignment of the opinion writing duty, voting blocs, 
dissenting and concurring opinions, and the unity of the Court 
will be analyzed in an effort to discern whether the Chief 
Justice has been an influencing factor. The study attempts to 
^Walter F. Murphy and Herman Pritchett, Courts, Judges 
and Politics (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 33. 
16nogan, p. 9 
7 
inform school administrators, school boards, and the general 
public how Chief Justice Burger has influenced public school 
cases. 
Methods of Procedure 
This study utilized the United States Supreme Court 
Reports as the primary source of Court decisions for the 
period under study. Secondary sources include books, journal 
articles, dissertations, magazine articles, and transcripts 
of television news shows which examine the role of the Chief 
Justice in Court decision-making and examine the influence 
former Chief Justices have had on Court decisions. The cases 
are grouped under the following major headings: 
1. Religion: cases in which violations of rights as 
granted under the First Amendment to the Constitution are at 
issue. 
2. Desegregation: cases dealing with the creation of 
unitary school systems and enforcement of desegregation orders. 
3. Constitutionally guaranteed human rights: cases 
dealing with the rights of teachers and students as granted by 
the Constitution. 
All primary and secondary sources are listed in the bibliography. 
Scope and Limitations 
This study includes decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court which were rendered from the beginning of the October 
term of 1968 through the end of the October term of 1978. The 
8 
cases studied concern elementary and secondary school issues 
and omit most cases which involve higher education and persons 
not directly involved in education. The cases in which Chief 
Justice Burger wrote an opinion represent the majority of 
cases considered, though other public school cases which 
reflect the influence of the Chief Justice were considered. 
An attempt is made to analyze Chief Justice Burger's 
impact on Supreme Court decisions affecting public elementary 
and secondary education. This study will analyze the position 
of Chief Justice as a factor in Supreme Court decisions. 
United States Supreme Court Reports and other appropriate 
literature will be used to review chronologically Burger Court 
rulings in public education cases in order to ascertain trends 
and gain insights into future rulings and into Chief Justice 
Burger's impact on potential cases. 
Definitions of Terms Used 
accommodationist: advocate of state aid for religious schools. 
appeal: to take a case to a higher court for review. Gener­
ally, a party losing in a trial court may appeal once to 
an appellate court as a matter of right. If he loses in 
the appellate court, appeal to a higher court is within 
the discretion of the higher court. Most appeals to the 
United States Supreme Court are within the court's 
discretion. 
appellant: the party who takes an appeal from one court or 
jurisdiction to another. 
appellee: the party in a cause against whom an appeal is 
taken; that is, the party who has an interest adverse to 
setting aside or reversing the judgment. 
bill of attainder: law inflicting penalty without due process; 
also may be ex post facto. 
9 
brief: a document prepared by counsel to serve as the basis 
for an argument in an appellate court. 
certiorari: the name of a writ of review or inquiry. Certio­
rari is an appellate proceeding for the re-examination 
of action of inferior tribunal or as auxiliary process 
to enable appellate court to obtain further information 
in pending cause. 
child-benefit theory: the theory that the benefit of state 
aid is intended for the child and that any simultaneous 
benefit accruing to a religious institution is incidental. 
comity: describes the defense of a court into another juris­
diction; for examplef a Federal Court allowing a state 
court to decide a case when it could have made the decision 
itself. 
concurring opinion: an opinion separate from that which em­
bodies the views and decision of the majority of the 
court, prepared and filed by a judge who agrees to the 
general result of the decision, and which either rein­
forces the majority opinion by the expression of the 
particular judge's own views or reasoning or, more com­
monly, voices his disapproval on the grounds of the 
decision or the ajrpuments on which it was based, though 
approving the final results. 
contract theory: the theory that a legislature may contract 
to purchase secular educational services from nonpublic 
(including parochial) schools, since these services would 
otherwise have to be provided by the legislature to ful­
fill its constitutional duty of providing education for 
the people of the state. 
de facto: existing equally in fact, such as holding office, 
but not de jure. 
de jure: legitimate, within the law; usually referring to 
having a legal claim to an office but never having held 
such office. 
dissenting opinion: a separate opinion in which a particular 
judge announces his dissent from the conclusion held by 
a majority of the court and expounds his own views. 
due process: law in its regular course of administration 
through courts of justice. 
enjoin: to require; command, positively direct. To require 
a person by writ of injunction from a court of equity to 
perform, or to abstain or desist from some act. 
10 
ex post facto: after the fact; generally, a law which makes 
an act illegal prior to the adoption of the law. 
find the law theory: the theory that judges decide cases 
solely on the basis of law with no influence from other 
factors. 
injunction: a court order prohibiting the person to whom it 
is directed from performing a particular act. 
"Minnesota Twins": name given Chief Justice Eurger and 
Justice Harry Blackmun because both are from Minnesota 
and almost always voted on the same side during their 
early years on the Court. 
moot: unsettled; undecided. A moot question is also one 
which is no longer material. 
parity: the concept that religious schools seek aid of the 
same magnitude as states grant to public schools. 
parochial school: a school, controlled directly by the local 
church, parish, or diocese. 
per curiam: a phrase used in the reports to distinguish an 
opinion of the whole court from an opinion written by 
any one judge. Sometimes it denotes an opinion written 
by the Chief Justice or presiding judge. 
petitioner: one who files a petition with a court seeking 
action or relief, including a plaintiff or an appellant. 
But a petitioner is also a person who files for other 
court action where charges are not necessarily made; for 
example, a party may petition the court for an order 
requiring another person or party to produce documents. 
The opposite party is called the respondent. 
plaintiff: a party who brings a civil action or sues to ob­
tain a remedy for injury to his rights. The party 
against whom action is brought is termed the defendent. 
remand: to send back. 
respondent: one who is compelled to answer the claims or 
questions posed in court by a petitioner. A defendent 
and an appellee may be called respondents, but the term 
also includes those parties who aiiswer in court during 
actions where charges are not necessarily brought or 
where the Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari. 
reverse: to overthrow, vacate, set aside, make void, annul, 
repeal or revoke. 
11 
sectarian: parochial group. 
separationist: advocate of no state aid for religious schools. 
social leadership : potential for leadership of the court de­
riving from the use of social skills. 
statute: a written law enacted by a legislature. A collection 
of statutes for a particular government division is called 
a code. 
stay: to halt or suspend further judicial proceedings. 
task leadership: potential for leadership of the court deriv­
ing from a justice's ability to keep the court on task. 
tenure: generally, same as continuing contract. In some 
states, infers greater protection; for elected officials, 
refers to length of term of office. 
vacate: to make void, annul or rescind. 
Organization of the Remainder of the Study 
This study contains six chapters. Chapter II will pre­
sent an analysis of the historic role of Supreme Court Chief 
Justices as factors in the Court's decision-making process 
and an analysis of relevant literature addressing Chief Justice 
Eurger's leadership record. Chapters III, IV, and V will pre­
sent an analysis of the public education cases involving 
religious issues, desegregation issues, and constitutionally 
guaranteed human rights issues. Each chapter will contain a 
comparison of cases involving similar issues which preceded 
and followed. 
Chapter VI will present a summary and a conclusion drawn 
from the information advanced in the preceding chapters. A 
statement will be made indicating the degree to which Chief 
12 
Justice Burger has influenced Supreme Court cases dealing 
with public education based on the cases analyzed. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND 
The Historic Role of Chief Justices in Court Decision-Making 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the federal court 
system. This system consisted of a Supreme Court of six mem­
bers and one district court for each of the thirteen states. 
The districts were divided into three circuits 
and a circuit court was created for each. Since the 
act (Judiciary Act of 1789) made no provisions for 
circuit court judges, each circuit court was pre­
sided over, by two Supreme Court justices and the 
judge of the district where the court was held. 
This situation resulted in Supreme Court justices having 
to "ride circuit" in an era when travel was slow and arduous. 
This hardship along with the fact that justices often heard a 
case twice if it were appealed to the Supreme Court, caused 
many of the early justices to resign.2 
John Jay, the first Chief Justice, resigned after six 
years to become governor of New York. Jay had so little regard 
for the position of Chief Justice that he had campaigned for 
the gubernatorial position while still serving on the Court. 
During his brief tenure as heard of the Court, Jay wrote only 
•*-The Supreme Court: Justice and the Law (2d ea.; 
Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1977), p. 7. 
2Ibid., p. 2. 
13 
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one opinion, and this decision was overruled by a constitu­
tional amendment.^ Jay's main contribution to the American 
constitutional system came as a result of his refusal to give 
President George Washington a written opinion on the law 
involved in a case which was in the courts.^ This refusal 
helped establish the separation of powers and discouraged 
Washington's tendency to treat the Chief Justice as a member 
of his administration.-* 
John Rutledge served as interim Chief Justice following 
Jay's retirement. Rutledge was the only man to serve an in­
terim term and then fail to get Congressional confirmation. 
Most Court scholars attribute this to the fact that there was 
some question about his sanity following the death of his wife. 
Rutledge, too, only wrote one opinion while serving as Chief 
Justice. 
Chief Justice Rutledge was followed by Oliver Ellsworth 
in 1796. During Ellsworth's term the Court began to establish 
its right to review government actions and judge their con­
formity with the provisions of the Constitution.^ Chief Justice 
Ellsworth, however, had no part in these cases.^ Ellsworth's 
^Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, II Ed. 440 (1793). 
^Kenneth B. Umbreit, Our Eleven Chief Justices, (Port 
Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1969), p. 43. 
5Ibid. 
^Walter Murphy and Herman Pritchett, Courts, Judges, and 
Politics, (New York: Random House, 1961), p 156. 
^Umbreit, p. 103. 
15 
work on the Judiciary Act had had far more influence on the 
development of the Court than had any decision he rendered 
while serving as Chief Justice.^ 
During the tenure of the first three Chief Justices, the 
Supreme Court had little power or influence. The Court was 
treated as a part of the administration by President George 
Washington, and the Chief Justice often felt that his position 
was far less desirable than that of a political office. Yet 
during this period the foundation was being laid for the 
review of legislative action. 
One of the most important contributions made by John Jay, 
the first Chief Justice, was his refusal of President John 
Adams' attempt to nominate hira to serve a second term as Chief 
Justice following the retirement of Chief Justice Ellsworth. 
This event was significant because it made possible the nomi­
nation of the man xvrho has generally been considered to be the 
greatest Chief Justice who ever served. 
Chief Justice John Marshall was the first Chief Justice 
to utilize fully the leadership potential of the position. 
Marshall has been given credit for making the judicial branch 
equal with the other branches of government.9 The most impor­
tant case decided during Chief Justice Marshall's tenure on 
the Court and one of the most important cases that has ever 
8Ibid., p. 101. 
^The Supreme Court: Justice and the Law, p. 7. 
16 
been decided by the Court was Marbury v. Madison (1803).^ 
Chief Justice Marshall wrote this opinion, as he did most of 
the decisions of the Court while he was Chief Justice, and 
reasoned that the Constitution, which the Supreme Court 
Justice takes an oath to support, was the supreme law of the 
land. The Chief Justice reasoned that it was the responsibil­
ity of the judiciary to interpret the law, and he concluded 
that the Supreme Court could not enforce a statute that the 
justices believed to be in violation of the provisions of the 
Constitution. With this decision the Court's right to rule 
on the constitutionality of legislation was established. In 
writing this opinion. Chief Justice Marshall not only estab­
lished the Court's claim to power and influence, but also 
demonstrated the leadership potential that was available to 
the Chief Justice. This potential had not been seen by his 
predecessors. 
In the very broadest of terms, Marbury v. Madison estab­
lished the Court's supremacy not only over judicial proceed­
ings, but also over the other political processes insofar as 
Constitutional questions were involved: 
. . . the Supreme Court is the authoritative 
interpreter of the Constitution; therefore, govern­
ment officials are oath-bound to obey Supreme Court 
interpretations of the.Constitution whenever they 
make policy decisions.11 
^Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). 
X1lbid., p. 157. 
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Chief Justice Marshall's claim that the Court had the 
right to rule on the constitutionality of legislation did not 
stand unchallenged. Justice Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, in referring to the right to constitutional reviews, 
stated: "... the grant of a power so extraordinary ought to 
appear so plain, that he who should run might read it."12 
There have been other critics of the Maybury v. Madison, 
most notably Presidents Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln. 
Yet, Chief Justice Marshall's opinion has withstood all 
attacks, and the Court has maintained its powers. Alexis de 
Tocqueville's 1835 observation that the Court has been 
"invested with immense political power" remains true today. 
Chief Justice Marshall was by birth a frontiersman. 
Coming to the Court at a time when the Chief Justice had been 
expected to act as though he were a member of the President's 
cabinet, this frontiersman nevertheless established the 
power and independence of the judiciary which neither the 
colonial aristocrats nor conservative New Englanders who pre­
ceded him had been able to do. 
Chief Justice Marshall dominated the Court as no other 
Chief Justice before or after: 
l^The Supreme Court: Justice and the Law, p. 7. 
l^Ibid., p. 7. 
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During the thirty-four years that Marshall pre­
sided over the Supreme Court his personal views can, 
except in a few relatively unimportant instances, be 
treated as equivalent to the views of the Court. No 
Chief Justice before or since has dominated his 
colleagues the way Marshall did.14 
This Chief Justice originated the practice of one justice, 
usually himself, giving the Court's opinion rather than each 
justice writing a separate opinion. Much to the displeasure 
of some of his associate justices, Marshall reserved the right 
to give the Court's opinion in the most important cases. This 
tradition extends to the present. 
Chief Justice Marshall successfully, at least for his 
time, handled a delicate problem in the Court's ability to 
make constitutional interpretations. 
As Justice Robert Jackson was to observe in 
1952, the materials of constitutional interpreta­
tion are often "as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph 
was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh." The 
declaratory theory of the judicial function obscures 
the fact that constitutional interpretation necessar­
ily involves a highly personalized choice among con­
flicting public policies, . . . Marshall did not 
hesitate to embrace this concept of the judge as 
devoid of will, operating only as a competent and 
disinterested technical expert in matters constitu­
tional . 
Just as the myth that judges in private law 
disputes only "find" law was a price that had to be 
paid to keep individuals from resorting to violence 
so the myth of the judge as the neutral expert who 
decides policy disputes by reference to a trans­
cendent - and inscrutable - body of law was necessary 
to hold together the intricate patterns of government 
organization which had been woven into the tapestry 
of the American Constitution.15 
l^Umbreit, p. 169. 
l^Murphy and Pritchett, p. 158. 
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No one questioned how the Court made its judgments dur­
ing the early years of the Republic. The myth that courts 
were able to eliminate all prejudice and external influence 
as they ruled on a case was created. Since that time a num­
ber of justices have spoken about the process of judicial 
decision making, and this myth has been questioned. 
Chief Justice Marshall changed the role of the Supreme 
Court and that of the Chief Justice. The impact of his 
influence upon the function of the Court and its Chief Justice 
has been felt from the time he served to the present. This 
influence extended even into the area of education, as he was 
responsible for writing the opinion in the first case dealing 
with education. Dartmouth v. Woodward (1819).^ This case 
served as a precedent and has been used to justify the Court's 
involvement in education even though the federal Constitution 
makes no mention of education (See Chapter I, p. 2). 
Many people felt that the Court, as it had developed, 
could not survive Chief Justice Marshall's death.^ The task 
of following Chief Justice Marshall was, therefore, ominous. 
^The Supreme Court: Views from Inside, (New York: W.W. 
Norton Company, 195b). 
^Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton (U.S.) 518 
(1819). 
^Umbreit, p. 199. 
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Chief Justice Roger Taney was a conservative who wanted 
to preserve the social system into which he had been born.^ 
He had served as a state senator in his native Maryland and 
Attorney-General of both Maryland and the United States. 
Chief Justice Taney's entire reputation rested for many years 
on the opinion he had written in one case. In Dred Scott v. 
Sanford (1857)20 the Chief Justice had insisted that a slave 
is property; therefore, the Congress could not pass a law 
which deprived any citizen of property. "This opinion was 
not accepted by the general public outside of the South, and 
it served to show how Chief Justice Taney was out of touch 
with public opinion.The reputation of both the Court and 
Chief Justice Taney suffered greatly as a result of the Dred 
Scott decision. Yet the "right of property concept" which is 
part of the Dred Scott decision became the Court's dominant 
issue until well into the next century.22 
Chief Justice Taney's actions in the Dred Scott case 
seem to reveal some of his weaknesses as Chief Justice. Chief 
Justice Marshall always took care to see that he did not 
arouse public resentment. D Chief Justice Taney in failing 
to follow this practice weakened the Court and himself: 
l^Ibid., p. 241. 
2^Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393, 15 L.Ed. 691 (1857). 
2^-Umbreit, p. 241. 
22The Supreme Court: Justice and the Law, p. 7. 
23uinbreit, p. 241. 
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Taney forgot that the power which the Court 
wielded rested on an almost purely moral basis and 
it was his forgetfulness here which was responsible 
for his impotence when he attempted to uphold the 
Bill of Rights during the storm of civil war. Ke 
must take the full responsibility for the mistake. 
It is peculiarily the type of responsibility which 
belongs to the head of the Court. 
History has taken a more favorable view of Chief Justice 
Taney than his contemporaries did, and his Dred Scott opinion 
has not kept him from being ranked as a great justice.25 
Following his death in 1864 Chief Justice Taney was re­
placed by Salmon P. Chase. Chief Justice Chase believed that 
he was destined to govern. 
His desire to govern cannot be described as 
vanity; it was far deeper than that. It was an 
intense egotism, a confirmed conviction that there 
was nobody in the country who was quite his equal 
as a statesman, a conviction which preyed on him 
to such an extent that it made much of his life 
unhappy.2° 
The reputation that this Chief Justice developed as an 
efficient administrator was matched by his physical appearance. 
Lincoln once remarked that "Chase is about 
one and a half times bigger than any other mati 
that I ever knew." It was more than height and 
bulk that made even his physical appearance con­
spicuous. He "was one of those few men," said 
one who knew him well, "who, even in crowds, attracted 
general observation."27 
24Ibid. 
^^Albert Blaustein and Roy Mersky, The First One Hundred 
Justices, (Hamden, Connecticut: Archer Books'] 19*78) , p. 37. 
26umbreit, p. 241. 
27lbid., p. 250. 
Chief Justice Chase, ill spite of his physical and mental 
prowess, never became a strong leadership force on the Court. 
"No one ever doubted his ability, but no one ever became 
enthusiastic about it. He was too competent. lie struck 
people not as a great political leader, but as an incomparably 
efficient machine."28 
The record of the Chase Court shows that the Chief Justice 
could often be found in the minority. He seemed to have had 
very little influence with his colleagues.29 in view of his 
strength of character and talent for administration, it might 
seem strange that the Chief Justice was not able to gain the 
influence over his colleagues that some of his predecessors 
had. However, most seem to think this inability was a result 
of his vanity and the fact that he could not persuade people 
that he had given up politics. 
The lack of control on the part of Chief Justice Chase 
may be seen in the Greenback Case.30 This case concerned the 
issue of using paper currency as legal tender for debts. 
President Grant was in favor of the Congressional Act because 
it would allow the railroads to pay their debts in currency 
rather than gold. After the Court ruled 4-3 that the Act was 
unconstitutional, the President appointed two justices to fill 
28ibid. 
^^ibid., p. 283. 
^Hejpburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 8 Wall 603. 
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existing vacancies, and the case was reopened with the earlier 
decision being reversed 5-4, Chief Justice Chase reacted to 
this action by saying, "The re-opening of the case was a 
serious mistake and the overuling in such a short time, and 
by one vote, of the previous decision, shook popular confi­
dence in the Court."31 
Chief Justice Chase was followed in 1874 by Morrison 
Remick Waite. Chief Justice Waite headed the Court during a 
period when it functioned with general satisfaction. This 
condition has caused some to call Chief Justice Waite inferior, 
while others have pointed to it as an indication of his 
greatness.^2 
Chief Justice Waite is not known for his domination of 
the Court in the style of Marshall. His strength could be 
found more in the social skills he was able to use in order 
to win the personal friendship of those with whom he came into 
contact.33 
In part, Waite's failure to gain a great 
reputation is due to the fact that the Court 
functioned too successfully during his term of 
office. Institutions which function competently, 
efficiently, and quietly do not often attract the 
public eye.34 
3lThe Supreme Court: Justice and the Law, p. 21. 
32umbreit, p. 295. 
33umbreit, p. 297. 
34Ibid., p. 300. 
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Some indication of Chief Justice Waite's social skills 
may be gained from reviewing the events which took place as 
he assumed the leadership of the Court. After the death of 
Chief Justice Chase, the associate justices each campaigned to 
get the nomination from President Grant. The President had 
had a great deal of trouble getting confirmation of a nominee, 
and Morrison R. Waite had been his fourth recommendation. 
Though the Chief Justice had a successful professional lav? 
record, there were many other lawyers in the country with a 
greater practice. This situation caused some resentment on 
the part of the other justices, and Chief Justice Waite found 
their reception to be rather cold. 
The day the new Chief Justice took his seat 
he came, after the adjournment of the Court, to 
the office of General Cowen, the Acting Secretary 
of the Interior, a fellow Ohioai and an old friend, 
who had been one of the most active in suggesting 
his nomination to the President. Waite was ob­
viously much upset and, after considerable hesita­
tion, stated the reason. "Those fellows up there," 
he said, jerking his head in the direction of the 
courtroom, "want to treat me as an interloper. I 
was met today by the senior Associate Justice, who 
has been presiding since the vacancy, with the 
suggestion that, as I am a stranger to the Court 
and its methods, I would better allow him to contin­
ue to preside for a time until I learn the forma­
lities of the Court. Now, I do not want to be 
considered unamiable or unreasonable, but before I 
act, I want your opinion, as a friend, as to what 
I shall do under the circumstances."35 
In spite of his initial difficulties with the Associate 
Justices, the new Chief Justice soon established his position 
35umbreit, p. 316. 
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as the head of the Court. The Waite. Court was no easy court 
to lead. Each of the Associate Justices had been appointed 
at an advanced age, and all had distinguished themselves in 
their own communities. This made Chief Justice Waite1s job 
all the more difficult.36 
Melville Weston Fuller became Chief Justice in 1888. He 
was the first Chief Justice who was a physically small man. 
Chief Justice Fuller used his social leadership skills well. 
He is said to have been one of the Court's most outstanding 
presiding officers.37 The way in which Chief Justice Fuller 
handled the disagreements and social operations of the Court 
seems to have been his greatest strength as its leader , for 
he was not known for his intellectual prowess. On many 
occasions he exercised his skills to keep the Court from 
exploding.38 
One of these situations occurred during the deliberations 
over the Fong Yue Ting v. United States (1893) case.39 in 
this case Justice Horace Gray wrote the opinion for the 
majority; however, after reading the dissent written by Justice 
Stephen Field, he changed the wording of his majority opinion. 
36ibid., p. 317. 
37Glendon Schubert, Ed., Judicial Behavior: A Reader 
in Theory and Research (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 
T9"64) , p. 171. 
38Ibid. 
39Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
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This action upset Justice Field greatly, and he appealed to 
the Chief Justice to restore the original wording. Chief 
Justice Fuller was able to persuade Justice Gray to concede, 
and the incident was resolved.40 
Another example of Chief Justice Fuller's social leader­
ship skills may be found in the situation that developed 
between Justice Oliver W. Holmes and Justice John M. Harlan 
during the discussion of a case. Custome required that the 
justices not interrupt when one of their colleagues was stat­
ing his opinion on a case. However, Justice Holmes interrupted 
Justice I-Iarlan's statement of his views with a caustic, "That 
won't wash!" This interruption brought a flush of anger to 
Justice Harlan's face. Chief Justice Fuller quickly added, 
"But I keep scrubbing away, scrubbing away," using his hands 
as if rubbing clothing on a washboard. The justices all broke 
into laughter, and the discussion continued without a bitter 
verbal battle.^ 
In spite of his social leadership skills, Chief Justice 
Fuller is ranked as only an average justice.̂  After his death 
Justice Holmes made a statement that indicates the degree to 
which Chief Justice Fuller failed to provide the kind of leader­
ship other Chief Justices had provided. 
^Schubert, p. 407. 
41Ibid., p. 397. 
^^Blaustein and Mersky, p. 39. 
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"Of course," wrote Justice Holmes immediately 
after Fuller's death, "the position of the Chief 
Justice differs from that of the other judges only 
on the administrative side." The "of course" 
indicates the degree in which Fuller fell short of 
his predecessors. Holmes' statement was technically 
true of any of the Chief Justices but practically 
Fuller was the first one of whom it was true. The 
prestige which goes with the headship of the Court 
is such as to give the Chief Justice a great advan­
tage in the struggle of ideas which takes place in 
the conference room. Fuller's difficulty was a lack 
of ideas for which to struggle.4 3 
Edward Douglas White was appointed Chief Justice in 1910 
after having served as an associate justice since 1894. It 
is said that Chief Justice White looked so much like a Chief 
Justice that even if he had known no law, he should have been 
given the position.44 
The new Chief Justice, like Chief Justice Fuller, excelled 
in the role of social leader of the Court. When the judges 
donned their gowns in the robing room, the Chief Justice would 
step to the center of the room and greet each of the associ­
ate justices in order of seniority.45 Chief Justice Fuller 
was known for his ability to control flare-ups in conference. 
This was accomplished by turning the discussion at the proper 
moment.46 
William Howard Taft followed Chief Justice White as head 
of the Court in 1921. The new Chief Justice had appointed the 
43umbreit, p. 343. 
44-ibid., p. 366. 
45lbid., p. 384. 
^^schubert, p. 171. 
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old Chief Justice to his position as well as five of the 
associate justices during the time that he was President of 
the United States. 
Chief Justice Taft also excelled as social leader of the 
Court and was a strong advocate of teamwork as the means by 
which the Court should fulfill its responsibilities. He 
initiated the practice of calling several of the justices 
together at his home on Sunday afternoon for the purpose of 
discussing some of the most difficult cases in order to pre­
sent a unified front.^ 
Chief Justice Taft recognized his intellectual limita­
tions as is shown by his comment to his son in 1925. "I find 
myself constantly exposed to the humiliation of not discover­
ing things in cases, especially in matters of jurisdiction 
which are very intricate and most exasperating."48 
The Chief Justice overcame this handicap by asking Justice 
Willis Van Devanter to look over his uncirculated opinions and 
make suggestions. This practice along with the use of the 
social skills he already possessed made Chief Justice Taft an 
effective leader of the Court: 
47ibid., p. 413. 
48ibid., p. 396. 
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The Chief Justice, as Taft once wrote, is 
the head of the Court, and while his vote counts 
but one in the nine, he is, if he be a man of 
strong and persuasive personality, abiding con­
victions, recognized by bearing and statesman­
shiplike foresight, expected to promote teamwork 
by the Court, so as to give weight and solidity 
to its opinions.49 
The best indication of the degree of success that Chief 
Justice Taft enjoyed as a leader of the Court can be found in 
the letter he received from his former associates shortly 
before his death: 
Dear Chief Justice: 
We call you Chief Justice still, for we cannot 
quickly give up the title by which we have known you 
for all these later years and which you have made so 
dear to us. We cannot let you leave us without try­
ing to tell you how dear you have made it. You came 
to us from achievements in other fields, and with the 
prestige of the illustrious place that you lately had 
held, and you showed in a new form your voluminous 
capacity for work and for getting work done, your 
humor that smoothed the rough places, your golden 
heart that has brought you love from every side, and, 
most of all, from your brethren whose tasks you have 
made happy and light. We grieve at your illness, but 
your spirit has given life an impulse that will abide 
whether you are with us or are away. 
Affectionately yours, 
Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Willis Van Devanter 
J. C. McReynolds 
Louis D. Brandeis 
Geo. Sutherland 
Pierce Butler 
Edward T. Sanford 
Harlan F. Stone^O 
49schubert, p. 397. 
SOumbreit, pp. 449-450. 
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The next man to serve as Chief Justice, Charles Evans 
Hughes, had served as an associate justice from 1910 to 1916, 
having resigned to run for the office of President of the 
United States. He came to the Court as Chief Justice in 1930. 
There is a distinct difference to be found 
between his opinions as Chief Justice and as 
Associate Justice. In his first career on the 
bench his opinions sometimes showed a tendency 
to be prolix and dull. His opinions as Chief 
Justice have lost their lawyerlike regard for 
the precedents, but there is a new element: an 
occasional vigorous and pointed sentence illumi­
nating the cloistered atmosphere of the Court 
like a flash of lightning.51 
Chief Justice Hughes excelled as the Court's task leader 
and is said to have been the master of the conference. This 
Chief Justice was able to comprehend the details of hundreds 
of cases which enabled the Court to dispose of its business 
quickly.52 chief Justice Hughes was the dominant force in 
the conference.53 
The Chief Justice presides in open court and 
more importantly at the conference. He is then 
given an opportunity to exercise task leadership 
by stating his views first on cases and, as Hughes 
usually did, selecting the issues to be discussed.54 
Chief Justice Hughes registered only 23 dissents in the 
1,382 cases decided by the full court during his first nine 
Sllbid., pp. 497-498. 
52schubert, p. 230. 
53Ibid., p. 397. 
54Ibid. 
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years as Chief Justice. ̂ 5 Discussions that threatened to get 
out of hand were controlled by the Chief Justice's comment, 
"Brethren, the only way to settle this is to vote."56 Chief 
Justice Hughes is rated as a great justice, but he was not 
able to keep his Court from strike and anger over the human 
rights issues which were beginning to reach the Court in large 
numbers during his tenure:^7 
Hughes exploited his authority with superb 
skill, yet he could not prevent his colleagues 
from splintering into angry factions, or keep 
his Court from engaging in a wasted and almost 
suicidal war against the twentieth century. 
Chief Justice Hughes was followed in 1941 by Harlan F. 
Stone who is probably the least effective leader the Court has 
ever had. 
. . . the Chief Justices serving in the 
period 1888-1958 were (with the exception of 
Stone) men of strong personality and first rate 
abilities who exerted steady and effective 
influence on those who served with them.59 
The Court that Chief Justice Stone headed was frequently 
divided and the most quarrelsome in history.^ This fact 
reveals the lack of leadership which the Court experienced 
S^ibid., p. 409. 
56Ibid., p. 397. 
57Ibid., p. 398. 
58Ibid, p. 37. 
59ibid.f p. 171. 
60Ibid., p. 171. 
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under him. Chief Justice Taft had realized Justice Stone's 
lack of leadership abilities in 1929 when he asserted that 
he was not a leader and would have trouble uniting the 
Court.61 
The conferences which had lasted four hours under Chief 
Justice Hughes now lasted up to four days. Chief Justice 
Stone was accused of having his clerks prepare his statements 
for the conference. The associate justices could tell which 
clerk had prepared the statement by the length of time Stone 
took to state the case.62 
He (Stone) came to a Court characterized by 
efficiency and a high level of unanimity developed 
under Hughes' dominant leadership. But, almost 
immediately the Court began to deteriorate and was 
much more frequently divided than before." 
Chief Justice Stone adopted a style much different from 
that of Chief Justice Hughes. While still an associate jus­
tice, Stone had been frustrated by Chief Justice Hughes's 
methods. Chief Justice Stone refused to cut off discussions 
as the previous Chief Justice had done, and he even joined in 
angry wrangling with his associates, something his predecessor 
would have considered beneath his station. The Court under 
Justice Hughes had come to expect the Chief Justice to act as 
61Ibid. 
62Ibid. 
63Ibid., p. 172. 
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both task and social leader. Chief Justice Stone gave them 
neither. 
After serving on the Stone Court, the associate justices 
probably came to expect a different kind of leadership from 
that which they had received from Chief Justice Hughes.64 It 
seems logical to assume that this would have prevented Chief 
Justice Fred M. Vinson from exerting the same kind of leader­
ship that Chief Justice Hughes had exerted even if he had had 
the social charm and intellectual abilities to be such a 
leader. 
Chief Justice Vinson served from 1946 to 1953. During 
this period the Court was continually asked to review civil 
rights cases. Though gains were made by desegregationists in 
graduate schools, the Vinson Court had a generally conserva­
tive civil liberties record. The accounts of the deliberations 
on the Brown case as it was being argued while Chief Justice 
Vinson headed the Court indicate that the Court and the Chief 
Justice favored continuing segregation.*^ 
The Brown case was one of the most significant decisions 
in the area of education that the Court has delivered. The 
way in which Chief Justice Vinson handled this case gives some 
insights into his judicial philosophy. On December 13, 1952, 
64lbid., p. 398. 
65Brown v. Board, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Chief Justice Vinson stated his views on the Erown case in 
conference. He noted that schools had been segregated in 
1868 in the District of Colxombia when the Fourteenth Amend­
ment had been adopted. Further, he called the justices' 
attention to the fact that Congress had declined to pass a 
statute barring racial segregation in schools. In consider­
ing Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, he noted 
that he was careful to avoid any reference to public schools.66 
This seems to indicate that the Chief Justice upheld the 
validity of segregation.67 At this time in the deliberations 
of the Brown case, Court observers noted that the Chief Justice 
was joined by four of his associates in favoring affirmation of 
the lower courts verdict in allowing segregation.6® 
Chief Justice Vinson is another of the Chief Justices who 
used social leadership skills to compensate for weakness in 
other areas. This Chief Justice is reported to have been weak 
in technical ability but likeable and diplomatic.69 The Court 
he inherited from Chief Justice Stone was badly in need of 
leadership that would ease the excess tension. The new Chief 
Justice was able to use his social skills to do that. Chief 
Justice Vinson, however, was rated a failure.70 Any judgment 
^Murphy and Pritchett, p. 505. 
67Ibid. 
68Ibid. 
69schubert, p. 171. 
70Blaustein and Mersky, p. 40. 
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on this Chief Justice should be tempered by an awareness that 
his predecessor had destroyed any aura of legitimacy surround­
ing the Chief Justice's position as leader of the Court.71 
Chief Justice Vinson died September 8, 1953, and was 
replaced by Earl Warren on October 5, 1953. Beginning with 
the Brown case, Chief Justice Warren served as leader of the 
Court during a time when more cases came before the Court con­
cerning education than had ever been heard before. His influ­
ence on the Court was immediate as is shown by his impact on 
the Brown decision, which had already been argued before he 
arrived. 
As was noted earlier, Chief Justice Warren inherited a 
Court that was badly divided over the segregation issue. As 
of December 13, 1952, the associate justices were split down 
the middle with four favoring approval of segregation and 
four favoring ruling it unconstitutional. In conference fol­
lowing the second argument in the Brown case, the new Chief 
Justice, suppressing any caution which might have been expected 
from someone lacking prior experience on the bench, stated that 
the Court must decide whether segregation was allowable in 
public schools. Ke concluded that segregation must be 
prohibited. 
71-Schubert, p. 398. 
7%urphy and Pritchett, p. 506. 
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Upon reflection Warren's opening statement 
was a masterly one. It condemned no one; it was 
unemotional; it recognized differences among the 
states and in conditions relevant to the problem; 
it suggested tolerance in disposing of the matter; 
it referred humbly to the need for wisdom. Thus 
it projected a reasonable and concerned man with 
malice toward none - a judge faced with a case to 
decide whatever the impediments. At the same time 
one must be struck by the firmness with which 
Warren asserted at the outset that he was prepared 
and that the Court was obliged to bar consciously 
segregated public schools. Given the uncertainties 
with which some of the other justices were plagued 
at this time, strong leadership on the question was 
undoubtedly a key factor in the ultimate solution.73 
Chief Justice Warren, beginning with the justices' split, 
worked to get the Court behind a unified position. He real­
ized the importance of a unanimous decision in this case 
because of the emotional reaction which could be expected 
from the public: 
The unanimous opinion in the case must, of 
course, be attributed to Warren. Though he was 
reported as saying in 1S68, "Well, gee, the Chief 
Justice doesn't write all of the important decisions," 
he did assign the segregation cases to himself and 
worked for unanimity from the start. Since we know 
he did not inherit a unanimous Court, it is probably 
correct to credit him with achieving the full agree­
ment that ultimately prevailed. There is no hard and 
fast rule by which we can evaluate the significance 
of unanimity in these cases, though one supposes 
that the unanimity of the Court enhanced the 
acceptability of the decision.74 
Following the Brown decision, Chief Justice Warren used 
his leadership to guide the Court into a period in which civil 
rights claims drew a major part of the Court's attention. In 
73Ibid. 
74Ibid., p. 510. 
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a series of rulings the Court adopted rules protecting the 
criminal defendant and suspect from the admission of impro­
perly seized evidence at the trial,75 denial of the right to 
have counsel,76 and confessions given without being informed 
of rights:77 
The Warren Court's civil liberties record, 
reinforced by its easing access to the courts for 
those wishing to challenge government action, led 
to a considerable dependence on the federal courts. 
Groups increasingly turned initially to the courts 
for redress of their grievances, particularly 
against state and local officials, instead of using 
those courts as a last resort. This gave pause to 
the Court's observers, including some who supported 
its decisions. They wondered whether reliance on 
the courts might lead to atrophy of the legislative 
process, central to a democratic political system.7° 
The last case heard by the Warren Court, Powell v. 
McCormack (1969), was a case which had been accepted on appeal 
from the court of Judge Warren Burger. The Warren Court over­
turned the verdict of Judge Burger. Following the appointment 
of Chief Justice Burger, many pointed to this as an indication 
of the coming change in the Court.79 
7^Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
^Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
^Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
7^Stephen L. Wasby, The Supreme Court in the Federal 
Judicial System, (San Francisco: Holt, RineEart and Winston, 
1973), p. 7. 
79Henry Abraham, Justices and Presidents, (New York: 
Oxford Press, 1974), p~ 239. 
38 
TABLE I 
CHIEF JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 
Chief Justice 
John Jay 
John Rutledge 
Oliver Ellsworth 
John Marshall 
Roger Taney 
Salmon Chase 
Morrison Waite 
Melville Fuller 
Edward White 
William Taft 
Charles Hughes 
Harlan Stone 
Fred Vinson 
Earl Warren 
Warren Burger 
Term 
1789 - 1795 
1795 
1796 - 1799 
1801 - 1835 
1836 - 1864 
1864 - 1873 
1874 - 1888 
1888 - 1910 
1910 - 1921 
1921 - 1930 
1930 - 1941 
1941 - 1946 
1946 - 1953 
1953 - 1969 
1969 -
Nominated By 
George Washington 
George Washington 
George Washington 
John Adams 
Andrew Jackson 
Abraham Lincoln 
U. S. Grant 
Grover Cleveland 
William Taft 
Warren Harding 
Hurbert Hoover 
F. D. Roosevelt 
Harry Truman 
Dwight Eisenhower 
Richard Nixon 
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TABLE II 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF OPINIONS PER CHIEF JUSTICE 
PER TERM 
Con­
curring Dissenting 
Majority Con- No Ro 
Name Opinions' curring Opinion Dissenting Opinion 
John Jay .20 -
John Rutledge - -
Oliver Ellsworth 2.00 - - - -
John Marshall 14.91 - - .15 -
Roger Taney 9.29 .25 .11 . 46 .61 
Salmon Chase 16.75 .25 .13 1.00 3.75 
Morrison Waite 62.29 .14 .36 1.71 2.00 
Melville Fuller 35.71 .05 .38 1.52 4.81 
Edward White 30.50 .20 .80 .50 4.40 
William Taft 31.88 .13 - .25 2.13 
Charles Hughes 22.82 .18 .82 1.00 3.82 
Harlan Stone 19.20 2.00 2.40 7.00 11.40 
Fred Vinson 10.86 - 1.29 1.71 7.86 
Earl Warren 10.31 .69 .63 2.94 .81 
Warren Burger 13.25 7.25 5.25 8.75 4.75 
Source; 
Albert P. Blaustein and Roy M. Mersky, The First One 
Hundred Justices (Hamden , Connecticut: Archer Books, 1978) 
PP. 147-9: 
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Chief Justice Warren Earl Burger 
In his speech designating Judge Warren E. Burger as the 
successor to retiring Chief Justice Warren, President Richard 
Nixon, said, "our Chief Justices have probably had more pro­
found and lasting influence on their times and on the direction 
of the nation than most Presidents."80 With this statement the 
President indicated his feelings about the importance of the 
position to which he was appointing this judge from the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 
The activism and support of human rights for which the 
Warren Court was known had drawn a great deal of criticism. 
Most notably, Richard Nixon was a critic of the Warren Court 
rulings, especially those that extended the rights of persons 
suspected of having committed a crime and the rulings that 
initiated the busing of public school students to achieve 
racial integration.81 Following the Brown decision, President 
Dwight Eisenhower is reported to have said that appointing 
Chief Justice Warren was the "worst damnfool mistake X ever 
made."82 Senator Sam J. Ervin, Democrat from North Carolina 
and a constitutional scholar, accused the Warren Court of 
^Charles Moritz, ed., Current Biography, (New York: 
Wilson Company, 1969), p. 61. 
8^-Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
8^The Supreme Court: Justice and the Law, p. 8. 
41 
revising the Constitution while professing to interpret it.**3 
An "impeach Earl Warred' movement developed but never resulted 
in impeachment. This situation had a great impact upon Presi­
dent Nixon as he began the process of selecting a man to 
replace the person that he felt had been influential in Court 
rulings which were contrary to his philosophical position. 
Warren Earl Burger, who was of Swiss-German Protestant 
background, was born on September 17, 1907, in St. Paul, 
Minnesota, the fourth of seven children. His father was a 
railroad cargo inspector who also worked as a traveling sales­
man. At the age of nine Warren Burger began delivering news­
papers to help with the family finances, and he acquired a 
taste for the rags-to-riches stories of Eoratio Alger. At 
John A. Johnson High School in St. Paul, the future Chief 
Justice participated in athletics and student government, and 
he was a good, but not outstanding, student. Burger declined 
a scholarship to Princeton University because the stipend was 
too small. Instead, Burger took extension courses at the 
University of Minnesota from 1925-1927 and then entered St. 
Paul College of Law, graduating third in his class in 1931. 
While attending law school, he earned his living as a salesman 
with the Mutual Life Insurance Company. 
83Ibid. 
84 
Moritz, ed., Current Biography, p. 62. 
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Following his admission to the Minnesota bar in 1931, the 
future Chief Justice joined the firm of Boyesen, Otis, and 
Faricy as an associate. In 1935 he became a partner in the 
firm of Faricy, Burger, Moore, and Costello and was a capable 
lawyer until 1953. He also served as a member of the faculty 
at St. Paul College of Law, his alma mater, from 1931 to 
1953.85 
Kis interest in the postwar civil rights 
struggle led to his appointment to the Governor's 
Interracial Commission, of which he was a member 
from 1948 to 1953. As the first president of the 
St. Paul Council on Human Relations, he became 
responsible for hiring experts to improve relations 
between the police and the city's Negro and Mexican-
American minorities.86 
The future Chief Justice was a lifelong Republican, and 
helped to organize the Young Republicans in Minnesota in 1934. 
In 1948 he was floor manager for Harold Stassen's campaign for 
the Presidential nomination at the Republican National Conven­
tion to Philadelphia. In 1952 he was again manager of Stassen's 
campaign, but threw his support to Dwight D. Eisehnower thus 
helping to ensure the general's nomination on the first 
ballot.87 
In 1953 President Eisenhower appointed Warren Burger 
assistant attorney general in charge of the Civil Division of 
the Department of Justice. While serving on the Attorney 
General's staff, he agreed to handle a controversial case for 
85Ibid. 
86Ibid. 
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the government. John Peters was a Yale professor who had 
been dismissed from his position as a part-time consultant 
to the United States Public Health Service. He appealed the 
dismissal to the Supreme Court, contending that he had been 
denied the right to face his accuser. The case fell to the 
future Chief Justice when Simon Sobeloff, the Solicitor Gen­
eral, refused to handle the case for the government because 
he felt Peters' constitutional rights had been violated. By 
handling the case, Assistant Attorney General Burger drew 
op 
criticism from some liberals.00 
In April of 1956 Assistant Attorney General Burger was 
sworn into the office of Judge of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: 
Burger's confirmation was delayed for several 
months, because of unsubstantiated charges of pre­
judice made against him at the Senate Judiciary 
Committee hearings by three former employees of 
the Civil Division, whom he had dismissed for in­
competence. He was sworn into office on April 13, 
1956. 
During the thirteen years on the Court of 
Appeals, Burger became known as a conservative, 
especially in cases involving criminal justice, 
and his views in that area often clashed with 
those of his liberal colleagues on the court, and 
with opinions handed down by the Supreme Court.89 
It was during his term on the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia that Judge Burger established the 
88ibid., p. 63. 
89ibid. 
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reputation that attracted the interest of President Nixon. 
Judge Burger's philosophy was revealed in his speech at Ripon 
College in 1967. 
Governments exist chiefly to foster the 
rights and interests of their citizens - to 
protect their homes and property, and their 
persons and their lives. If a government fails 
in this basic duty, it is not redeemed by pro­
viding even the most perfect system for the 
protection of the rights of defendants in the 
criminal courts.90 
Judge Burger was critical of the Supreme Court decisions 
in which the rights of persons accused of a crime were 
expanded.^ In a dissenting opinion delivered in March of 
1969, Judge Burger wrote: 
The seeming anxiety of judges to protect 
every accused person from every consequence of 
his voluntary utterances is giving rise to myriad 
rules, sub-rules, variations, and exceptions, 
which even the most sophisticated lawyers and 
judges are taxed to follow .... Guilt or 
innocence becomes irrelevant in the criminal 
trial as we flounder in a morass of articifial 
rules poorly conceived and often impossible of 
application.92 
This attitude, as expressed in the Judge's speeches and 
opinions from the bench, seemed to match nicely with those of 
President Nixon. For this reason Judge Burger found himself 
being considered for the position of Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 
90james F. Simon, In His Own Image (New York: David 
McKay Company, 1973), p. 75T 
91 
Moritz, p. 63. 
92Ibid. 
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Yet, the future Chief Justice, in spite of his hard line 
on human rights in criminal matters, seemed to be an advocate 
of minority rights. In addition to his work back in St. Paul 
to end abusive treatment by city police of minority groups, 
he ruled in favor of minorities in cases before his bench. 
Most notable is a case which came before the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia in which a Jackson, Mississippi, 
television station, WLBT, was charged, with deliberate racial 
discrimination in its broadcasting policy. This came before 
his court twice and on each occasion Judge Burger ruled in 
favor of the plaintiff and against the government. This action 
was contrary to his usual tendency of siding with the govern­
ment in cases which came before his court. 
Judge Burger owed his conservative label to his rulings 
in criminal cases and to his adherence to the law and order 
theme in his lectures outside the courtroom. 
Warren's concern for the defendant, often at 
the expense of the government, branded the chief 
justice as a judicial liberal. On the other hand, 
Warren Burger's often articulated interest in 
society's rights, as opposed to the criminal sus-
pect's, made him known as a judicial conservative. J 
One of Judge Burger's dominant goals during the time that 
he served on the Court of Appeals was to get the United States 
criminal justice system back on track. This obsession con­
tinued when Judge Burger became Chief Justice Burger. To get 
^^Simon, p. 83 . 
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the criminal justice system back on track, he called for the 
courts to remember that the system exists for the purpose of 
Q A 
protecting society from criminal behavior.'1 In order to 
effect the changes that would be necessary to accomplish this 
goal, Judge Burger recommended that the criminal justice sys­
tem in the United States be modified to emulate as closely as 
possible the system being used in the Scandinavian countries. 
This system spends very little time on the trial of criminals 
and a great deal of time and money on their rehabilitation. 
This goal was carried over into his work as Chief Justice. In 
speeches to the American Bar Association and in efforts to per­
suade Congress to establish a court of appeals beneath the 
Supreme Court, he continued this effort. 
Following his appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States on June 24, 1969, the new Chief 
Justice found a mixed reception from the media. The conserva­
tive U.S. News and World Report ran an article entitled, "Judge 
Burger: Champion of Law and Order," while the more liberal 
publication Nation stated, "We pray he will not be as inade­
quate as his record seems to predict."96 Time magazine quoted 
civil rights lawyer Anthony Amsterdam in calling the new Chief 
Justice "a fine judge" and an "enlightened law-and-order man."97 
94Ibid. 
9̂ Ibid., p. 84. 
96Ibid., p. 92. 
97 
Moritz, p. 63, 
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Shortly after being confirmed, the new Chief Justice 
served notice that his fight for administrative reform of the 
judicial system would be continued. Chief Justice Warren had 
shown very little interest in the administration of the federal 
judiciary.98 Former Chief Justice Taft, however, had dedicated 
himself to the reform of an antiquated court system and is con­
sidered by some to be one of the greatest of Chief Justices, 
not because of his opinions, but because of the influence he 
had in getting the Judges' Bill of 1925 enacted.99 chief 
Justice Burger wasted little time in letting it be known that 
he, like Taft, would place a very high priority on the reform 
of the judiciary. In August of 1969 in an address to the 
American Bar Association, the new Chief Justice called for a 
sweeping program for reform of Court administration, legal 
education, and the correctional system. 
The December 14, 1970, issue of U.S. News and World Report 
printed an interview with Chief Justice Burger which dealt with 
his philosophy and ideas as Chief Justice. When asked if the 
new judicial system that he was proposing might limit a per­
son's right to appeal, he responded, "I suppose, when you talk 
about finality, that must carry with it a limit somewhere -
^Simon, pp. 92-93. 
"ibid., p. 93. 
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that there is a point at which proceedings of all kinds are 
terminated."100 He carried this idea further, saying: 
There is a curious paradox relating back to 
your opening question: In spite of what seems to 
be a lessening of esteem for the courts, there is 
an attitude that the courts should resolve all 
problems. But that is not realistic: courts can 
serve only a limited function, and it should not 
be broadened any more than is absolutely necessary. O-1-
The Chief Justice had supported efforts to form a new 
court which would be a court of appeals between the Supreme 
Court and the courts of appeals. This court of appeals would 
deny some review, decide some cases itself, and send on others 
to the Court.̂ -02 sUch a plan was rejected by Chief Justice 
Warren who felt that the Supreme Court was not being over­
worked. Yet the record shows the number of cases appealed to 
and reviewed by the Court has increased at a rapid pace during 
the last twenty years. 
Chief Justice Burger's attitude that the courts should 
not be used to remedy every social evil has had an effect on 
the human rights movement in the schools. 
100"Interview with Chief Justice Warren E. Burger," U.S. 
News and World Report, December 14, 1970, p. 35. 
lOlibid. 
102The Supreme Court: Justice and the Law, p. 32. 
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Chief Justice Burger spoke out often to 
express his concern about the growing workload 
of federal courts. These two elements coalesced 
in a long line of rulings that dismissed the 
arguments of prisoners, environmentalists, tax­
payers, and consumers by stating simply that 
they did not have a federal case.1^3 
This attitude along with the idea that the National 
Court of Appeals should be established has led some to the 
conclusion that the civil liberties cause will no longer be 
heard by the Court. 
Besides the workload criticism, the Freund 
Committee's proposal would create the problem of 
the National Court of Appeals depriving many 
litigants of recourse to the Supreme Court as 
the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution. Symbol­
ically, this could cause harm to the role of the 
Supreme Court while concretely depriving the Court 
of control over its docket. Former Justice Arthur 
Goldberg has expressed doubt that many of the key 
civil liberties cases like Brown v. Board of 
Education would have reached the Supreme CourfnA 
under the proposed National Court of Appeals.10̂  
As noted earlier, education was not mentioned in the 
federal Constitution and was therefore considered to be, as 
the Tenth Amendment provides, among those rights reserved by 
the states and the individual citizens. With education being 
an area which has no inherent federal question, it seems rea­
sonable to assume that the Chief Justice's efforts to restrict 
the Court's role on social issues and to establish a national 
court of appeals might have the effect of making the Supreme 
103yiHiam R. Thomas, The Burger Court and Civil Liberties 
(Brunswick, Ohio: King's Court Communication, Inc., 1976), 
p. 25 
104 
Ibid., p. 26, 
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Court much less of a factor in public education than it has 
become since the Brown decision. 
The decisions of the Supreme Court under the leadership 
of Chief Justice Burger have been neither as conservative as 
some liberals had feared nor as liberal as those same lib­
erals had come to expect from the Court under Chief Justice 
Warren.The new Chief Justice initially joined a Court 
composed of holdovers from the Warren Court. However, by 
1972 the Court had changed as a result of President Nixon's 
appointment of Justice Harry A. Blackmun in 1970, and Justices 
Lexvds F. Powell, Jr. and William H. Rehnquist in 1972. All 
three of these men appeared to meet the strict construction­
ist and law-and-order criteria that the President had set 
when he appointed Chief Justice Eurger. This situation left 
Chief Justice Burger in the position of leading a Court which 
included himself and three others who seemingly had a common 
philosophical position. 
Although during his first term Chief Justice Burger led 
a Court dominated by the holdovers from the Warren Court, 
many Court observers felt the Court began to vote more con­
servatively than it had during the Warren Court tenure.106 
One Court observer commented, "Under Chief Justice Eurger, the 
Supreme Court is more subdued in the tone of its rulings. It 
j. Steamer, "Contemporary Supreme Court Direc­
tions in Civil Liberties," The Western Political Quarterly, 
92:440-441, Fall, 1977. 
106"The Burger Court - A New Tone," U.S. News and World 
Report, May 2.5, 1970, p. 36. 
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isn't making as many people angry with what it is saying and 
deciding. "^-07 
In the area of desegregation, the Chief Justice came out 
for a more flexible pace in the desegregation of public schools. 
Though he voted with the majority in a Court order which de­
clared that Mississippi should desegregate its public schools 
immediately, he later argued that the Court should have heard 
arguments in the case before reversing the appeals court. 
This action by the new Chief Justice may have been an 
effort to establish rapport and to convince the associate 
justices that he was open to compromise. In view of the 
criteria established by President Nixon in selecting this 
strict constructionist, it was surprising that he voted in 
favor of this d e c i s i o n .109 
During his first year in office, the new Chief Justice 
served notice that things were going to be different now that 
he was leading the Court. He started by changing the Court 
physically. He redecorated the conference room, moved his 
office into the large conference room where the justices dis­
cuss the cases, put new flowers in the private dining room, 
and replaced the justices' old water tumblers with silver 
1Q7lbid. 
108Ibid. 
^^Simon, p. 128. 
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goblets.Many viewed this as an effort to fill the Court's 
social leadership role.^-H-
It was evident in this first year that there was a deep 
philosophical difference between Chief Justice Warren and 
Chief Justice Burger. 
Chief Justice Warren's questions almost 
invariably focused on the fairness of the law; 
they were often instinctive probings into the 
moral position of government authorities. The 
technical queries Warren happily left to his 
colleagues. Chief Justice Burger spent almost 
no time on such moral questions. When he 
strayed from the technicalities of a case, it 
was usually to question the impact of the 
appellant's asserted right on the entire sys­
tem. Concern for the underdog tended to be 
lost in Burger's judicial overview. There was 
none of the outrage, the righteous indignation 
that so often crept into an exchange between 
Chief Justice Warren and an attorney.H2 
In his speeches and opinions the new Chief Justice con­
tinually voiced his displeasure with the "activist" trend of 
the Court. He accused his colleagues of being unreasonable 
and irrational in the analysis of cases.This attitude 
seemed to push the new Chief Justice into a more and more 
isolated position. Only one-third of the full-opinion cases 
were unanimous during Chief Justice Burger's first term.^^" 
HOlbid., p. 133. 
^•'-Ibid. 
^-•^Ibid. , p. 134. 
113Ibid. 
•'••'•^'Schubert ,p. 165. 
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This is in contrast with the Warren Court's record of unani­
mous cases. During this time the Chief Justice dissented 
twenty-seven times. This failure to achieve unanimity seems 
to indicate that he lacked interest in massing the Court be­
hind a single opinion. •'-•'-5 
Being the first Chief Justice to be appointed from a 
lower court, it seems that Chief Justice Burger was less in 
awe of the High Court. He had won his appointment by his 
refusal to give in to the views of his more liberal judicial 
colleagues, and he seemed determined to continue this practice 
in spite of the lack of support from his colleagues.Chief 
Justice Burger seemed to be willing to split the Court if that 
was necessary to get the Court back on the "proper course."117 
During his first term the new Chief Justice had served 
notice that he was not going to agree with the Warren Court 
holdovers when their decisions failed to meet his strict con­
structionist philosophy. Yet the new Chief Justice did not 
have to contend with this block of associates for very long. 
With the appointment of Associate Justices Harry A. Elackmun 
in 1970, and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William H. Rehnquist in 
1972, Chief Justice Burger had the basis of a conservative 
H5lbid. 
H^S^on, 140 
H7lbid. 
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bloc with which to work. These appointments changed the 
Burger Court, and it was expected that, along with the appoint­
ment of John P. Stevens in 1975 by President Gerald Ford, the 
new Burger Court would be a stark contrast to the Warren Court. 
As Charles Warren noted, however, in 1926, "Nothing is 
more striking in the history of the Court than the manner in 
which the hopes of those who expect a judge to follow the 
political views of the president appointing him have been dis­
appointed. "HQ This certainly seems to be the case with Chief 
Justice Burger and his associates who were appointed by 
President Nixon. 
The Burger Court has failed to maintain a conservative 
position under Chief Justice Burger even with the addition of 
four associates who seem to meet the "strict constructionist" 
criteria established by President Nixon. In the area of de­
segregation, an area that was of great concern to President 
Nixon, the Burger Court lias quietly held the lines established 
by the Warren Court.jn a series of cases, the Court 
affirmed the Brown decision and advocated the use of busing to 
achieve desegregation. The Burger Court also expanded its 
interest in these cases. The Chief Justice and his Nixon 
appointed associates voted with the majority in some cases 
and dissented i.n others. They were not able to form a 
HSlIoyt Gimlin, ed., Editorial P>.esearch Reports, (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc." 1978), 2:683. 
H^Simon, p. 155. 
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consistently unified position under the leadership of their 
conservative Chief Justice. 
The statistics on the Burger Court during its first nine 
years reveal a Court that seems to have no philosophical 
nucleus. This has resulted in a series of decisions which 
are confusing to many Court observers. Following the 1974 
term, one observer noted that the Court: 
. . . tries to make potentially important 
cases stand for as little as possible; a Court 
whose theme song is the refrain "we only decide," 
a Court that loves to decide issues "in these 
particular circumstances," that performs contor­
tions to avoid announcing new principles even 
when new principles are inescapably needed, and 
that pretends not to be announcing them even 
while it is announcing them . . . .120 
Professor A. E. Dick Howard, University of Virginia Law 
School, by pointing to the Court's idiosyncratic nature in 
rulings, has suggested that the Court suffers from a "split 
personality." The Court has supported desegregation of 
schools while refusing to allow busing beyond city limits, 
and upheld a woman's right to abortion while ruling that women 
cannot receive disabilities benefits while pregnant. ̂-21 
This "split personality" seems to be a result of strong 
ideological differences between the justices and Chief Justice 
Burger's lack of desire, or ability, to lead the Court toward 
120 âsby, p. 9, 
121"A  Rudderless Court," Newsweek, July 23, 1979, p. 67. 
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a unified position. In the 1970-71 term one hundred twenty-
five dissents were recorded, which may be an all-time record.122 
During the 1972 term the Nixon bloc of Chief Justice Burger and 
Justices Blaclcmun, Powell, and Rehnquist voted together in one 
hundred of the one tmndred seventy-seven cases that were heard 
by the full court.123 These four were often joined by Justice 
White or Justice Stewart to form a majority. During this terra 
of the Court, the conservative bloc seemed to be operating 
under the leadership of the Chief Justice, while the moderates, 
Justices White and Stewart, voted with either the conservatives 
or the liberal bloc which was composed of Justices Brennan, 
Douglas, and Marshall. This term seems to have held potential 
for the formation of a dominant conservative voting bloc under 
the leadership of the Chief Justice. In the 1973 term the 
domination of the conservatives continued while the minority 
liberal bloc relied on the writing of opinions to reduce the 
impact of the changes made by the conservatives. 124 -phe 1974 
term was dominated by the illness of Justice Douglas. This 
term saw the Court split into three groups. The conservative 
voting bloc was composed of Chief Justice Burger, Justice 
122paui Qf Bartholomew, "The Supreme Court of the United 
States, 1970-1971," Western Political Quarterly, 25:176, 
December, 1972. 
123paui c. Bartholomew, "The Supreme Court of the United 
States, 1972-1973," The Western Political Quarterly, 27:164, 
March, 1974. 
l24R0ger F>. Eandberg, "The 1974 Term of the United States 
Supreme Court," Western Political Quarterly, 29:290, June, 1976. 
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Blackmun, and Justice Rehnquist. The moderates were 
Justices Stewart, White, and Powell. The liberals were 
Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall.This term pro­
duced a slight erosion in the conservative bloc with Justice 
Powell moving to the moderate or swing vote category. In the 
1975 term Justice Douglas was replaced by John Paul Stevens. 
This left the liberal bloc at two, Justices Brennan and 
Marshall. During this term the Nixon-appointed justices 
voted together a majority of the time. 
The 1975 term showed greater stability in 
the Court and greater assuredness from the con­
servatives. The most common pattern in non-
unamiotis cases remained the four Nixon appointees 
plus White and Stewart; the next most common 
involved those six justices plus Stevens, the 
Court's newest member. With Douglas gone, the 
most frequent dissenting pattern was the liberal 
pair of Brennan and Marshall, who voted alone as 
a pair 22 times; the two were joined five times 
each by White and Stevens. With almost 90 non-
unamious cases, the "Nixon Four" was together in 
50 cases, never in dissent (although they were in 
the minority on one order to allow certain persons 
to proceed in forma pauperis in the Court.) 
Three of the four Nixon appointees were together 
79 times, only seven in dissent. High rates of 
agreement continued to be registered by the 
"Minnesota Twins" and by Burger and Rehnquist. 
White and Stewart also voted together frequently, 
but as might be expected of centrist judges, less 
frequently than the just noted conservative pairs 
or the liberal Brennan-Marshall pairing. Showing 
his mid-Court position, new Justice Stevens paired 
at roughly the same rates with Burger, Stewart, 
White, and Brennan.126 
l^Bruce e. Fein, Significant Decisions of the Supreme 
Court 1974-75 Term (Washington, D. CTi American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976), p. 4. 
^•^Wasby, 171. 
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The solidarity of the Nixon bloc underwent further erosion 
in the 1977 term . Following their record of voting together 
seventy percent of the time in their first full term together, 
seventy-five percent of the time in the 1973 term, and sixty-
seven percent in the 1976 term, the Nixon bloc voted together 
in only thirty-six percent of the cases in the 1977 term.^27 
This growing independence on the part of the Nixon-appointed 
justices was further revealed by the fact that Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice Blackmun, referred to as the "Minnesota 
Twins" early in their careers, split more than any other Nixon 
appointees in the 1977 term.-*-28 These splits revealed a de­
cline in the influence of the Chief Justice over his fellow 
Nixon-appointed colleagues. In 1977-1978 Justice Blackmun 
voted contrary to the Chief Justice on 40 of 133 decisions, 
Justice Powell on 35, and Justice Rehnquist on 26—^9 twice as 
often as they had broken with the Chief Justice in the preced­
ing two terms.-^0 
Following the appointment of the Chief Justice in 1969, 
Presidents Nixon and Ford appointed four associate justices 
who seemed to meet the criteria of being strict constructionists 
in their judicial philosophies. Yet the 1977 term of the Supreme 
Court resulted in the splintering of what had looked to be the 
•^^Editorial Research Reports, p. 688. 
128Ibid. 
129Ibid. 
130Ibid. 
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relatively solid hloc of Nixon and Ford appointees. In 
explaining the reasons the Court did not establish a conser­
vative philosophy under the strict constructionist Chief 
Justice, many Court observers have pointed to a lack of leader­
ship on the part of Chief Justice Burger. 
It is reported that some of the associate justices do not 
respect Chief Justice Eurger's intelligence.-^1 Scott Powe, 
professor of law at the University of Texas and former clerk 
for Justice Douglas, stated that the Chief Justice is not the 
intellectual equal of his associates on the Court. 1 3 2  A . E .  
Dick Howard, law professor at the University of Virginia, 
feels that the Chief Justice does not try to produce deeply 
philosophical opinions.133 Others feel, however, that he does 
not have to be an intellectual. Leon Jaworski, former Special 
Watergate Prosecutor, feels that general judicial experience 
is preferable to intellect in a Chief Justice.134 A former 
clerk for the Chief Justice, Stewart Jay, sees no lack of 
scholarship in Chief Justice Burger's opinions.135 
Chief Justice Burger is also accused of being pompous and 
domineering. Critics mocked his efforts to redecorate the 
131"inside the Burger Court," Newsweek June 13, 1977 , 
p. 101. 
132"The Chief Justice," Sixty Minutes Transcript March 25, 
1979 , p. 15. 
133"inSide the Burger Court," p. 101. 
134"The Chief Justice,1' p. 15. 
135lbid. 
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Supreme Court building and the gold chain he uses to fasten 
his robes.He has been accused of trying to bxilly the 
associate justices at the weekly conference and of playing 
favorites with his power to assign opinions. ̂37 Nina 
Totenberg, for the past ten years correspondent at the Supreme 
Court, notes that the Chief Justice is a man who came from 
very poor means. She feels that he is constantly overcompen-
sating for the lack of stature in his background. Totenberg 
sees the Chief Justice as a man with an inferiority complex 
who is trying to compensate by making a fetish out of his 
taste for good wine and painting.^8 Mark Tushnet, former 
clerk for Justice Marshall, thinks Chief Justice Burger is not 
a nice person.̂ 39 He says: 
He's got a pomposity about him that's very 
hard to penetrate. The best example that I know 
is a story his law clerks tell about their first 
meeting with him. They were sitting around talk­
ing when one of the messengers who works at the 
Court opened the door, came in, and said in a tone 
of voice that obviously implied they were all 
supposed to stand up, "Gentlemen, the Chief Justice 
of the United States."140 
Some feel that his efforts to bring about national judi­
cial reform have distracted him from his constitutional duties. 
136"inside the turger Court," p. 102. 
137Ibid., p. 101. 
138'"£he Chief Justice," p. 13. 
139lbid. 
140Ibid. 
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Chief Justice Burger seems to feel that he is destined to 
reform the judicial system in the manner that Chief Justice 
Taft did in the 1920's. VJhen criticized for spending time 
talking to the bar or Congress about judicial reform, he said, 
"How many opinions of Charles Hughes do people remember? "14-2 
Chief Justice Burger's attempts to limit the work load of 
the Court have brought criticism. Justices White and Blackmun 
charged in December of 1978 that the Court had passed up so 
many seemingly important cases that they were no longer pro­
viding "effective monitoring of the nation's courts."^3 
Access is a more sophisticated legal concept 
than criminal rights, but its impact can eventually 
touch more people. By establishing procedural road­
blocks, such as "standing" and "comity,"the Burger 
Court has simply thrown out of the Federal system a 
succession of public interest and civil rights 
plaintiff s.l-44 
Chief Justice Burger seems to be a roan who is aware of the 
opportunity the Chief Justice has for providing the Court with 
social leadership. In addition to his efforts to redecorate 
the Court, he attempted to ease the strain at heated confer­
ences by calling coffee breaks. His concern for the ailing 
Justice Douglas was noted by many Court observers. yet 
some of his actions are misunderstood because of his 
•^^"Inside the Burger Court," p. 101. 
143Ibid. 
144Ibid., p. 102. 
145"The Chief Justice," p. 15. 
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unwillingness to share a personal confidence. A prime ex­
ample of this can be found in criticism he received for buy­
ing a gold carpet to put behind the Justices' bench. Many 
of his critics accused him of imperiousness when in reality 
he had purchased the runner for thirty dollars in Georgetown 
while browsing in an antique shop, and he placed it on the 
bare floor because he feared Justice Black, who was infirm, 
and Justice Harlan, who was nearly blind, might fall.^^ 
Chief Justice Burger is the first among equals in the 
collegial body which is the Supreme Court. He came to the 
Court with a mission. He had dedicated himself, as Professor 
Howard said, to "developing a present view of the proper place 
of the courts in dealing with social issues."147 This "pro­
per place" is one in which the courts are riot asked to resolve 
every social conflict that arises and one which sees to it 
that criminals do not go free. 
The position of Chief Justice carries the potential for 
leadership in the Court. This leadership potential has been 
classified into two categories, social and task, either or 
both of which the Chief Justice or another justice may fill. 
Reports by Court observers and the justices themsevles indi­
cate that Chief Justice Burger has attempted, in his own way, 
to provide both social and task leadership. Most agree, how­
ever, that Chief Justice Burger has failed to provide either 
146"insicie the Burger Court," p. 102. 
147Ibid. 
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social or task leadership. The Court is composed of a 
majority appointed after the Chief Justice was, all of whom seemed 
to meet the strict constructionist criteria established for 
the Chief Justice. Yet, following a period in the mid-1970's 
when this bloc seemed to vote together under the.Chief 
Justice's leadership, the Court has splintered into three 
factions. Two Warren Court holdovers, Justice Brennan and 
Justice Marshall, are considered to be the liberal bloc. The 
conservatives which once numbered four, now consist of Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. The remaining five 
justices make up the "floating middle." This "floating middle" 
moves between the ideological poles and has caused many Court 
observers to call the Burger Court unpredictable.-^® 
. . . the Court's ability to chart a clear 
course in the cases it can review appears to many 
lawyers and legal scholars to be declining sharply. 
Hampered by the lack of a clear-cut majority philo­
sophy, it frequently seems to be drifting one way, 
then the other.149 
In comparison with former Chief Justice Warren, Chief 
Justice Burger seems to lack the leadership skills to unify 
the Court: 
Burger has been unable to lead the Court as 
some authorities believe Warren did. Warren was 
not his Court's leading intellectual - nor is 
Burger. But Burger seems to lack the skills to 
become a "strong unifying force," says a lawyer 
who knows both men. 
148"^ Rudderless Court," p. 67. 
149Ibid. 
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It would seem that Chief Justice Burger has failed in 
his efforts to provide social leadership as is evidenced by 
the observation of Yale Law School Professor Geoffrey Hazard 
who sees the internal squabbling on the Court as a symptom of 
a ,:low degree of trust."151 The lack of trust and squabbling, 
according to some Court observers, is a result of the lack 
of leadership being provided by the Chief Justice: 
During 10 years as Chief Justice, Burger had 
prodded his colleagues toward a policy of judicial 
restraint, favoring narrow readings of laws and 
the Constitution and deference to Congress and 
state legislatures. He prevailed for a time but 
has had growing trouble lining up support in the 
last few years. His critics see this as a failure 
of leadership. "Farl Warren had to deal with a 
diverse group, some with strongly held positions, 
but lie managed to pull them together on the tough 
ones," says one Washington lawyer. "Burger can't 
seem to do that."152 
Yet, the Chief Justice is defended by others who point to 
the increased complexity of cases in today's society. Pro­
fessor Howard feels that the issues are more divisive and 
troublesome than they have been in the past.^53 i?e points to 
the difficulties in carrying out the Brown decision. A clerk 
for the Court during the 1977 term feels that the Court is 
composed of strong-willed people who do not bend. He states, 
•^lDavid F. Pike, "Supreme Court Trials and Tribulation," 
U.S. Hews and World Report, March 26, 1979, p. 34. 
152Ibid. 
l53Ibid. 
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"I don't know of any person, no matter how talented, who 
could bring that bunch together."154 
The Decision-Making Process of the Court 
The judicial system in the United States is more complex 
and confusing than systems found in almost any other country.155 
There are two separate court systems in existence simultane­
ously. The state court system is composed of the fifty 
separate state systems. Most of these state systems were set 
up using models and principles that originated in the eight­
eenth century. 156 Federal court system has emerged fol­
lowing a long period of legislative adjustment. The Consti­
tution makes provision for a federal court system saying, 
. . judicial power of the United States, shall be vested 
in one supreme court and in such inferior courts as the Con­
gress may from time to time ordain and establish."157 
The state court systems usually consist of lower courts 
and a state supreme court. Initially, these courts and the 
original federal courts were localistic as a result of the 
communication and transportation problems encountered in the 
154-lbid. 
155^urphy and Pritchett, p. 33. 
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TABLE III 
SUPREME COURT MEMBERSHIP, 1969 - 1978 
THE BURGER COURT 
Name 
Hugo L. Black 
William 0. Douglas 
John M. Harlan 
William J. Brennan, 
Potter Stewart 
Byron R. White 
Thurgood Marshall 
Warren E. Burger 
Harry A. Blackmun, Jr. 11/12/1908 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 9/19/1907 
William W. Rehnquist 10/01/1924 
John Paul Stevens 4/20/1920 
Nominated 
Date 
Con­
firmed Resigned 
Roosevelt 8/17/37 9/17/71 
Roosevelt 4/04/39 11/12/75 
Eisenhower 3/16/55 9/23/71 
Eisenhower 3/19/57 
Eisenhower 5/05/59 
Kennedy 4/11/62 
Johnson 8/30/67 
Nixon 6/09/69 
Nixon 5/12/70 
Nixon 12/06/71 
Nixon 12/10/71 
Ford 12/17/75 
Date 
of Birth 
2/27/1886 
10/16/1898 
5/20/1899 
Jr. 4/25/1906 
1/23/1915 
6/08/1917 
6/02/1908 
9/17/1907 
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early years of the nation's history. As in the federal sys­
tem, the state courts usually follow a course of appeal which 
takes a case from the lower state courts to the state supreme 
court. 
The federal court system is composed of district courts, 
courts of appeals, specialized courts, and the Supreme Court. 
The district courts, one or more of which is located in every 
state, are the trial courts of the federal system. When a 
case falls within the jurisdictional bounds of the federal 
court system, it is first heard at the district court level 
unless it is heard by a specialized court. 
The jurisdiction of the federal courts is defined by 
Article III of the Constitution. This Article provides that 
the federal courts will hear: (1) all cases in law and 
equity arising under the Constitution, (2)all cases in law 
and equity arising under the laws of the United States, 
(3) all cases in law and equity arising under treaties made 
under the authority of the United States, (4) all cases of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, (5) cases in which the 
United States is a party, (6) cases between two or more 
states, (7) cases between a state and citizens of another 
state, (8) cases involving disputes between citizens of differ­
ent states, (9) cases between states and its citizens, and 
foreign states or citizens, and (10) cases involving 
ambassadors. 
158 ûrphy an(j Pritchett, pp. 38-39. 
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Until abolished by statute in 1911, federal circuit 
courts were trial courts for some classes of federal cases.^59 
In 1891 Congress created the courts of appeals which were 
known as circuit courts of appeals until 1948.1-60 The courts 
of appeals receive appeals from the decisions of the district 
courts. There are eleven courts of appeals in the United 
States. The country and its administrative zones and posses­
sions abroad have been divided into ten districts. Each of 
these ten districts has a court of appeals which is led by 
one of the Supreme Court justices who has been assigned to the 
district to provide judicial leadership. The eleventh dis­
trict is the District of Columbia, which has its own court of 
appeals. In addition to the Supreme Court justice assigned 
to the district court, each court has from three to nine dis­
trict judges and, normally, three judges sit in deciding a 
case.-^l The purpose of the court of appeals is to relieve 
the Supreme Court of the obligation of hearing all cases which 
are appeals from the district courts.1^2 
At the apex of the federal judicial hierachy is the 
United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is a product 
159ibid., p. 36. 
160Ibid. 
161Ibid. 
1 ̂̂Eclwaird. C. Bolmeier, Landmark Supreme Court Decisions 
on Public School Issues (Charlottesville, Virginia: The 
Michie Company, 1973), p. 2. 
69 
of the Constitution,1^3 it ±s essentially an appellate 
court. The Constitution does, however, provide two categories 
of cases which the Court can hear as original jurisdiction. 
These cases are those in which a state is a party and those 
affecting ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls. 
Except in the limited classes of cases where 
there is an appeal to the Supreme Court as of 
right, review is sought by filing with the Court a 
petition for writ of certiorari from a state supreme 
court or federal court of appeals.164 
These petitions are reviewed by all the justices and are 
granted on the affirmative vote of four justices. The major­
ity of cases involving educational issues are related to the 
"human rights" provisions of the Constitution.165 The states, 
however, were not originally restrained by the "human rights" 
provisions of the Constitution, as it applied only to federal 
judicial and legislative action. It was not until the Four­
teenth Amendment was adopted in 1368 that the federal courts 
and Congress were able to challenge state action in the area 
of human rights.166 
163united States Const., Art I, Sec. 1. 
164Murphy and Pritchett, p. 31. 
165Bolmeierf p# 2 
166Bolmeier t p# 
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Article XIV, Section 1. All persons born or 
naturalized in these United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the state wherein they reside. 
No state shall make or enforce any lav? which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.-'-®' 
Any case, whether it involves educational issues or not, 
that is appealed to the Supreme Court must be based on charges 
that rights protected by the Constitution have been violated. 
A case appealed from a state supreme court may not be accepted 
by the Supreme Court of the United States because it lacks a 
substantial federal q u e s t i o n .  
The nature of complaints in educational 
matters has spanned the following alternatives: 
1. Suit to compel action 
a. Reinstatement of teachers or students; 
b. Declaration of state law unconstitutional; 
c. Declaration of local law unconstitutional. 
2. Actions in equity 
a. Reimbursement of court costs; 
b. Punitive damages; 
c. Specific performance. 
3. Suits to enjoin action 
a. Application of desegregation plan; 
b. Allocation of funds to non-public schools; 
c. Application of uniform dress codes.1"^ 
167United States Const., Amend. XIV, Sec. 1. 
168Murphy and Pritchett, p. 38. 
169ceorge R. Deakin, "The Burger Court and the Public 
Schools" (Ed.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina -
Greensboro, 1978), pp. 9-10. 
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These complaints follow a course which begins in a lower 
federal or state court, and by virtue of the appeals process, 
are argued before the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court consists of nine men who serve life 
terms as Justices. The Justices who leave office only be­
cause of retirement or, as Section 1 of Article III of the Con­
stitution specifies, "The absence of good behavior," are the 
focal points for all discussions on the Court and its rulings. 
By casting their votes the Justices make the decisions that 
have had such a devastating effect on public education. The 
values and attitudes of the Justices are important in the 
process which results in a Supreme Court ruling. 
No matter what pressures are placed upon the 
Court from outside political forces, be they narrow 
group interests or broader societal concerns, judi­
cial policy making ultimately involves the resolu­
tion of these conflicting interests by nine 
justices .... once the hearing is over, the 
Court retires to conference where the internal 
dynamics of judicial decision making begin.1'0 
Supreme Court cases are drawn from two major sources. 
The Court has original jurisdiction in some cases, and others 
may be brought before the Court on appeal from lower courts. 
The cases which come to the Court for review as original jur­
isdiction are placed on the Orginal Docket. The Court 
usually receives ten to twenty such cases each term.1'71 The 
•^^Thomas, pp. 35-36. 
1̂ lDavid Rohde and Harold Spaeth, Supreme Court Decision 
Making (San Francisco: W. K. Freeman Company, 1976), p. 59. 
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Court receives the majority of its cases as appeals from lower 
courts. These cases may be brought before the Court on a writ 
of appeal or on a writ for certiorari. 
In 1925 Chief Justice William Howard Taft 
achieved a major administrative reform for the 
Supreme Court, the passage of a judiciary act 
containing the discretionary writ of certiorari. 
Since Congress controls the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts, it was necessary for Taft to 
lobby Congress for the passage of the Judiciary 
Act of 1925. This writ became the primary tool 
by which the Court could pick and choose its 
cases. It was also a clearcut recognition of 
the policy making nature of the Court. Although 
the technical right of appeal to the Court still 
exists, as a practical matter appeal and certio­
rari are treated in the same manner.172 
All writs of appeal are placed on the Appellate Docket. 
Petitions for certiorari come in two forms and may be placed 
on either the Appellate or the Miscellaneous Docket. Peti­
tions filed in forma pauperis (in the manner of pauper) are 
placed on the Miscellaneous Docket. These petitions are 
usually requests for review filed by indigent prison inmates. 
Petitions for certiorari filed by lawyers in accord with the 
strict format requirements of the Court are placed on the 
Appellate Docket.^73 
During the periodic conferences in which the justices 
discuss cases and other Court matters, the requests for de­
cision are considered. The Chief Justice is able to exercise 
a great deal of influence in this process. 
172Thomas, p. 24. 
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In the process by which the Court decides 
whether or not to grant certiorari, the Chief 
Justice plays a particularly important role 
because, assisted by his law clerks, he carries 
out the initial sifting of the certiorari peti­
tions and also makes the conference presentation 
of most cases. All members of the Court now get 
copies of the papers on all the petitions, but 
the Chief Justice prepares a "discuss list." 
Cases not on that list are not discussed unless 
another justice specifically requests it; if such 
a case is an "unpaid" one, the requesting justice 
makes the conference presentation about it. 
Cases not on the "discuss list" and not added to 
it are automatically denied review. Once the 
Chief Justice has sorted out and "special listed" 
cases, review is granted to as many as one-third 
of the cases remaining.^-^4 
Even when the Court decides to consider the merits of a 
case this does not mean it will necessarily be given a full-
scale consideration. Some cases are so clear-cut that the 
Court decides to dispose of there summarily. During the 1975 
term a number of cases were handled with summary dispositions 
including a case concerning the spanking of pupils in public 
schools.175 
Summary dispositions include a variety of 
brief orders and some per curiam (unsigned) 
rulings, although other per curiams are indis­
tinguishable from full signed opinions in 
announcing substantive law except perhaps for 
their relative brevity. First used to indicate 
only cases where the substantive law was 
"indisputably clear," per curiam rulings came 
to cover orders in original jurisdiction cases, 
dismissals of appeals for want of a substantial 
federal question, and obviously moot cases. Now, 
•'-^Wasby, p. 147. 
175ibid. 
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however, most cases not announcing new substan­
tive law are placed with the Court's other orders 
(such as those granting and denying review), 
where they appear in such new categories as 
"affirmed on appeal" and "vacated and remanded 
on appeal."1'" 
The importance of the Court's action in denying review 
often goes unnoticed by the public. Yet, this is an important 
function of the Court which has indicated Court policy in the 
past. In denying review the Court is in effect concurring 
with the lower court's decision. 
The Court's decisions denying review and its 
other summary actions are of generally low visibil­
ity. Moreover, the reasons underlying them are 
often intentionally well hidden. The sheer numbers 
of such decisions and the variety of factors poten­
tially playing a part in any particular Court action 
further mask their meaning but do not decrease their 
extreme importance, which stems from the fact that 
such decisions account for the bulk of the Courtis 
actions, far exceeding in number the Court's formal 
statements of policy. For the Court to make a de­
cision not to hear a case may be as important - not 
only for the litigants but also for the (unaware) 
public - as for it to decide particular controver­
sial questions explicitly. The patterns of the 
Court's actions, reinforced by statements by some 
of the justices, provide strong evidence that the 
Court's actions denying review have clear policy 
implications. 
The Supreme Court, as already noted, may pick 
and choose from among the cases people wish it to 
consider. The justices select for further consid­
eration about half the appeals cases and a small and 
decreasing percentage of those brought up on certio­
rari. Although 17.5 percent of the certiorari cases 
were granted review in 1941, ten years later it was 
only somewhat more than 10 percent (11.1 percent), 
by 1961 it was 7.4 percent and by 1971 it had reached 
5.8 percent with a continued subsequent slow 
decrease.177 
176ibid., p. 153. 
177ibid., p. 143. 
75 
The cases which are accepted for oral argument are heard 
from the beginning of the term, usually in October, through 
late March or early April. Cases accepted early in the term 
may not be heard until the next term. The Court hands down 
decisions in all argued cases, except those set for reargurnent, 
before the term ends. 
The importance of oral argument in the disposition of 
cases is disputed by the justices and those who observe the 
Court. Justice John Harlan has stated that on "many occasions 
my judgment of a decision has turned on what happened."170 
Others feel the oral argument is little more thaii tradition 
which is tolerated while the briefs are what count in the 
conference.^79 
Oral argument can provide judges with infor­
mation to assist them in determining the Court's 
strategies, that is, how the Court should exercise 
its broader political role. Questions as to how 
many people might be affected by a decision and 
where the Court might be heading if it decided a 
case a certain way help elicit this type of infor­
mation. As Leon Friedman has noted, "The Justices' 
purpose in oral argument is to force the lawyers to 
think out the political, social, and constitutional 
implications of their arguments." In so doing, "the 
Justices constantly seek to relate the immediate 
problem to analogous situations . . . and try to 
cut through the rhetoric of the lawyers to see the 
concrete result of any argument advanced. 
The conference is the key to all Supreme Court actions. 
It is here that the business of the Court is discussed and 
178;Ebid., p. 161. 
179^he Supreme Court: Views from Inside , p. 57. 
l^Wasby, p. 162. 
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that the decisions are made. The conference is not open to 
any person outside of the circle of nine justices. 
The judicial conference, is held behind closed 
doors. It is so secret that the junior justice 
acts as a doorman when one of the justices wants 
something from a clerk on the outside. As such, 
little formal information is known regarding what 
takes place in conference. But what is known sup­
ports the view that the conference is where the 
justices develop and debate significant issues 
that trouble them. It is at this stage that the 
justices express differences of opinion and attempt 
to persuade their brethren to accept their point of 
view. Here individual justices with strongly held 
beliefs often resort to personal influence to per­
suade and bargain with justices who do not hold as 
strong an opinion on a subject. It is in conference 
that small group leadership plays an integral part, 
and the structure of the conference favors the 
Chief Justice in performing this role.181 
Most scholars have rejected the "find the law" theory 
of judicial decision making and have accepted the fact that 
a judge's personal values affect his decisions.^82 Supreme 
Court decisions are affected by several factors. The setting 
for Court decision making, a conference where nine men ex­
change thoughts and make decisions by majority vote, makes 
the influence of the Chief Justice, potentially, one of the 
most important of these factors. When viewed in perspective 
the judicial decision-making process is a "choice between 
competing values by fallible, pragmatic, and at times non-
rational men engaged in a highly complex process in a very 
human setting."183 ^ process such as this can be influenced 
18lThomas, pp. 35-36. 
182yasby, p. 164. 
183Ibid. 
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by strong leadership. The Chief Justice may influence the 
Court through task or social leadership.1-84 However, the 
degree to which a Chief Justice is able to influence the 
Court through his leadership depends upon his esteem, ability, 
and personality, and how he performs his many roles.  ̂-85 
The leadership of a Chief Justice is exercised in the 
conference, though he also presides in Court during argument. 
In the conference the Chief Justice is first to make his posi­
tion known on a particular case. In so doing he has the 
opportunity to set the tenor for how the issues should be 
defined and resolved.̂ 86 The Chief Justice who can present 
his views with force and clarity and can define them success­
fully can expect to be highly esteemed by his associates.187 
The Chief Justice will then be looked to when perplexing 
questions arise, and he will be in a position to give guidance. 
Holding the position of Chief Justice enables this member of 
the Court to control the conference by inviting suggestions 
and opinions, seeking compromise, and cutting off debate when 
it appears to be getting out of hand.^88 
Court members frequently disagree in conference 
and argue their positions with enthusiasm, seeking 
to persuade their opponents and the undecided brethren. 
184MUrphy an(j Pritchett, p. 497. 
185 Ibid. 
18&lbid., pp. 497-498. 
187lbid. 
ISSibid. 
78 
And always, when the discussions ends, the vote 
declares the victor. All of this gives rise to 
antagonism and tension, which, if allowed to get 
out of hand, would make intelligent, orderly de­
cision of cases virtually impossible. However, 
the negative aspects of conference interaction 
are more or less counterbalanced by activity 
which relieves tension, shows solidarity, atid 
makes for agreement. One Court member usually 
performs more such activity than the others. He 
invites opinions and suggestions. He attends to 
the emotional needs of his associates by affirm­
ing their value as individuals and as Court mem­
bers, especially when their views are rejected by 
the majority. Ordinarily he is the best-liked 
member of the Court and emerges as its social 
leader. While the task leadership concentrates 
on the Court's decision, the social leader con­
centrates on keeping the Court socially cohesive. 
In terms of personality, he is apt to be warm, 
receptive, and responsive. Being liked by his 
associates is ordinarily quite important to him; 
he is also apt to dislike conflict.189 
The Chief Justice can emerge as both task and social 
leader of the conference; however, this requires a rare com­
bination of qualities which must be skillfully used. 19(3 The 
Chief Justice can extend his influence in the conference by 
virtue of his right to list cases which are considered for 
review, assign opinions to be written, and vote last. 
As noted earlier, the Chief Justice prepares a "discuss 
list" which contains the cases, from all the cases that are 
filed with the Court, which he considers worthy of considera­
tion. A Chief Justice who has established himself as task 
leader is in a position to have a great deal of influence over 
IS^ibid. 
iSOibid. 
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the Court's docket. Though any justice can present a case, 
a strong Chief Justice, by virtue of leaving a case off the 
"discuss list," will limit its chances of receiving the re­
quired four votes for consideration. 
The Chief Justice's power to assign opinions 
is significant because his designation of the 
Court's spokesman may be instrumental in: 
1. Determining the value of a decision as 
a precedent, for the grounds of a de­
cision frequently depend upon the justice 
assigned the opinion. 
2. Making a decision as acceptable as possible 
to the public. 
3. Holding the Chief Justice's majority to­
gether when the conference vote is close. 
4. Persuading dissenting associates to join 
in the Court's opinion.191 
The Chief Justice is expected to assign the opinion in 
important cases to himself in order to lend the prestige of 
his office to the Court's decision. He may also use the 
opinion-assigning powers to affect the vote on certain deci­
sions. Professor David J. Danelski suggests that the Chief 
Justice might use one of two rules to win dissenting justices 
to the majority opinion. This usage would strengthen the 
impact of the decision. 
Rule 1: Assign the case to the justice 
whose views are the closest to the dissexiters on 
the ground that his opinion would take a middle 
approach upon which both majority and minority 
could agree. 
Pvule 2: VThere there are blocs on the Court 
and a bloc splits, assign the opinion to a majority 
191ibid., p. 503. 
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member of the dissenters' bloc on the grounds 
that (a) he would take a middle approach upon 
which both majority and minority could agree 
and (b) the minority justices would be more 
likely to agree with him because of general 
mutuality of agreement.19'-
The job of unifying the Court falls to the Chief Justice. 
A unanimous decision, especially in important or controversial 
cases,carries much more weight than a split decision. It is 
important that the Chief Justice use his powers to obtain 
decisions which are as unified as possible. 
The right to vote last affords the Chief Justice the 
opportunity to be the deciding factor in cases in which the 
associate justices split four and four. This power is some­
what limited in that a justice may change his vote later as 
the opinion is being written; however, the Chief Justice is 
in a position to know the votes of all the justices before he 
casts his vote. This affords him the opportunity to act as a 
unifying force and occasionally to be the deciding factor in 
a case. 
192ibid., p. 504. 
CHAPTER III 
RELIGION CASES 
Introduction 
The basic right of freedom of religion is granted by the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which 
states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish­
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof 
. . . ."1 It is significant to note that the First Amendment 
only enjoined the Federal Government in making laws that would 
affect individual religious beliefs and practices. Initially, 
the freedoms that the Amendments listed were not applicable to 
state action and only the states' judgment prevented abuse of 
these freedoms at the state level. 
The passage of the Fourteenth Amendment placed restric­
tions on state action. This amendment did not, however, 
originally extend the protection of the Bill of Rights to in­
dividuals from state invasion.̂  Before 1940, the challenges 
to religious involvement in the public schools were made under 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than 
under the religious clause of the First Amendment. After 1940, 
^•United States Const., Amend, I. 
C. Hudgins, The Warren Court and the Public Schools 
(Danville, Illinois: Interstate Printers and Publishers, 
1970), p. 25. 
81 
82 
state action in religious matters was restricted by the First 
Amendment. This change resulted from opinions of the Supreme 
Court that stated that the fundamental freedoms of the First 
Amendment were "incorporated in the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a protection against state action. 
This new principle was first used in Cantwell v. Connecticut 
The first challenge of government aid to parochial schools 
occurred early in the twentieth century. This initial chal­
lenge came in Quick Bear v. Leupp (1S08) when Reuben Quick 
Bear and others sued to prevent tribal funds from being paid 
to the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions for Indian instruc­
tion on the reservation. In Quick Bear Chief Justice Melville 
W. Fuller stated that the Constitution precluded any law that 
would prohibit the free exercise of religion. Chief Justice 
Fuller stated: 
. . .  w e  c a n n o t  c o n c e d e  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  
Indians cannot be allowed to use their own money 
to educate their children in the schools of their 
own choice because the government is necessarily 
undenominational, as it cannot make any law re­
specting an establishment of religion or prohibit­
ing the free exercise thereof.^ 
This ruling allowed these Indians to use government funds 
which had been appropriated to them in treaties signed in 1868 
3Ibid. 
^Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
^Ouick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908). 
6lbid. 
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and 1899 to pay for sectarian education in spite of an 1899 
congressional act prohibiting the appropriation of funds for 
education in any sectarian school. This case has been cited 
to support legislation calling for the expenditure of public 
funds to support nonpublic schools.^ Following the Quick Bear 
decision, the Court heard two cases which established that the 
state may not interfere with the constitutional rights of 
parents to guide the education of their children^ and the 
legality of federal appropriations £br any purpose.9 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) tested the state of 
Oregon's right to pass a law requiring all children age eight 
to sixteen to attend a public school. The law was challenged 
by the Society of Sisters, a parochial school, and Hill 
Military Academy, a private school. Citing the precedent 
established in Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), the Court found the 
state's action to be unconstitutional. ̂  Speaking for the 
Court, Justice James C. McReynolds said: 
The child is not the mere creature of the state; 
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the 
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and 
prepare him for additional obligations.12 
^George R. Deakin, "The Burger Court and Public Education" 
( Ed.D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro, 1978), p. 22. 
^Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
^Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
lOpierce v. Societ}' of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
H-Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
1 9 •^Pierce v. Society of Sisters, p. 515. 
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This case is significant in that it established the right 
of parents to educate their children in private or parochial 
schools. As Professor E. C. Bolmeier notes: "In virtually-
all cases where legislation is in conflict with the due pro­
cess of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the legisla­
tion will be nullified."13 
The next test for aid to parochial schools came in Cochran 
v. Louisiana (1930).-^ This case tested the constitutionality 
of a state statute which provided free textbooks from tax funds 
for children in nonpublic schools. In this case Chief Justice 
Charles E. Hughes wrote the unanimous opinion of the Court 
stating: 
One may scan the acts in vain to ascertain 
where any money is appropriated for the purchase 
of school books for the use of any church, private, 
sectarian, or even public school. The appropria­
tions were made for the specific purpose of pur­
chasing school books for the use of the school 
children of the state, free of cost to them. It 
was for their benefit and the resulting benefit 
to the state that the appropriations were made. 
True, these children attended some school, public 
or private, the latter, sectarian, or non-sectarian, 
and that the books are to be furnished them for 
their use, free of cost, whichever they attend. 
The schools, however, ax-e not the beneficiaries of 
these appropriations. They obtain nothing from 
them nor are they relieved of a single obligation 
because of them. The school children and the state 
alone are the beneficiaries.15 
l^Edward C. Bolmeier, Landmark Supreme Court Decisions On 
Public School Issues (Charlottesville, Virginia: kichie 
Company, ly/li) , p. 26. 
•^Cochran v. Board, 281 U.S. 370 at 374 (1930). 
15Ibid. 
85 
With this case the child benefit theory was created. As 
applied in this case, the theory states that state funds used 
directly or indirectly for a child's education is an aid to 
the child and not to the school. This theory has been criti­
cized by those who think it can be used to unconstitutionally 
entangle state and church activities.^ 
The issue of requiring students to participate in a flag 
salute exercise was brought to the Court in Minersville v. 
Gobitis. ̂-7 xn this case the Jehovah's Witnesses, a religious 
group, challenged a requirement that stxidents in the Miners-
ville School District be commanded to salute the flag at the 
beginning of the school day. The challenge was based on the 
Witnesses' belief that saluting the flag was bowixig before a 
graven image. This practice is forbidden by the Bible and 
contrary to the Witnesses' beliefs. Justice Felix Frankfurter 
spoke for an eight to one majority in holding the requirement 
to be valid, saying: 
. . . the process may be utilized so long as 
men's right to believe as they please, to win others 
to their way of belief, and their right to assemble 
in their chosen places of worship for the devotional 
ceremonies of their faith, are fully respected.18 
Justice Ilarlan F. Stone cast the lone dissenting vote in 
the Gobitis case and stated: 
l^Eolmeier, p. 31. 
l^Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 
(1940). 
18Ibid. 
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If these (Constitutional) guarantees are to 
have any meaning they must, I think, be deemed to 
withhold from the state any authority to compel 
belief or the expression of it where that expression 
violates religious convictions, whatever may be the 
legislative view of the desirability of such com­
pulsion. 
This dissent is significant because three years later, in 
West Virginia v. Barnette (1943), the Court reversed itself 
for the first time in a public school case.The six-to-
three decision against a West Virginia statute requiring flag 
saluting resulted from the change in attitude of three justices 
and the addition of a new justice who replaced Justice James 
F. Byrnes.21 Since this decision, no case dealing with similar 
issues has been brought before the Court.22 in giving the 
majority opinion, Justice Robert H. Jackson, said: 
We think the action of the local authorities 
in compelling the flag salute and pledge trans­
cends Constitutional limitations on their power 
and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit 
which is the purpose of the First Amendment to 
our Constitution to reserve from all official 
control.23 
In Everson v. Board of Education (1947) the child benefit 
theory was enlarged.24 in a five-to-four decision the Court 
ruled that a local school district could reimburse parents of 
19Ibid. 
20west Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
2^-Hudgins, p. 11. 
22Dealcin , p. 26. 
23west Virginia v. Barnette, p. 631. 
2^Everson v. Board, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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children attending parochial schools for certain school-
related expenditures. This case is important in that it 
clearly speaks to parochial schools. Acting under a New 
Jersey statute, the Ewing Township School District allowed 
parents to be reimbursed for bus service to private schools. 
This practice was challenged in Everson on the grounds of 
deprivation of property without due process of the law under 
the Fourteenth Amendment and establishment of religion under 
the First Amendment. In speaking for the majority, Justice 
Hugo L. Black clarified the meaning of the First Amendment and 
found that Ewing Township had not violated the First Amendment. 
The four justices voting against Ewing Township action wrote 
dissenting opinions. 
In McCollum v. Board (1948), the Court was asked to rule 
on the constitutionality of the teaching of religion in the 
public schools for the first time.25 The case arose as a re­
sult of a Champaign, Illinois, school district plan for teach­
ing religion in the public schools. The plan called for 
religious instruction to be given by the Council on Religious 
Education at no charge to the schools. Vashti McCollum con­
tended that the practice violated the due process clause of 
the First Amendment. The Court, in an eight-to-one decision, 
declared the practice to be unconstitutional. Justice Hugo L. 
Black gave the Court's decision, saying: 
^^McCollum v. Board, 333 U.S. 203 at 205 (1948). 
38 
The foregoing facts, without reference to 
others that appear in the record, show the use 
of tax-supported property for religious instruc­
tion and the close cooperation between the school 
authorities and the religious council in promoting 
religious education. The operation of the state's 
compulsory education thus assists and is integra­
ted with the program of religious instruction 
carried on by separate religious sects. Pupils 
compelled by law to go to school for secular edu­
cation are released in part from their legal duty 
upon the condition that they attend the religious 
classes. This is beyond all question a utiliza­
tion of the tax-established and tax-supported 
public school system to aid religious groups to 
spread their faith.26 
In evaluating the impact of the HcCollum decision, Pro­
fessor Bolmeier stated: "In this case, however, the Court 
was adamant in abiding strictly by the separation of church 
and state principle. It left no doubt in its upholding the 
wall of separation."27 
The constitutionality of dismissed time for religious 
instruction was questioned in a case that arose four years 
later. In Zorach v. Clauson (1952) a challenge was made to 
a New York City plan under which students were dismissed to 
go to religious centers for sectarian instruction.28 The 
Court upheld the practice by a six-to-three vote. Justice 
William 0. Douglas gave the Court's decision, saying: 
When the state encourages religious instruction 
or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting 
26ibid. 
27]3olmeier, p. 71. 
28zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
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the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, 
it follows the best of our traditions. For it then 
respects the religious nature of our people and 
acconmiodates the public service to their spiritual 
needs.29 
In 1952 a case was appealed to the Court which tested the 
validity of a Hew Jersey statute requiring Bible reading in 
the public school classroom. Doremus v. Board (1952) was 
rendered moot by the graduation of the only person who was 
complaining.30 
Engel v. Vitale was the first public school religion case 
to be heard by the Warren Court.31 The constitutionality of 
the use in the public schools of New York of a prayer that had 
been composed by the Board of Regents was tested. The prayer 
stated: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon 
Thee, and we beg Thy blessing upon us, our parents, our teachers 
and our country."32 The Supreme Court reversed the New York 
Court of Appeals on certiorari, and in an eight-to-one decision, 
ruled that the recitation of the Regents' prayer was unconsti­
tutional. Justice Black wrote the Court's opinion, stating: 
It is neither sacriligious nor antireligious to 
say that each separate government in this country 
should stay out of the business of writing or sanc­
tioning official prayers and leave that purely 
29ibid. 
30Doremus v. Board, 342 U.S. 429 (1952). 
3lEngel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
32nudgins, p. 27. 
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religious function to the people themselves and to 
those the people choose to look to for religious 
guidance.33 
The following year the Court ruled on the constitution­
ality of reading the Bible and reciting the Lord's Prayer in 
Abington Township v. Schempp (1963).34 in this case the 
Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania which had decided for the 
plaintiffs. This case is important in that it affected possi­
bly forty percent of the nation's school children.35 
In Murray v. Curlett (1963) the Court ruled that a 
Baltimore ordinance requiring that a chapter of the Bible be 
read and/or the Lord's Prayer be recited daily abridged the 
establishment clause of the First Amendment.36 in rendering 
this decision, the Court specified tests by which future cases 
could be decided: 
The test may be stated as follows: what are 
the purpose and the primary effect of the enact­
ment? If either is the advancement or inhibita-
tion of religion, then the enactment exceeds the 
scope of legislative powers as circumscribed by 
the Constitution. That is to say that to with­
stand the strictures of the establishment clause, 
there must be a secular jurpose and a primary effect 
that neither advances or inhibits religion.37 
33£ngel, p. 429. 
34-Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
35i-iudgins, p. 29. 
36Murray v. Curlett, 179 A 2d. (1962). 
37ibid. 
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Chamberlin v. Dade County (1964) was a Florida case 
which appeared on the Court's docket twice.^ This case 
challenged five practices: 
(1) reading Bible verses in assembly and in the classroom; 
(2) reciting the Lord's Prayer and other sectarian prayers; 
(3) holding baccalaureate services; 
(4) conducting a religious test as a qualification for 
teacher employment; 
(5) conducting a religious census among pupils.^9 
When this case first appeared on the Court's docket, it was 
remanded to the Florida Supreme Court for further considera­
tion in light of the Schempp decision. On its second appear­
ance before the Court, a brief per curium opinion was issued 
stating that devotional Bible reading and the recitation of 
prayers required by the statute was unconstitutional as estab­
lished in Schempp. The justices dismissed the other three 
issues for lack of a federal question. 
In Stein v. 0shimshy (1965) the Court refused to grant 
certiorari in a case in which the principal of a New York City 
school refused to allow the recitation of voluntary prayers.4® 
The principal had issued the ban in September, 1962, because 
of the Schempp decision. 
^^Chamberlin v. Dade County, 143 So. 2d 21 (1962). 
39lbid. 
40Stein v. Oshimshy, 332 U.S. 959 (1965). 
^Kudgins, p. 37. 
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In 1968 the Court handed down two decisions that related 
to the relationship of church and state in the context of 
public education. Board v. Allen (1968) was a challenge to a 
New York statute that required local school officials to lend 
textbooks at no cost to students enrolled both in public and 
nonpublic schools in grades seven through twelve.42 The Court 
held this practice to be constitutional in a six-to-three de­
cision. Justice Byron R. X/hite relied on the precedents estab­
lished in previous decisions and especially on the Everson 
decision in giving the Court's opinion.43 
In his dissent Justice Hugo Black warned of the future 
involvement which might occur saying: 
It makes but a snail inroad and does not 
amount to complete establishment of religion. 
But that is no excuse for upholding it. It 
requires no prophet to forsee that on the argu­
ment used to support this law others could be 
upheld providing for state or federal funds, 
to erect religious buildings or to erect the 
building themselves, to pay the salaries of 
the religious school teachers, and finally to 
have sectarian religious groups cease to rely 
on voluntary contributions of members of their 
sects while waiting for the government to pick 
up all the bills for the religious schools.44 
In the second opinion to be handed down in 1968, the 
Court altered the doctrine that a federal taxpayer lacks 
42£oard v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
43nudgins, p. 38. 
44-Allen, p. 236. 
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standing to challenge the expenditure of federal funds. 
Flast v. Cohen (1963) tested the complaints of taxpayers who 
were in opposition to expenditures of federal tax funds under 
Titles II and III of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act for the financing of instruction in reading, arithmetic, 
and other subjects in parochial schools.^ 
In Epperson v.. Arkansas (1968) the Court struck down an 
Arkansas statute which forbade the teaching of evolution.̂ 6 
In striking the anti-evolution law, the Court ruled that it 
was an abridgement of the establishment-of-religion clause 
of the First Amendment. Justice Abe Fortas stated: 
There is and can be no doubt that the First 
Amendment does not permit the states to require 
that teaching and learning must be tailored to 
the principles or prohibitions of any religious 
sect or dogma.^ 
These cases just reviewed represent the precedents which 
had been established by the Court prior to the tenure of Chief 
Justice Burger. Direct aid to parochial schools was ruled 
unconstitutional; however, aid was allowed, under the child 
benefit theory, for children attending parochial schools. The 
Court ruled that children cannot be required to attend public 
school, salute the flag, pray, read the Eible, or receive 
religious instruction in school. Tests were developed which 
^Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
46Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
47Ibid. 
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would serve to guide the courts in religious cases in the 
future. Following the Court's rulings in the Everson and 
Allen cases, which allowed the use of public funds for some 
support of private school costs, many advocates of state aid 
would give private schools more aid.^8 
The Cases 
Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) was joined with two cases, Earley 
v. DiCenso and Robinson v. DiCenso, and questioned the consti­
tutionality of statutes in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island which 
called for the spending of state funds to supplement teacher 
salaries and to provide other benefits to nonpublic schools.^ 
Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the seven-to-one majority, 
found the statutes allowing these actions to be unconstitu­
tional. Justice White recorded the lone dissent in the case. 
The Chief Justice said, "Every analysis in this area must 
begin with consideration of the ciamulative criteria developed 
by the Court over the years. "^0 majority opinion was based 
upon the three tests which the Chief Justice gleaned from the 
Court's previous decisions. The test questions were the 
following: 
1. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
4-SDeakin, P« 52. 
^Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
50Ibid., p. 612. 
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2. Its principle or primary effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion; 
3. The statute must not foster "an excessive government 
entanglement with religion."51 
The Chief Justice was careful to note that church and 
state cannot be separated by a wall. The state's responsibility 
to its citizens necessitates fire inspections and other 
activities which must extend into the domain of the church. 
According to the Chief Justice, church and state are separated 
by a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on 
all the circumstances of a particular relationship."52 
The Chief Justice, in drawing distinctions between this 
case and the Everson and Allen cases, noted that teachers were 
under religious control and discipline. This teacher involve­
ment issue posed a problem in the separation of religion from 
the secular aspects of education which had not been encountered 
in the use of tax money for textbooks, transportation, and 
lunches.53 Chief Justice Burger stated: 
We simply recognize that a dedicated religious 
person, teaching in a school affiliated with his or 
faith and operated to inculcate its tenets, will 
inevitably experierice great difficulty in remaining 
religiously neutral.54 
The Chief Justice felt that "comprehensive, discriminating, 
and continuing state surveillance" would be essential if the 
Sllbid. 
52rbi.d. , p. 614. 
53ibid., p. 617. 
54Ibid., p. 619. 
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restrictions of the First Amendment were to be enforced.^5 
This would violate the third of the tests that the Court had 
established as guides. 
The aspirations of those who hoped the Burger Court would 
expand the trend toward more tax aid for parochial schools 
were seemingly dashed by Chief Justice Burger. In his opinion 
the Chief Justice stated that what some had feared was the 
verge of entangling church and state relations now seemed to 
indicate that there would be no further erosion of the wall of 
separation between church and state. 
Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion in this case. 
He was joined by Justice Black in all three cases and by 
Justice Marshall, who did not participate in the Lemon case, 
in the Earley and Robinson opinions. This concurring opinion 
is only slightly shorter than the majority opinion written by 
the Chief Justice. Justice Douglas stated that the state 
should never get involved in financing sectarian education. 
A long history of Court cases in which the Court attempted to 
avoid such an entanglement was quoted. Justice Douglas felt 
that the statutes in this case were sophisticated attempts to 
avoid the Constitution and, as such, were as invalid as simple-
minded ones.57 
Justice Brennan dissented in the Lemon case and filed an 
opinion which served to express his feelings that not only were 
^Ibid. f p. 619. 
56Ibid., p. 624. 
57lbid., p. 641. 
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these statutes unconstitutional, but so, too, was the Federal 
Higher Education Act of 1963 which allowed federal grants to 
go.to sectarian institutions of higher education. 
Justice White dissented in the Earley and Robinson cases 
while concurring in the majority opinion in the Lemon case 
stating: 
Where a state program seeks to ensue the 
proper education of its young, in private as well 
as public schools, free exercise considerations 
at least counsel against refusing support for 
students attending parochial schools simply because 
in that setting they are also being instructed in 
the tenets of the faith they are constitutionally 
free to practice.58 
Justice White also noted the seeming inconsistencies 
of the Court in striking the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island 
statutes while allowing the Federal Higher Education Act of 
1963 to perform essentially the same function.^9 
Tilton v. Richardson was decided on the same day as 
f i ( )  
Lemon. This case tested the constitutionality of the Higher 
Education Facilities Act of 1963. Taxpayers and residents of 
Connecticut instituted action against federal officials and 
certain church-related institutions of higher education in 
Connecticut, challenging the constitutionality of the federal 
aid the defendant institutions were receiving. The Act pro­
vided grants to these institutions for the purpose of con­
structing buildings that would house secular activities. Under 
5^Ibid.) p, 665. 
59Ibid., p. 671. 
^Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). 
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the Act, the institutions would agree to use the buildings for 
only secular activities for twenty years. If this agreement 
was not honored, the United States would be entitled to recover 
a proportion of the original grant. A three-judge district 
court ruled that the Act did not violate the Constitution. 
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for entry of an 
appropriate judgment. The Court did not agree on an opinion; 
however, five Justices, Chief Justice Burger, and Justices 
Harlan, Stewart, Blackmun and White, agreed that the religion 
clause of the First Amendment was not violated as far as the 
authorization of construction grants was concerned. Eight mem­
bers of the Court agreed that the First Amendment was violated 
by the Act's provisions limiting the government's interest to 
twenty years. 
Chief Justice Burger announced the judgment of the Court, 
joined by Justices liarlan, Stewart, and Blackmun. The major­
ity noted that the Congress was reacting to a "strong nation­
wide demand" for the expansion of facilities at institutions of 
higher education when it passed the Act. The Act was adminis­
tered by the United States Commissioner of Education, and the 
majority found his procedures to be sufficient to guard against 
unconstitutional uses of the money for religious purposes.61 
61Ibid., p. 675. 
99 
Chief Justice Burger reviewed the Act from the perspec­
tive of the four tests which the Court had established in 
previous church and state cases.^2 
First, does the Act reflect a secular legis­
lative purpose? Second, is the primary effect of 
the Act to advance or inhibit religion? Third, 
does the administration of the Act foster an ex­
cessive government entanglement with religion? 
Fourth, does the implementation of the Act inhibit 
the free exercise of religion?63 
The Chief Justice answered the appellant's complaint that 
the institutions of higher education were "an integral part of 
the religious mission of the Catholic Church" by noting that 
the skepticism of the college student, the internal discipline 
of college-level courses, and academic freedom tend to limit 
any effort to indoctrinate students with religious instruction 
as may be done in precollege schools.^ In finding that the 
Act passed all the Court's tests, the Chief Justice stated, 
". . . the evidence shows institutions with admittedly religious 
functions, but whose predominant higher education mission is to 
provide their students with a secular education."65 
A dissenting opinion was written by Justice Douglas with 
Justice Black and Justice Marshall joining. This opinion called 
attention to the inconsistencies between the majority opinion 
in this case and the majority opinion in the Lenon case. 
62Ibid., p. 678. 
63ibid., p. 686. 
6̂ Ibid., 
65Ibid., p. 687. 
100 
The plurality's distinction is in effect 
that small violations of the First Amendment 
over a small period of years are unconstitutional 
(see Lemon and DiCenso) while a huge violation 
occurring only once is de minimis.06 
Justice Douglas' feelings were summarized when he stated: 
. . .  a  p a r o c h i a l  s c h o o l  i s  a  u n i t a r y  i n s t i ­
tution with subtle blending of sectarian and 
secular instruction. Thus the practices of 
religious schools are in no way affected by the 
minimal requirements that the government financed 
facility may not "be used for sectarian instruc­
tion or as a place for religious worship." Money 
saved from one item in the budget is free to be 
used elsewhere.67 
Lemon v. Kurtzman (1973) resulted from the efforts of the 
plaintiffs in Lemon I (1971) to enjoin payments of state funds 
for services which were found unconstitutional but performed 
before the date of the Court's decision in Lemon 1.68 This 
case, being a sequel to the first Lemon v. Kurtzman, is known 
as Lemon II. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Blackmun, 
Powell, and Rehnquist, announced the judgment of the Court. 
Justice White concurred in the judgment and Justices Douglas, 
Brennan, and Stewart dissented. Justice Marshall did not 
participate in the decision. 
In affirming the district court's decision, the Chief 
Justice noted that the plaintiffs had not taken any action 
66ibid., p. 693. 
67ibid. 
68Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973). 
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to enjoin the payment of funds to the schools prior to the 
date that contracts were entered into for the 1970-1971 
school year. The Court found that the denial of reimburse­
ment to church-related schools "would impose upon them a 
substantial burden which would be difficult for them to 
meet."69 Chief Justice Burger stated that the Court viewed 
Lemon I as an issue "whose resolution was not clearly fore­
showed."^® The Court concluded that the state officials who 
continued to act under the provisions of the Act in the period 
before the Court's initial decision were acting in good faith. 
Although not agreeing on an opinion, the Court agreed that 
the judgment of the federal district court should be affirmed. 
Justice Douglas dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and 
Stewart, saying, "There is as much a violation of the Estab­
lishment Clause of the First Amendment whether the payment 
from public funds to sectarian schools involves last year, the 
current year, or next year."71 
Justice Douglas did not agree with the Chief Justice and 
the majority in their contention that there was no warning in 
previous Court decisions that the subsidies were unconstitu­
tional. The dissenting justices felt that no consideration 
69ibid., p. 204. 
70ibid., p. 206. 
71lbid., p. 209. 
102 
of situation should have been made other than the consider­
ation that the Court had established its position in Lemon I. 
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. 
Nyquist (1973) tested the constitutionality of a New York 
statute which would have provided state money for maintenance 
and repair of nonpublic school facilities and equipment, for 
tuition reimbursement to parents of children attending non­
public elementary and secondary schools, and for tax relief 
for parents of nonpublic school children.Court was 
divided in its opinion in this case. 
Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion. Seven mem­
bers of the Court joined in his opinion that the maintenance 
and repair provisions of the statute were invalid because 
they had the primary effect of advancing religion, since no 
attempt was made to restrict payments to the upkeep of facil­
ities used exclusively for secular purposes. Five members of 
the Court joined Justice Powell in his opinion that the tuition 
reimbursement provisions were invalid based on essentially the 
same reasons stated in the rejection of the maintenance and 
repair funding. The tax-relief provisions for parents of non­
public school children were found to be insufficiently re­
stricted to assure that they would not have the effect of 
advancing the sectarian activities of religious schools. 
^Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. 
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
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In stating the Court's opinion in this case, Justice 
Powell again asked the three test questions which had evolved 
from previous decisions. The statute was judged to have a 
secular legislative purpose.73 The Court, however, found the 
statute was not restrictive and would have the impermissible 
effect of advancing the sectarian activities of the religious 
schools.74 The majority found it unnecessary to consider 
whether the statute would result in entanglement of the state 
with religion, since it had already judged it to be unconsti­
tutional . 
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist and in 
part by Justice White, concurred in part and dissented in part. 
The Chief Justice joined in the part of the Court's opinion 
which found the maintenance and repair provisions unconstitu­
tional, but he disagreed with the Court's decision to strike 
down New York and Pennsylvania tuition-grant programs and the 
New York tax-relief provisions.75 The Chief Justice based his 
dissent upon previous Court rulings which, in his opinion, 
separated government aid to individuals from direct aid to 
religious institutions. Chief Justice Burger stated, "The 
tuition grant and tax relief programs now before us are, in 
73ibid., p. 773. 
74ibid., p. 794. 
75sioan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973). 
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my view, indistinguishable in principle, purpose, and effect 
from the statutes in Ever8on and Allen."76 
Sloan v. Lemon (1973) tested the constitutionality of the 
Pennsylvania Parent Reimbursement Act for Nonpublic Educa­
tion. 77 This Act provided funds to reimburse parents for part 
of tuition expense incurred in sending their children to non­
public schools. 
Justice Powell, joined by five members of the Court, stated 
the Court's opinion in this case. The Court found the Act to 
be in violation of the Establishraent Clause of the Constitution 
for generally the same reasons as stated in Nyquist. Chief 
Justice Burger, Justices White, and Rehnquist dissented on the 
grounds that aid to individuals is permissible under the 
Constitution and the Court's previous rulings. 
Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and Religious 
Liberty (1973) tested the constitutionality of a New York 
statute which provided for state reimbursement of private 
schools for certain testing and record-keeping costs which 
were required by the state.78 chief Justice Burger, express­
ing the views of five members of the Court, held that the 
statute was an unconstitutional aid to religion. In differen­
tiating this act from acts which the Court had found to be 
constitutional, the Chief Justice stated: 
76committee v* Nyquist, 413 U.S. 803 (1973). 
77sioan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973). 
7̂ Levitt v. Committee, 413 U.S. 472 (1973). 
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The statute now before us, as written and as 
applied by the Commissioner of Education, contains 
some of the same constitutional flaws that led the 
Court to its decision in Nyquist. We cannot ignore 
the substantial risk that these examinations, pre­
pared by teachers under the authority of religious 
institutions, will be drafted with an eye, uncon­
sciously or otherwise, to inculcate students in the 
religious precepts of the sponsoring church.'" 
Justice Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, though not join­
ing in the opinion written by the Chief Justice, were of the 
view that the Act was unconstitutional because of the Court's 
decisions in Hyquist. Justice White dissented without opinion. 
Hunt v. McNair tested the constitutionality of the South. 
Carolina Educational Facilities Act insofar as it authorized 
a proposed financing transaction involving the state-created 
Educational Facilities Authority's issuance of revenue bonds 
that would benefit the Baptist College of Charleston.®^ The 
Act provided for bond proceeds to be used to finance a project 
which the college would convey to the Authority. The Authority 
would lease it back to the college, and upon full repayment of 
the bonds, the college would assume ownership. 
Justice Powell, expressing the views of six members of 
the Court, held that the Act did not violate the First Amend­
ments establishment clause. In applying the Court's three-
part test, Justice Powell found that the statute had a secular 
purpose, would not advance or inhibit religion, and would not 
79ibid., p. 480. 
SOfiunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973). 
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entangle the state in religion. In this opinion Justice 
Powell quoted Chief Justice Burger's opinion in previous cases 
on several occasions. 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, 
dissented, noting that the Act aided religious institutions by 
allowing the College to "avail itself of the state's unique 
ability to borrow money at low interest rates."82 
Norwood v. Harrison tested the constitutionality of a 
Mississippi program to loan state-owned textbooks to children 
attending racially segregated private schools.Chief Justice 
Burger, expressing the views of seven members of the Court, 
held that the state's loaning of textbooks to students attend­
ing racially discriminatory private schools was unconstitutional. 
The Chief Justice stated that though the Constitution may 
compel toleration of private discrimination in some situations, 
it "does not mean that it requires state support for such dis­
crimination. "84 The Court ruled that the program was uncon­
stitutional because it aided sectarian education in segregated 
schools. The Court remanded the case to the district court 
and recommended that a screening program be established which 
81Ibid.,pp. 743, 745, and 746. 
82Ibid., p. 755. 
83Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973). 
84Ibid., p. 463. 
107 
would screen schools applying for textbook aid. Justices 
Douglas and Brennan, though not joining in the opinion of 
the Chief Justice, concurred. 
Wheeler v. Barrera (1974) tested the constitutionality 
of using federal funds under Title I of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 to fund special programs for 
educationally deprived children in private parochial schools.85 
In this case parochial school students brought suit to force 
state public school authorities to provide adequate Title I 
programs that were comparable to programs provided for public 
schools. 
Justice Blackmun delivered the majority opinion, joined 
by five members of the Court, including the Chief Justice. 
The Court found that the Title I programs provided for non­
public schools in Missouri were substantially inferior to 
those provided for public schools.̂  The Court outlined three 
methods byvhich the state could provide funding for nonpublic 
schools and fulfill the intent of the legislation. First, the 
state could approve plans that measure up to the requirements 
of comparability without using on-the-premises teachers. 
Second, it could develop a plan that eliminates the use of on-
the-premises instruction in both public and private schools. 
Third, it could become a nonparticipant in the Title I program. 
85yheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974). 
86lbid., p. 410. 
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The Court refused to render an opinion 011 the issue of whether 
Title I legislation violated the First Amendment, since no 
specific plan was put before the Court. 
Meek v. Pittenger (1975) challenged the constitutionality 
of Pennsylvania Acts 194 and 195.^7 These Acts, in an effort 
to assure every student an opportunity to share in the benefits 
of auxiliary services, textbooks, and instructional materials, 
authorized the Commonwealth to provide counseling; testing and 
psychological services; speech and hearing therapy; teaching 
and related services for exceptional children, for remedial 
students, and for the educationally disadvantaged; and text­
books for students in nonpublic elementary and secondary 
schools. Act 195 also authorized the Secretary of Education 
to lend periodicals, phonographs, maps, charts, sound record­
ings, films, and other printed or published materials directly 
to the nonpublic schools upon their requests. 
Justice Stewart announced the judgment of the Court and 
was joined in his opinion by Justices Blackmun and Powell. 
Justice Stewart noted that the District Court had applied the 
three-part test that had been established by the Court in its 
considering of the constitutionality of the Act. The District 
Court found the textbook loan provisions of Act 195 to be 
identical to the program the Court considered in Allen. The 
Court agreed with this portion of the District Court's decision. 
37Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
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The Court refused, however, to accept the District Court's 
findings that the other provisions of the Acts were consti­
tutional . 
Justice Stewart noted that the amount of aid, twelve 
million dollars in 1972-1973, had the effect of advancing 
religion. The Court concluded that this was sufficient to 
find unconstitutional the provisions of the Acts which gave 
the nonpublic schools materials. With regard to the provi­
sions of the Acts which provided teacher services to the 
schools, the Court noted that "Whether the subject is 'reme­
dial reading,' 'advanced reading,' or simple 'reading,' a 
teacher remains a teacher, and the danger that religious doc­
trine will become intertwined with secular instruction 
persists."88 
Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Douglas and 
Marshall in concurring and dissenting. Justice Brennan joined 
in the reversal of the District Court's judgment in upholding 
the constitutionality of Act 194 and Act 195, but dissented 
from the majority opinion in upholding the constitutionality 
of the textbook loan provision. This dissent notes that the 
Court established a fourth test to be applied in cases where 
church and state issues arose in the funding of nonpublic 
schools. This was the test for the potentially devisive 
38ibid., p. 370. 
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political effects of an aid program. Justice Brennan, who 
joined the Court's decision in Allen which found a similar 
textbook loan program to be constitutional, stated that the 
Allen case was decided before the Kurtzman test was estab­
lished and the Court should not overlook this fourth test 
simply because it was not a part of the Allen decision.89 
This dissent also notes that the books are loaned to the non­
public schools and not to the students. 
Justices Powell, White, and Marshall concurred in the 
judgment of the Court. Justice Douglas filed a dissenting 
opinion. 
Roemer v. Maryland Public Works (1976) challenged the 
Maryland statute which provided aid to private, including 
parochial, colleges.^ This statute provided for annual non-
categorical grants to state-accredited private colleges re­
quiring only that none of the state funds be used for sectar­
ian purposes and that the institutions award not only seminar­
ian or theological degrees. The Court was unable to agree on 
an opinion; however, five members of the Court agreed that the 
statute did not violate the establishment clause of the First 
Amendment. 
Justice Blackmun announced the judgment of the Court, 
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Blackmun 
89ibid., p. 378. 
90Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976). 
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found that the Maryland statute passed the Court's three-part 
test and did not violate the establishment clause of the 
First Amendment. 
In a concurring opinion Justice White, joined by Justice 
Rehnquist, expressed the view that the three-fold test was 
superfluous and it was not necessary to consider whether there 
was "excessive entanglement" of church and state when the other 
tests proved to be negative.91 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented; 
Justice Stewart dissented; and Justice Stevens dissented. 
Wolman v. Walter (1977) tested the constitutionality of 
all but one of the provisions of Ohio Revenue Code 3317,06, 
which authorized various forms of aid to nonpublic, induding 
parochial, schools.92 The Ohio plan called for funding to non­
public school children for textbooks; tests and test scoring; 
speech, hearing, and psychological diagnostic services; 
theraputic, guidance, and remedial services for students 
needing specialized attention; instructional materials and 
equipment; and field trip transportation. 
The Court ruled that the parts of the Ohio statute auth­
orizing the state to provide nonpublic school students with 
books, standardized testing and scoring, diagnostic services, 
and therapeutic and remedial services were constitutional. 
91Ibid., p. 749. 
92Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). 
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The parts of the statute authorizing funds for instructional 
materials and equipment and for field trips were found to be 
unconstitutional. 
The Court was split in this case. Four concurring and 
dissenting opinions were filed and one dissenting opinion was 
filed. Justice Blaclcmun announced the judgment of the Court 
joined in part by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, 
Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens. Justices Brennan, 
Marshall, Powell, and Stevens filed statements concurring in 
part and dissenting in part. Chief Justice Burger dissented 
from two parts of the Court's opinion. Justice White and 
Rehnquist concurred in part and dissented in part. 
In New York v. Cathedral Academy (1977) the constitution­
ality of a New York statute by which the state would reimburse 
nonpublic schools for the cost of certain state-required test­
ing and recordkeeping was tested.93 The Court ruled, in a 
six-to-three decision, that the statute was unconstitutional 
because "it will of necessity either have the primary effect of 
aiding religion, or will result in excessive state involvement 
in religious affairs."94 
Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented, stating that 
they would have affirmed the judgment of the Coutt of Appeals 
93n6W York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977). 
94Ibid., p. 133. 
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of New York which had found the statute to be constitu­
tional.^ Justice White dissented, stating that he believed 
the Court had misconstrued the First Amendment in a manner 
that was "contrary to the fundamental educational needs of 
the country."96 
In summary action the Court affirmed an Appellate Court 
decision that a Connecticut act authorizing state reimburse­
ment to private schools for a part of the expense of texts 
and teachers' salaries incurred in teaching secular subjects 
was unconstitutional.97 The Court denied an application for 
a stay of the order of a district court which had found an 
Ohio tuition-reimbursement plan for parents of students in 
nonpublic schools to be unconstitutional.98 Chief Justice 
Burger, Justices White, and Rehnquist dissented in this case 
and would have granted the stay. 
Marburger v. Public Funds (1974) was a memorandum deci­
sion in which the Court upheld the decision of a Federal 
District Court in which a New Jersey statute providing funds 
for reimbursement of parents of nonpublic school students 
for textbooks, instructional materials, and supply expenditures 
95Ibid., p. 134. 
96Ibid. 
97johnson v. Sanders, 403 U.S. 955 (1971). 
98Essex v. Wolman, 92 S. Ct. 1761 (1972). 
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was found to be unconstitutional.99 jn this case Chief Justice 
Burger, and Justices White and Rehnquist stated that they noted 
probable jurisdiction and would have set the case for oral 
argument. 
In two summary judgments issued on October 21, 1974, the 
Court affirmed lower court decisions which prevented nonpublic 
students from getting tax funded bus transportation,100 and 
struck down a California statute which would have given a state 
income-tax reduction to taxpayers sending their children to 
nonpublic schools.1^1 in both of these cases, Justice White 
dissented, joined by the Chief Justice. 
Analysis of Chief J\istice Burger's Influence 
Chief Justice Burger's attitude toward the proper involve­
ment of the state in nonpublic, including sectarian, schools is 
revealed in his opinions in the cases which the Court has con­
sidered. In each of these cases the Chief Justice has consist­
ently rejected any attempt to directly finance religious 
instruction; however, he has been equally as consistent in his 
efforts to get the Court to expand its rulings so thatmore 
state aid could be given directly to nonpublic school students 
and their parents,under the "child benefit theory." 
^^Marburger v. Public Funds, 417 U.S. 961 (1974). 
100Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 419 U.S. 888 (1974). 
lOlTax Board v. United Americans, 419 U.S. 890 (1974). 
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The justices use their opinions to express their feelings 
and attitudes about the issues which come before the Court. 
When a justice writes an opinion for the majority, he must be 
concerned with developing a statement that will be acceptable 
to the entire Court. This responsibility often forces a jus­
tice to make compromises that disguise his true feelings. 
When a justice writes a dissenting opinion, however, he is free 
to express his true feelings. The dissenting justice is making 
an appeal to a future care in which the Court may again consider 
a similar issue.102 por this reason the dissenting opinion 
gives a much more accurate indication of the true attitude of 
a justice. 
Chief Justice Burger has dissented often in education 
cases dealing with the involvement of church and state. In 
these dissents his support for the use of state funds to aid 
nonpublic school students and their parents is well docvimented. 
The Chief Justice's dissent in Committee v. Nyquist illustrates 
this point: 
While there is no straight line running through 
our decisions interpreting the Establishment and Free 
Exercise clauses of the First Amendment, our cases do, 
it seems to me, lay down one solid, basic principle: 
that the Establishment Clause does not forbid govern­
ments, state or federal, to enact a program of general 
welfare under which benefits are distributed to pri­
vate individuals, even though many of these individuals 
may elect to use those benefits in ways that "aid" 
religious institutions of worship.103 
102The Sup reme Court: Views from Inside (New York: V I .W. 
Norton Co., 1960) , p~ 26. 
lO^Committee v. Nyquist, p. 799. 
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A second factor which must be considered, is the attitudes 
of the associate justices. The dissenting opinions and voting 
patterns of the associate justices serve to indicate their 
attitudes in education cases dealing with the involvement of 
church and state. 
Justices Black and Harlan served on the Burger Court from 
1969 until September of 1971. During this time they partici­
pated in four education cases which dealt with the involvement 
of church and state. In all four cases they voted the same 
way the Chief Justice did. Eecause of the relatively small 
number of cases in which these two justices participated, no 
further analysis of their attitudes seems warranted. 
Two justices seem to share the Chief Justice's desire to 
expand the range of permissable state aid to nonpublic schools. 
Justice White, xvho has served on the Burger Court since 1969, 
and Justice Rehnquist, who has served since December of 1971, 
have voted with the Chief Justice in overninety percent of the 
education cases dealing with church and state involvement. 
These three justices often join in dissenting opinions in church 
and state cases which do not allow the use of state funds. This 
group, Chief Justice Eurger, Justice White, and Justice Rehnquist, 
meets Sprague's criteria for identification as a voting bloc in 
education cases dealing with church and state involvement.104 
^-04-Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tannenhaus, The Study of 
Public Law (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 163-165. 
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Justice Douglas, who served on the Burger Court from 
1969 to November 1975, joined by Justices Brennan and 
Marshall, who have served on the Burger Court since 1969, made 
up the bloc which most often found itself in opposition to the 
Burger, White, and Rehnquist bloc. This bloc of Douglas, 
Brennan, and Marshall, also met Sprague's criteria for iden­
tification as a voting bloc in education cases dealing with 
church and state involvement. The members of this group agreed 
in eighty-eight percent of these cases. These three justices 
agreed with Chief Justice Burger in only thirty-eight percent 
of these cases. 
Justice Douglas, being the senior-most justice following 
Justice Black's retirement in 1971, could be considered the 
leader of his bloc and attempted to attract nonaligned jus­
tices to his bloc's position through the assignment of the 
opinion writing duty. The position of Justice Douglas and the 
members of his bloc is directly opposed to the position of 
Chief Justice Burger and the members of his bloc. This fact 
is seen in Justice Douglas' dissent in Tilton v. Richardson: 
. . . a parochial school is a unitary institu­
tion with subtle blending of sectarian and secular 
instruction. Thus the practices of religious schools 
are in no way affected by the minimal requirements 
that the government-financed facility may not "be 
used for sectarian instruction or as a place for 
religious worship." Money saved from one item in the 
budget is free to be used elsewhere.105 
lO^Tilton v< Richardson, p. 693. 
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The justices who were not in the Burger, White, and 
Rehnquist bloc or the Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall bloc were 
referred to as the swing vote justices. This title derived 
from their tendency to swing between the two voting blocs. The 
swing vote justices are Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, 
and Stevens. Justice Stewart has voted with Chief Justice 
Burger in forty-eight percent of the education church and 
state cases. His support has been fairly well divided between 
the two voting blocs. Being one of only four justices who has 
written a majority opinion in the education church and state 
cases leads to the conclusion that Professor David J. Danelski's 
rules for winning justices to a majority opinion, as noted in 
Chapter It, may have been utilized in assigning opinions to this 
justice.106 The other swing vote justices are Justice Blackmun, 
having voted with Chief Justice Burger sixty-three percent of 
the time, and Justice Powell, having voted with the Chief 
Justice sixty-one percent of the time, Like Justice Stewart, 
these two have also written majority opinions and the assump­
tion concerning Danelski's rules for assigning opinions to 
uncommitted justices seems to hold for them as well. 
The last justice to be appointed, Justice Stevens, has had 
only limited opportunity to vote in educational church and state 
issues. Having replaced Justice Douglas on the Court, his 
twenty-nine percent agreement rate with the Chief Justice may 
indicate that he may replace Justice Douglas in his voting bloc. 
106vja2.ter Murphy and Herman Pritchett, Courts, Judges, and 
Politics (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 504. 
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During the tenure of Chief Justice Burger up to the end 
of the October 1978 term, the Chief Justice had written five 
of the Court's opinions, thirty-three percent, in education 
church and state questions. This percentage compares with 
twenty-three percent of the remaining opinions having been 
written by Justice Powell, another twenty-three percent by 
Justice Blackmun, and sixteen percent by Justice Stewart. In 
sixty-two percent of the education church and state cases the 
Chief Justice concurred with the majority. In thirty-eight 
percent of these cases, the Chief Justice dissented, at least 
in part. In summary decisions, the Chief Justice dissented in 
four of the five cases considered. 
An analysis of the eighteen cases which were decided by 
the Court during this period shows that six, or one-third, of 
the education church and state decisions could be considered 
to be sympathetic to the concept of state aid for nonpublic 
schools. A case-by-case analysis reveals the role the Chief 
Justice played in the formation of decisions. 
The education church and state cases which were decided 
by the Burger Court must be viewed within the context of pre­
vious Court decisions. The Warren Court had considered a 
number of education church and state questions which had en­
couraged both separationists, those who advocate no state aid 
for religious institutions, and accommodationists, those who 
advocate state aid for religious institutions. In Everson and 
Allen the Court handed down decisions which were favorable to 
accommodationists who wanted increased state aid for religiously 
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affiliated schools. As a result of these decisions and the 
continuing increase in the cost of education at nonpublic 
schools, several state legislatures enacted statutes which 
allowed state aid to provide support to these schools.107 
Before these new statutes could be tested by the Court, Chief 
Justice Warren retired, and Chief Justice Burger assumed his 
position. 
The first church and state case to be considered by the 
Burger Court did not directly concern education. The opinion 
in Walz v. Tax Commission (1970) was written by Chief Justice 
Burger.1^8 This opinion, which was joined by all members of 
the Court except Justice Douglas, stated that property tax 
exemptions for church properties were permissable under the 
First Amendment. Following this decision, however, the Court 
had still not established a clear-cut position on church and 
state involvement.109 
The Tilton and Lemon I decisions, both reported on June 28, 
1971, were the first education church and state decisions de­
livered by the Burger Court. In Lemon I the Court rejected 
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes which provided state 
funds for supplementing nonpublic school teachers' salaries. 
The Chief Justice wrote the majority opinion in both these 
107philip Kurland (ed.) Church and State (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 238. 
108 âiz v> Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
lO^Kurland, pp. 240-241. 
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cases. By controlling the opinion-writing duty and assigning 
it to himself, the Chief Justice was able to establish the 
criteria by which future education church and state questions 
would be resolved. The criteria developed by the Chief Justice 
consisted of three test questions which were consolidated from 
previous Court decisions. These three questions asked: 
(1) Does the statute have a secular legislative purpose? 
(2) Does it have the primary effect of advancing or 
inhibiting religion? 
(3) Does it foster an excessive government entanglement 
with religion? 
In addition to these tests, the Chief Justice was able to in­
clude in this majority opinion a statement expressing the 
attitude that the line of separation between church and state 
was not a wall but rather a "blurred, indistinct, and variable 
barrier. ® The voluminous concurring opinions in this case 
indicate that a number of the associate justices did not feel 
comfortable with the Chief Justice's majority opinion. The 
Court had rejected an attempt by two states to aid nonpublic 
schools. Yet the Chief Justice, by controlling the writing of 
the majority opinion, had been able to soften this defeat for 
the accommodationists and leave the door open for Court approval 
of future state-aid programs. Justice Douglas' concurring 
opinion in this case serves to show how wary the associated 
justices were. This concurring opinion was written to counter 
HOLemon v. Kurtznan, p. 602. 
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Chief Justice Burger's claim that the line separating church 
and state was less than a wall. In this ca9e it would seem 
that Chief Justice Burger was able to exert his influence in 
a manner that established a precedent which would in the 
future allow state funding which he felt was constitutional. 
In Tilton the Chief Justice was able to play a much more 
decisive role. The decision approved the use of federal con­
struction grants at sectarian colleges. The Chief Justice 
cast the deciding fifth vote in this five-to-four decision. 
The majority was composed of consistent accommodationist 
supporters Justices White and Harlan joined by swing Justices 
Blackmun and Stewart. The role played by Chief Justice Burger 
in attracting these two swing votes is impossible to determine, 
but it seems reasonable to assume that he played some part in 
the discussions which may have affected their votes. There is 
no doubt, however, that he, as the Chief Justice who votes last, 
was the deciding factor in this case. 
The dissenting opinions in Tilton give an indication of 
the philosophical split between the bloc of justices with 
separationist sympathies and those with accommodationist sym­
pathies. This conflict and the resulting fight for votes from 
swing justices would be repeated in later decisions. 
Two years after Lemon I the litigants returned to the 
Court to argue the issue of whether religious schools could 
get the funds contracted for before the Court's decisions in 
Lemon I. This case, known as Lemon II, again tested the Chief 
Justice's ability to obtain a favorable accommodationist 
123 
decision. In this decision the Chief Justice had to rely on 
newly appointed Nixon justices plus Justice White in order to 
obtain the five votes required to control the decision. The 
Warren Court justices still in the Court,with the exception 
of Justice White, had given an indication of their separa-
tionist bent in previous cases.m Again, it is impossible 
to determine the degree to which Chief Justice Burger was able 
to persuade Justices Blackmun and Powell, the two swing votes, 
during the discussion of this case. Eased on their voting 
record in all cases, it would seem that Justices White and 
Rehnquist needed no persuasion to vote in favor of the accom-
modationist view. Justice Stewart was lost from the accommo-
dationist majority in this case after being one of the essen­
tial votes in Tilton. In this case the Chief Justice was again 
able to cast the deciding and critical fifth vote for the 
accommodationist position. 
The Chief Justice was the Court spokesman in the first 
three education church and state decisions; however, the next 
case to come before the Court, Nyquist, ended his domination. 
In Nyquist, the accommodationist bloc of Chief Justice Burger, 
Justice White, and Justice Rehnquist stood alone in a six-to-
three decision which barred a tuition reimbursement and tax-
relief plan for parents of nonpublic school students. This 
bloc was unable to attract any justices from the swing vote 
m*Kurland, p. 246. 
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group. Any attempts at influencing, on the part of the Chief 
Justice in this case, seem to have been fruitless. 
David Danelski has suggested, as noted in Chapter It, that 
the assignment of the opinion-writing duty may be used to 
attract undecided justices to a voting bloc's point of view. 
The Nyquist decision may be a result of this kind of action on 
the part of Justice Douglas. As the senior justice voting with 
the majority in a case in which the Chief Justice dissented, 
Justice Douglas had the opportunity to assign the majority 
opinion-writing duty. Justice Douglas had written a concurring 
or dissenting opinion in the three previous education church 
and state cases. To assign the opinion-writing duty to another 
justice seems to be inconsistent with Justice Douglas' previous 
actions, unless assigning the opinion to Justice Powell was 
done to attract the votes of other justices who might not be 
able to agree with an opinion written by the strict separation-
ist Douglas. Regardless of what leadership might have been ex­
erted by Justice Douglas, however, it seems obvious that the 
Chief Justice had very little impact in this case. 
In a companion case, Sloan v. Lemon (1973) (decided the 
same day as Nyquist), Justice Powell delivered an opinion in 
which the Court found a tuition-reimbursement plan that was 
similar to the one reviewed in Nyquist to be unconstitutional. 
The voting pattern in this case was identical to the pattern in 
Nyquist. It seems logical to assume that the strategy used in 
the analysis of Nyquist would also apply to Sloan. 
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In Levitt v. Committee (1973) the Court was asked to 
rule on the constitutionality of a New York plan that allowed 
public funding of nonpublic schools for certain testing and 
record-keeping costs. This plan seems to have violated the 
demands of separation between church and state that the Chief 
Justice had set for himself. In writing the majority opinion 
in this case, the Chief Justice noted the potential for sec­
tarian teachers to use state-funded teacher-made tests to 
incorporate "some aspect of faith or morals in secular sub­
jects. "112 Even though the Chief Justice was among the major­
ity and wrote the opinion in this case, there seems little 
doubt that, based on previous voting records, he had practi­
cally no meaningful influence on the voting in this case. 
Justice White continued his support for accommodation by dis­
senting, and Justice Rehnquist agreed with the Chief Justice's 
opinion, but the remainder of the Court voted in a manner that 
was consistent with their prior records. 
In Hunt v. McNair (1973) the Chief Justice may have acted 
in accordance with Danelski's theory by assigning the majority 
opinion-writing duty to a justice who could attract uncommitted 
votes. Justice Douglas had assigned the opinion to Justice 
Powell in Nyquist in what was an apparent attempt at attracting 
uncommitted votes. Now Chief Justice Burger appointed Justice 
Powell as opinion writer in what was perhaps another attempt to 
attract some of Justice Powell's swing-vote associates. In this 
H^Levitt v. Committee, p. 481. 
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case the majority consisted of the accommodationist bloc, 
Burger, White, and Rehnquist, plus swing Justices Blackmun 
and Powell. The separationists voting against the majority 
included Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart. Justice 
Marshall, usually a member of the separationist bloc, voted 
with the Chief Justice in this case. The information avail­
able in this case does not support the conclusion that Chief 
Justice Burger was solely responsible for the pro-accommoda-
tionist decision; however, knowledge of prior voting records 
and the fact that Chief Justice Burger assigned the opinion to 
someone other than himself in an education church and state 
case for the first time indicates that he was at least one of 
the factors in the decision. 
In Wheeler v. Barrera (1974) the Court again decided a 
case in a manner that was favorable to accommodationist inter­
ests. This time the Court was asked to direct Missouri to 
equalize the programs provided for nonpublic and public schools 
under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 
1965 funding. In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Court did 
just that. Missouri school officials were given three alter­
natives which would obtain the balance the Court required. 
Since the Court was not ruling on a plan already in operation, 
the Court concerned itself with the federal government's right 
to extend Title I to nonpublic schools. 
This case was decided by an eight-to-one vote. Only 
Justice Douglas from the separationist bloc dissented. Again 
the Chief Justice chose to assign the opinion writing to a 
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swing-vote justice. The vote in this case seems to indicate 
that the Court was well united behind this acconimodationist 
decision. Yet the concurring opinion of Justice Powell, in 
which he states his reservations about the decision, indi­
cated that the Court was not nearly as united as the margin 
seems to indicate. Chief Justice Burger seems to have again 
used a justice who could attract uncommitteed members of the 
Court for the opinion-writing duty. There is little doubt 
that the accommodationists were active during the conference, 
trying to win their colleagues to their point of view. The 
precise role played by Chief Justice Burger cannot be deter­
mined; however, his decision to appoint a justice not associa­
ted with the accommodaticrist bloc seems to have been important 
in view of the reservations expressed by Justice Powell. 
Following their success in Wheeler, the accommodationists 
were faced with a case in which Pennsylvania statutes authoiz-
ing a series of benefits for nonpublic schools were being 
tested. In Meek v. Pittenger, the acconimodationist majority 
that seemed solid in Wheeler evaporated. Of the provisions 
in Pennsylvania Acts 194 and 195, this Court left intact only 
the textbook loans in Allen, and this decision must be con­
sidered a defeat for the accommodationists. 
In Meek the swing votes were critical. The acconimoda­
tionist bloc of Burger, White, and Rehnquist was supported by 
the swing votes of Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell in approving 
the textbook loan program, but they could not hold this 
alliance to obtain approval for the auxiliary services, 
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equipment, and materials provisions. The separatist bloc re­
mained united in their dissent on the textbook provisions and 
in their support for the Court's ruling on the other provi­
sions. The Chief Justice seems to have been unsuccessful in 
any attempts he might have made in trying to win approval of 
the auxiliary services, equipment, and materials provisions 
in this case. 
The split in the Court which played a role in the Meek 
decision was again a factor in Roemer v. Public Works (1976). 
In this case a Maryland statute which provided state aid to 
religiously affiliated colleges was challenged. Being badly 
split, the Court was unable to agree on an opinion. The 
accommodationists were able to solicit the cooperation of two 
swing Justices, Blackmun and Powell, and produce an opinion 
which stated the Court's belief that the statute did not vio­
late the establishment clause of the First Amendment. 
This five-to-four decision was the result of the accom­
modationists being joined by two swing justices. The Chief 
Justice was able to cast the fifth and deciding vote in the 
case, but his use of the right to assign the opinion may have 
been equally important. In finding it impossible to agree on 
an opinion, the Court was more divided in this case than in 
any other education church and state case to date. The fact 
that only the Chief Justice and Justice Powell joined in 
Justice Blackmun's decision is evidence of the deep split in 
the Court. Even traditional accommodationists White and 
Rehnquist felt that it was necessary to ^^7rite a concurring 
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opinion, apparently believing the Court's opinion was too 
restricted. This case, possibly above all previous cases, 
demonstrates Chief Justice Burger's ability to obtain a de­
cision which is agreeable with his philosophy by means of 
skillful management of opinion assignment and the ability to 
cast a deciding fifth vote. 
In Wolman v. Walter (1977) the Court was again divided in 
a case which questioned the constitutionality of state aid to 
religious schools. In this case an Ohio statute which author­
ized the expenditure of public funds for textbooks, testing, 
diagnostic testing services, remedial services, materials, 
equipment, and field trips for nonpublic schools x<ras challenged. 
The Court affirmed the part of the lower court ruling which 
allowed state funding for textbooks, standardized testing and 
scoring services, diagnostic services, and therapeutic and 
remedial services. The Court reversed the lower court's 
approval of state funding for instructional materials and equip­
ment and field trips. 
Though dissenting in part, Chief Justice Burger seems to 
have played a role in the expansion of the Court's view of how 
much state aid should be given nonpublic schools. Since Allen 
the Court had found textbook loan programs to be constitutional; 
however, this case expanded the range of permissible aid to 
include standardized testing, diagnostic services, therapeutic 
services, and remedial services. Again the Chief Justice seems 
to have chosen a writer for the majority opinion who could 
attract the required number of swing votes to insure approval 
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of the expanded list of nonpublic school tax-supported aids. 
The Wolman decision was accompanied by a large number of dis­
senting and concurring opinions, as was Meek; however, once 
again the accommodationists were able to influence the Court 
and obtain an expansion of previously approved state-aid pro­
grams. Giving Chief Justice Burger credit for controlling all 
of these actions cannot be justified, but, considering his 
attitude in church and state matters, it is not difficult to 
assume that he played a major part in the formation of the 
decision through the powers he controls as Chief Justice. 
The separationists asserted themselves following the Meek 
and Wolman decisions, and in a six-to-three decision struck 
down a New York statute which called for state paymeite of fixed 
amounts to nonpublic schools for testing and record keeping. 
In this case the accommodationist bloc stood alone in dissent. 
The Chief Justice made use of a dissenting opinion to express 
his displeaure with the Court's opinion. Any attempts he 
might have made to influence the decision in this case seem 
to have been fruitless. 
In the Court's summary decisions in education church and 
state cases, the Chief Justice was ineffectual. The Court 
issued summary decisions in five education church and state 
cases. In these five cases the Chief Justice dissented in the 
Court's handling of four of the five cases. In each of the 
cases in which the Chief Justice dissented, the Court refused 
to consider lower court rejections of programs giving state 
aid to nonpublic schools. 
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The alignment of justices in separationist, accommoda-
tionist, and swing-vote blocs has had the effect of producing 
decisions in education church and state cases which are neither 
consistently favorable nor antagonistic toward the use of 
state aid in nonpublic schools. Chief Justice Burger, as a 
member of the accommodationist bloc, seems to have been able 
to exert some influence in obtaining decisions sympathetic to 
his philosophy. Though the assumptions about Chief Justice 
Burger's use of his opinion assignment duty to gain swing votes 
are speculative, there is no doubt that he was the deciding 
factor in cases where he, voting last, cast the fifth and de­
ciding vote. Chief Justice Burger has not been able to unite 
a divided Court as Chief Justice Warren did; however, he has 
been able to exert a significant amount of influence in 
education church and state cases. 
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Voting Record in Relation to the Majority Opinion 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) 
Pennsylvania salary reimbursement plan held unconstitutional. 
C* c c c D c C N C X X X 
Early v. DiCenso, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) 
Rhode Island salary supplement plan held unconstitutional. 
C* c c c c c D c C X X X 
Robinson v. DiCenso, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) 
Rhode Island salary supplement plan held unconstitutional. 
C* c c c c c D c c X X X 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; N - Nonparticipant 
X - Retired or not yet seated; * - Announced decision 
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Voting Record in Relation to the Majority Opinion 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) 
Federal construction grants for colleges held constitutional. 
C* D D C D C C D C X X X 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) (Lemon II) 
Payment for educational services performed before Lemon I. 
c* X D X D D C N C c c X 
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) 
Bond plan for sectarian college held constitutional. 
C X D X D D C C c c* c X 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; N - Nonparticipant 
X - Retired or not yet seated; * - Announced decision 
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Voting Record in Relation to the Majority Opinion 
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. 
Hyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) 
1. State grants for maintenance and repair held 
unconstitutional. 
C X c X c c c C c c* c X 
2. Tuition reimbursement plan held unconstitutional. 
D X c X c c D c c c* D X 
3. Tax relief for parents held unconstitutional. 
D X c X c c D c c c* D X 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; N - Nonparticipant 
X - Retired or not yet seated; * - Announced decision 
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Voting Record in Relation to the Majority Opinion 
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) 
Pennsylvania tuition reimbursement plan held unconstitutional. 
D X C X C C D C C C* D X 
Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty, 
2+13 U.S. 472 (1973) 
New York reimbursement plan for testing and record keeping 
held unconstitutional. 
c* X C X c c D c c C C X 
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) 
Textbook loan plan for racially discriminatory non-public 
school held unconstitutional. 
c* X c X c c c c c c c X 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; N - Nonparticipant 
X - Retired or not yet seated; * - Announced decision 
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Voting Record in Relation to the Majority Opinion 
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) 
1. Pennsylvania Act authorizing auxiliary services 
held unconstitutional. 
D X C X C C* D C C C D X 
2. Pennsylvania Act authorizing materials and 
equipment held unconstitutional. 
D X C X C c* D C C C D X 
3. Pennsylvania Act authorizing textbook loan held 
constitutional. 
C X D X D c* c D C C C X 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; N - Nonparticipant 
X - Retired or not yet seated; * - Announced decision 
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Voting Record in Relation to the Majority Opinion 
Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974) 
Use of Title I funds at non-public schools held constitutional. 
C X D X C C C C C* c c X 
Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) 
Maryland program for aiding sectarian colleges held 
constitutional. 
c X X X D D c D c* c c D 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; N - Nonparticipant 
X - Retired or not yet seated; * - Announced decision 
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Voting Record in Relation to the Majority Opinion 
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) 
T. Textbook loan and standardized test programs held 
constitutional. 
C X X X D C C D c* C C D 
2. Speech, hearing, and diagnostic services held 
constitutional. 
C X X X D C C c c* c c c 
3. Therapeutic, guidance, and remedial services held 
constitutional. 
c X X X D c c D c* c c c 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; N - Nonparticipant 
X - Retired or not yet seated; * - Announced decision 
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Voting Record in Relation to the Majority Opinion 
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (Continued) 
5". Instructional materials and equipment programs held 
uncons titutional. 
D X X X C C D C c* D D C 
5 >. Transportation program for field trips held 
uncons titutional. 
D X X X C C D C C* D D C 
New York v. Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977) 
New Tfork plan for reimbursement for testing and record 
keeping held unconstitutional. 
D X X X C C D C C C D c* 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; N - Nonparticipant 
X - Retired or not yet seated; * - Announced decision 
CHAPTER IV 
DESEGREGATION CASES 
Introduction 
The Fourteenth Amendment makes no mention of schools or 
education. However, the Amendment does state: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the law.l 
This Amendment has been the basis for the challenges in many 
segregation cases and, in particular, many cases dealing with 
the separation of whites and Negroes in public schools.2 The 
history of school segregation has been described as follows: 
Segregation in the schools has undergone 
three legal phases: that resulting from the 
Plessy decision of 1896, the higher education 
cases beginning in the 193O's, and the public 
school cases beginning with the Brown decision 
of 1954.3 
The Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) decision is a part of the 
legal background which must be understood in order to place 
•1-H. C. Hudgins, The Warren Court and the Public Schools 
(Danville, Illinois: Interstate. Printers and Publishers, 
1970), p. 73. 
2Ibid. 
^Ibid. 
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subsequent segregation decisions in the proper perspective.^ 
This case concerned the constitutionality of segregation of 
the races in public transportation facilities. In 1890 the 
Louisiana legislature passed a statute which established 
segregated railroad coaches. Horner Adolph Plessy, seven-
eighths white and one-eighth Negro, challenged the statute 
on the grounds that it violated his Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights. The Supreme Court, with Justice Henry B. 
Brown writing the opinion, ruled that the statute was rea­
sonable and consistent with customs and traditions, saying: 
The object of the Amendment /TTourteentH7 
was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality 
of the two races before the law, but in the 
nature of things it could not have been intended 
to abolish distinctions based on color, or to 
enforce social, as distinguished from political 
equality, or a commingling of the two races upon 
terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, 
and even requiring, their separation in places 
where they are liable to be brought into contact 
do not necessarily imply the inferiority of 
either race to the other, and have been generally 
if not universally, recognized as within the 
competency of the state legislatures in the 
exercise of their police power.5 
The Plessy case set the tone for subsequent segregation 
cases. Separate but equal became the accepted doctrine of 
the day; however, there is nothing in the Plessy opinion 
stating that segregation shall be permitted when facilities 
are equal.^ This case seems to indicate that the government 
^Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
-*Ibid. 
^ITudgins, p. 16. 
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did not want to get involved in segregation cases. 
Three years after the Flessy decision the Court heard 
another segregation case. This case, Cumming v. Richmond 
County Eoard of Education (1899), directly involved the pub­
lic schools.̂  The justices were asked to decide the consti­
tutionality of an injunction which would close a white high 
school until a similar, separate school was provided for 
Negroes. The Court found the following: 
The facts of the case showed that in 
Richmond County, Georgia, the only Negro high 
school, enrolling sixty students, was discon­
tinued to permit the building to be converted 
into an elementary school to house three 
hundred pupils. 
The Negroes alleged that the injunction was constitutional 
on the grounds that inequality resulted from the county's 
failure to provide a high school for Negroes when the whites 
had a high school. The Negroes had three private schools 
within the county that charged the same tuition fee charged by 
the public school. K. C. Hudgins reports that: 
In the oral argument the attorneys for the 
plaintiffs argued that separate schools were 
unconstitutional; however, the justices held in 
the opinion that such an allegation was given 
too lgte in the proceedings for the Court to act 
upon.' 
^Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 
528 (1899). 
^Hudgins, p. 16. 
%bid.. 
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In giving the Court's unanimous decision, Justice John 
M. Harlan noted that the justices could find no evidence of 
racial discrimination. He stated that closing the white 
schools would not remedy the wrong suffered by the Negroes, 
and that the plaintiffs would have had a stronger case had 
they requested a mandamus to compel the opening of the Negro 
schools. 
The Gumming decision shows that the Court recognized the 
authority of the state over education.10 In Cumming the Court 
stated: 
We may add that while all admit the benefits 
and burdens of public taxation must be shared by 
citizens without discrimination against any class 
on account of their race, the education of the 
people in schools maintained by the state taxation 
is a matter belonging to the respective States, and 
any interference on the part of Federal authority 
with the management of such schools cannot be justi­
fied except in the case of a clear and unmistakable 
disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of 
the land. 
The separate but equal doctrine remained unchallenged in 
the nation's highest court until Martha Lum, who was Chinese, 
objected to the placement of her daughter in a Negro school. 
In Gong Lum v. Rice (1927) the Court ruled that the school 
board's action was proper.1^ Chief Justice William H. Taft, 
l°Ibid. 
HCummirig, p. 528. 
12Gong Lum v. R.ice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927). 
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writing for the majority, reminded the plaintiff that 
separate but equal was still the doctrine under which the 
Court was operating.^ 
The Court heard cases in the period between the Lum 
decision and the Brown decision which concerned racial segre­
gation in colleges and universities. These cases concerned 
admission and treatment of Negro students in white institu­
tions of higher learning. A Negro student gained admission 
to a white university in Gaines v. Canada (1930).in 
Sipuel v. Board of Regents (1948), a Negro student won admis­
sion to the University of Oklahoma Law School.In Sweatt 
v. Painter (1950), the quality of a separate Negro law school 
was questioned.-^ In McLaurin v. Oklahoma (1950), segregation 
of classes within white institutions was struck down. 
Rudgins notes the importance of these cases saying: 
The significance of the four university cases 
is manifest as one sees the gradual erosion of the 
separation doctrine. Both Gaines and Sipuel opened 
the way for Negroes to attend white institutions. 
McLaurin held that, once a school has been desegre-
gated its facilities must be made available to all 
alike, its students must be accorded similar treatment. 
13Hudgins, p. 17. 
l^Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
•^Sipuel v. Board of R.egents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948). 
^Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
^McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
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Sweatt expanded the holding in showing a segre­
gated school to be unequal and in pointing out 
intangible factors as measurements of potential 
success. It was these cases which actually pro­
vided the springboard for an attack on segrega­
tion in the public elementary and secondary 
schools.in a case to be heard by the Warren 
Court.IS 
In 1952 four cases were joined for appeal before the 
Court which questioned the constitutionality of racial segre­
gation in the public schools of the United States. These 
cases are commonly known as Erown v. Board of Education 
(1952).19 The case was actually a combination of the Brown 
case and cases from South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware 
which challenged segregation on the same constitutional 
grounds. These cases were class action suits brought by 
minor Negro plaintiffs seeking admission to public schools on 
a nonsegregated basis. The counsel for the complainants was 
Thurgood Marshall, who became the first Negro justice in 1967 
and is a member of the Burger Court. During the time the 
case was being considered, Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson died, 
and Earl Warren was appointed Chief Justice by President 
Dwight D. Eisehnower. 
In his opinion Chief Justice Warren addressed the separate 
but equal doctrine. The Chief Justice pointed out that there 
had been six cases in public education involving the concept 
and then noted that equal facilities were not the question in 
l^Hudgins, p. 19. 
l^Brown v. Board, 347 U.S. 483 at 483 (1954). 
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this case. Chief Justice Warren said: "We must look instead 
to the effect of segregation itself on public education."20 
The Chief Justice then asked: 
Does segregation of children in public 
schools solely on the basis of race, even 
though the physical facilities and other 
"tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the 
children of the minority group of equal 
educational opportunity?21 
This was then answered in a manner that left no doubt about 
the future of segregated public schools when the Chief Justice 
stated: 
To separate them from others of similar age 
and qualifications solely because of their race 
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their 
status in the community that may affect their 
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone. We conclude that in the field of public 
education the doctrine of "separate but equal" 
has no place. Separate educational facilities 
are inherently unequal.22 
Boiling v. Sharpe (1954) considered the constitutionality 
of public school segregation in the District of Columbia.23 
It was not considered with the other cases in Brown because 
it did not challenge state action under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Both Brown and Boiling were restored to docket 
for further argument regarding formation of decrees. 
20lbid., p. 492. 
21Ibid., p. 493. 
^^Ibid., p. 495. 
23Boiling v. Sliarpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
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In 1955 the Brown case was reargued with the parties 
involved in the first Brown argument joined by the United 
States, Arkansas, Florida, Worth Carolina, Oklahoma, 
Maryland, and Texas as participants.^4 This case was heard 
for the purpose of implementing the first Brown decision. 
In its decision the Court gave the local school officials 
and the District Court the responsibility for implementation 
of the Brown decision. Again Chief Justice Warren spoke for 
the Court following the argument, saying: 
Full implementation of these constitutional 
principles may require solution of varied local 
school problems. School authorities have the 
primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, 
and solving these problems; courts will have to 
consider whether the action of school authorities 
constitutes good faith implementation of the 
governing constitutional principles. Because of 
their proximity to local conditions and the 
possible need for further hearings, the courts 
which originally heard these cases can best per­
form this judicial appraisal. Accordingly, we 
believe it appropriate to remand the cases to 
those courts.25 
In Pennsylvania v. Board (1957) the Court extended the 
Brown ruling to cover private schools where states were 
involved.26 The case was disposed in a brief per curiam 
op inion, s aying: 
2^Brown v. Board, 349 U.S. 294 at 300-1 (1955). 
25Ibid. 
^Pennsylvania v. Board, 353 U.S. 230 (1957). 
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Therefore, even though the Board was acting 
as a trustee, its refusal to admit Foust and Felder 
to the college because they were Negroes was dis­
crimination by the State. Such discrimination is 
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment ... .27 
The litigation which has come before the Court since this 
case has concerned implementation of the Brown decision. The 
implementation of this decision in Little Rock, Arkansas, pro­
vided the Court with its first challenge to the Brown decision. 
The Governor and State Legislature in Arkansas had acted to 
prevent the desegregation of Little Rock's Central High School 
by despatching the National Guard to the school to oppose 
integration. The violence that resulted caused the school 
board to request a postponement of the desegregation program. 
The District Court granted relief, but the Appeals Court 
reversed on appeal. The Supreme Court met in special session 
on August 28, 1958, to hear argument in the case. 
In this case, Cooper v. Aaron (1958), the Court again 
issued a unanimous decision.28 in speaking for the Court, the 
Chief Justice noted that the school officials had acted in 
good faith and that the educational progress of all students 
had suffered. He laid the blame for these conditions on the 
state legislature and executive officials, saying: "The con­
stitutional rights of respondents are not to be sacrificed or 
yielded to the violence and disorder which have followed upon 
27Ibid. 
^Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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the actions of the Governor and the Legislature."^ 
In Goss v. Board (1963) the Court ruled a transfer plan 
being used in Knoxville City Schools was unconstitutional 
The Court noted that the plan would perpetuate de facto 
segregation. 
In McNeese v. Board (1963) the Court ruled that state aid 
could not be withheld from districts which complied with state 
rules affecting such aid.^l This case established that state 
remedies do not have to be exhausted before a plaintiff can 
seek relief from a federal court under the federal Civil Rights 
Act. This was the first desegregation case since the Brown 
decision in which there was a dissenting vote.32 
In 1964 the Court heard a case that tested the constitu­
tionality of closing public schools in defiance of desegrega­
tion mandates issued in the Brown decision. Griffin v. School 
Board (1964) was a suit against Prince Edward County, Virginia, 
brought to compel the reopening of the public schools.^ In 
1956 the board of supervisors had stopped levying taxes and 
appropriating funds for integrated public schools. The Prince 
Edward School Foundation was formed to operate schools for 
29lbid. 
30Goss V. Board, 373 U.S. 683 (1963). 
^McNeese v. Board, 373 U.S. 668 (1963). 
•^justice John M. Harlan dissented. 
•^Griffin v. School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
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white students, and state financial assistance was obtained. 
Justice Black spoke for the Court, saying: 
For reasons to be stated, we agree with the 
District Court that, under the circumstances here, 
closing the Prince Edward County Schools while 
public schools in all the other counties of 
Virginia were being maintained denied the peti­
tioners and the class of Negro students they 
represent the equal protection of the laws 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.34 
In Rogers v. Paul (1965) the court was asked to rule on 
the adequacy of a desegregation plan which called for the 
integration of one grade per year.35 A per curiam opinion 
was handed down which directed the school officials to allow 
for immediate transfer to the high school for any student who 
was assigned to another school on the basis of race. In this 
case four justices dissented on the grounds that the case 
should have been set for argument and plenary consideration. 
In 1968 three cases were appealed to the court which 
asked the justices to overturn freedom-of-choise assignments. 
Unlike the Brown decision in which several similar cases were 
joined, the justices decided to hand down three separate 
opinions. In each case Justice Brennan, speaking for the 
Court, overruled the freedom-of-choice plans. 
In Green v. Board (1968) a new Kent County, Virginia, 
freedom-of-choice plan was attacked.36 Under the plan no 
34Ibid. 
^Rogers v. Paul, 383 U.S. 198 (1965). 
3^Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
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white child had elected to attend the Negro school, and 
approximately eighty-five percent of the Negro students still 
attended the Negro school.^7 The Court struck down the plan, 
but Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, noted that 
the Court did not overrule all freedom-of-choice plans. 
The two remaining freedom-of-choice cases were Raney v. 
Board (1968)3® anj Monroe v. Board (1968)39, in each of these 
cases the Court found the freedom-of-choice plans to be un­
acceptable, yet the Court continued to maintain that all 
freedom-of-choice plans were not unacceptable. 
In the last desegregation case to be brought before the 
Warren Court, United States v. Eoard of Education (1969), the 
desegregation of a Montgomery County, Alabama, high school 
faculty was questioned.^ jn ordering that the decision of 
the District Court would stand, Justice Black, speaking for 
the Court, stated that the Court was not "argue£ing7 here that 
racially balanced faculties are constitutionally or legally 
required."41 
These cases just reviewed represent the precedents which 
had been established by the Court prior to the tenure of Chief 
Justice Burger. The Brown decision established that the Court 
3?Hudgins, p. 91. 
38Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 443 (1968). 
^Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450 (1968). 
^United states v. Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225 (1969). 
41Ibid., p. 236. 
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would not allow racial segregation of public education 
facilities. The Court under Chief Justice Warren Burger had 
begun the implementation of this ruling. The Burger Court 
was now responsible for the continuation of this process, and 
the cases which were heard represent the Court's efforts in 
actualizing the Brown decision. 
The Cases 
Swann v. Board (1971) followed a series of per curiam 
rulings in which the Court sought to clarify the means by 
which racial segregation was to be eliminated from public 
schools.^2 The Burger Court attempted to define its position 
on school desegregation in the five cases which were decided 
between 1969 and 1971. In Alexander v. Board (1968), the 
Court ruled, in an unsigned per curiam opinion, that "continued 
operation of segregated schools under a standard of allowing 
'all deliberate speed' for desegregation is no longer constitu­
tionally permissible."̂ 3 in Carter v. Board (1969), the Court 
granted the petitioner's application for a temporary injunction 
which stopped the implementation of an order by the Appeals 
Court which would have delayed desegregation of Louisiana 
schools from February 1970 to September 1970.^4 This injunction 
was granted pending the Court's consideration of a petition for 
certiorari in the case. In Powell v. Board (1969) the Court 
^Swann v. Board, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
Âlexander v. Board, 396 U.S. 19 (1969). 
^Carter v. Board, 396 U.S. 226 (1969). 
153 
vacated the District Court order to desegregate Oklahoma 
schools.The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the 
desegregation plan should have been implemented pending the 
decision of the appeal. 
*n Carter v. Board (1970) the Court stated in a per 
curiam decision that the Court of Appeals had misconstrued 
the intent of the Alexander decision by authorizing the post 
ponement of student desegregation beyond February.46 
In this case Justice Harlan, joined by Justice White, 
stated his understanding of the procedure required by the 
Court in desegregation "since the Court has not seen fit to 
do so.Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall 
expressed their disagreement with the opinion of Justice 
Harlan. In a memorandum, Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Stewart expressed their view that the Court of Appeals was 
"far more familiar than we with the various situations of 
these several school districts . . . ."48 -jhe Chief Justice 
stated: 
To say peremptorily that the Court of Appeals 
erred in its application of the Alexander doctrine 
to these cases, and to direct summary reversal with­
out argument and without opportunity for exploration 
of the varying problems of individual school dis­
tricts, seems unsound to us.49 
45Dowell v. Board, 396 U.S. 269 (1969). 
^Carter v. Board, 296 U.S. 290 (1970). 
47Ibid. 
48Ibid., p. 294. 
49lbid. 
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In Northcross v. Board (1970) the Court, on certiorari, 
affirmed the Appeals Court order of remand to the District 
Court where the question of desegregation of Memphis City 
schools was to be considered "promptly" and consistently with 
the Alexander case.The Chief Justice concurred in the 
Court's opinion, stating that he would grant the petition for 
certiorari and set the case for argument if it were not for 
the fact that only seven justices could hear the case. He 
stated: 
From what is now before us in this case it 
is not clear what issues might be raised or 
developed on argument. As soon as possible, 
however, we ought to resolve some of the basic 
practical problems when they are appropriately 
presented . . . .51 
The "practical problems" were "appropriately presented" 
in Board v. Swann (1971).52 The Chief Justice delivered the 
unanimous opinion of the Court in the case, saying: 
We granted certiorari in this case to review 
important issues as to the duties of school 
authorities and the scope of powers of federal 
courts under this Court's mandates to eliminate 
racially separate public schools established and 
maintained by state action.53 
Chief Justice Burger noted that the issue in this case was the 
SONorthcross v. Board, 397 U.S. 232 (1970). 
51Ibid., p. 237. 
^^Board v. Swann, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
53Ibid., p. 5. 
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"implementation of the basic constitutional requirement that 
the state not discriminate between public school children on 
the basis of their race."54 The effort to desegregate the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, school system had re­
sulted in the development of several plans for desegregation 
and a number of appeals to the courts, in addition to Swann. 
In this case the Court attempted to help the District Court 
and Appeals Court by trying to "amplify guidelines, however 
incomplete and imperfect, for the assistance of school author­
ities and courts."55 
The Chief Justice noted that judicial authority could be 
invoked when school authorities failed in their duty to take 
affirmative action to convert to a unitary school system.56 
In that event a district court has broad power to fashion a 
remedy that will assure a unitary school system.57 According 
to Chief Justice Burger, the courts have the power to consider 
the following when designing desegregation plans: 
1. construction and abandonment of 
school facilities; 
2. the use of ratios for pupil assignment; 
3. a majority-to-minority transfer program; 
54ibid., p. 13. 
55ibid., p. 14. 
56ibid., p. 15. 
57ibid., p. 16. 
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4. the pairing and grouping of noncontiguous 
school zones; 
5. the use of busing.^8 
The Chief Justice noted that the Court could not lay down rigid 
rules because conditions and situations waried widely.59 
The Swann decision was followed by four additional deci­
sions, all reported on the same day as the Swann decision, 
which applied the guidelines established in Swann. The first 
of these cases was Davis v. Board (1971).^0 in this case the 
unanimous Court, speaking through Chief Justice Burger, found 
that the Court of Appeals had erred in treating the eastern 
part of metropolitan Mobile, Alabama, as an isolated area 
within the school system. The Court reversed the Appeals 
Court decision with regard to pupil assignment and directed 
the Court to disregard neighborhood school zoning if it stood 
in the way of achieving a unitary school system.61 
In the second case McDaniel v. Barresi (1971) , the Court, 
in an unanimous decision delivered by the Chief Justice, re­
versed the decision of the Georgia State Supreme Court.62 The 
Georgia Supreme Court had ruled that a desegregation plan for 
Clarke County, Georgia, violated the equal protection clause 
58ibid., pp. 21-31. 
^ibid., p. 29. 
60Davis v. Board, 402 U.S. 33 (1971). 
^Ibid. , p. 37. 
62McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971). 
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by treating students differently and violated the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 by using busing to achieve a racial balance.63 
In the third case, Board v. Swann (1971), the Court 
unanimously affirmed the decision of the District Court.^ 
This court had found a North Carolina statute, General Statute 
115-176.1, which prohibited the assignment of students on 
account of race and the use of busing to achieve racial balance, 
to be unconstitutional. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the 
Court, stated: 
. . . bus transportation has long been an 
integral part of all public education systems, 
and it is unlikely that a truly effective remedy 
could be devised without continued reliance upon 
it.65 
In the fourth case, Moore v. Board (1971), the Court, in 
a per curiam opinion, dismissed an appeal of the decision from 
the United States District Court for the Western District of 
North Carolina.66 The District Court had declared the anti-
busing statute passed by the North Carolina legislature to be 
unconstitutional. 
Having established that desegregation was to be accom­
plished now and that the federal courts had certain powers in 
the development of desegregation plans , the Court was faced 
63Ibid. 
6^Board v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971). 
65ibid., p. 46. 
^^Moore v. Board, 402 U.S. 43 (1971). 
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with the issue of how the establishment of new school dis­
tricts would affect such plans. In the first of two cases, 
Wright v. Council (1972), the Court ruled that the establish­
ment of a separate school district for the town of Emporia 
within the school district of Greenville County, Virginia, 
would impede the dismantling of the existing dual school 
system. 7̂ The Court, with Justice Stewart expressing the 
views of five associates, stated that the District Court was 
correct in focusing upon the effect of the separation and 
that the new school district would impede the dismantling of 
the dual system. *>8 
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Blackmun, 
Powell, and Rehnquist, dissented. The Chief Justice noted 
that the creation of a separate school system would not result 
in more than a "minor statistical difference" in racial ratios 
in both systems.^9 Chief Justice Burger stated: "It is quite 
true that the racial ratios of the two school systems would 
differ, but the elimination of such disparities is not the 
mission of desegregation."70 The Chief Justice called efforts 
to obtain a racial balance pointless.71 Efforts to "reproduce 
in each classroom a microcosmic reflection" of racial 
67Wright v. Council, 407 U.S. 451 (1972). 
68ibid., p. 470. 
69Ibid., p. 474. 
70Ibid., p. 473. 
71Ibid. 
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population patterns were described by the Chief Justice as no 
more effective or constitutional than efforts which produce no 
such condition.̂ 2 According to the Chief Justice, such bal­
ancing efforts were not constitutionally mandated. 
In United States v. Board (1972) the Court again was 
asked to rule on the constitutionality of dividing a school 
district.The United States Department of Justice had ob­
tained an agreement whereby Halifax County, North Carolina, 
schools attempted to desegregate a dual, racially segregated 
system consisting of twenty-two percent white students and 
seventy-seven percent Negro students. Following this action 
the City of Scotland Neck was authorized by the state legis­
lature to create a separate school district within the county. 
This action would have resulted in a formerly all-white school 
in the city retaining a white majority and a formerly all-Negro 
school just outside the city remaining ninety-one percent Negro. 
Justice Stewart concluded that the state statute would have the 
effect of impeding the disestablishment of the dual school 
system.^ 
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell, 
and Rehnquist, concurred. The Chief Justice noted that the 
7^Ibid 1> p. 474. 
73Ibid. 
^United States v. Board, 407 U.S. 484 (1972). 
7^Ibid.f p. 490. 
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situation in this case was significantly different from the 
situation in Wright. According to the Chief Justice, the 
creation of a separate school system would "preclude meaning­
ful desegregation."76 In distinguishing the two cases, the 
Chief Justice further noted that this attempt at creating a 
new school system did not seem to be the fulfillment of des­
tiny and the motivation seemed to be the desire to create a 
predominately white system.7 7 
In School Board of the City of Richmond v. State Eoard 
(1973) the Court upheld an Appeals Court decision that ruled 
that the District Court could not compel Richmond, Virginia, 
to join into a busing arrangement with two joining school 
systems for the purpose of integrating their public schools. 
The Court was split evenly in this case with Justice Powell 
not participating because he had served on both the State and 
Richmond school boards. The Court does not report how indivi­
dual justices vote when the Court has a split decision.̂ 9 
The Court was asked to review an Appeals Court decision 
which concerned the desegregation cf Denver, Colorado, city 
schools in Keyes v. Eoard (1973).The Appeals Court ruled 
76Ibid., p. 491. 
77ibid., p. 492. 
78school Eoard of the City of Richmond v. State Board, 
412 U.S. 92 (1973). 
79David Rohde and Harold Spaith, Supreme Court Decision 
Making, (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976), p. T5TT5 
^Keyes v. Board, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
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that the Park Hill area of Denver, an area of Denver that had 
been deliberately segregated, be desegregated, and the District 
Court's order for a remediation plan aimed at achieving equality 
for Denver's core city schools was reversed. 
The Supreme Court modified the Court of Appeals ruling by 
vacating instead of reserving the District Court's ruling. 
The case was remanded to the District Court so that it could 
be determined if Park Hill should be treated as isolated from 
the rest of the district and so that appropriate rulings could 
be made relative to the findings. Justice Brennan, expressing 
the views of five members of the Court, stated the Court's 
opinion in this case. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the 
result without written opinion. Justice Douglas joined the 
opinion of the Court, stating that he felt there was "no dif­
ference between de facto ana de jure segregation.Justice 
Powell concurred in part and dissented in part, noting that 
this was the "first school desegregation case to reach the 
Court that involved a  major city outside the S outh.Justice 
Powell expressed the view that a standard should be set for 
integration of all public school systems. Justice R.ehnquist 
dissented on the grounds that unconstitutional segregation in 
the Park Hill area did not indicate segregation in the entire 
district 
81Ibid., p. 215. 
82Ibid., p. 217. 
83lbid., pp. 254-265. 
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In Bradley v. Board (1974), Justice Blackmun, speaking for 
a unanimous Court, ruled that a district court may allow plain­
tiffs in a desegregation litigation a reasonable attorney's 
fee.8̂  Justice Marshall and Justice Powell took no part in 
the consideration or discussion of this case. 
On November 19, 1973, the Court granted certiorari in a 
case which would determine whether a federal court could impose 
a multidistrict, areawide remedy to a single school district 
segregation problem.8̂  When this case was argued before the 
Court, it was joined with two other similar cases, and those 
three cases were argued as Milliken v. Bradley (1974).86 
In this case Chief Justice Burger, joined by four members 
of the Court, delivered the Court's opinion. The Chief Justice 
found that the District Court and the Appeals Court had dic­
tated a metropolitan plan because they had concluded that a 
Detroit-only plan would not achieve a meaningful racial balance.87 
The Chief Justice referred to the Court's decision in Swann, a 
decision he wrote, in stating that desegregation does not re­
quire any particular racial balance.88 The Chief Justice con­
tradicted the District Court's contention that school district 
boundary lines are "arbitrary lines on a map drawn for political 
S^Bradley v. Board, 416 U.S. 696 (1974). 
S^Bradley v. Milliken, 414 U.S. 1038 (1973). 
^Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
87Ibid., p. 735. 
88Ibid., p. 740. 
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convenience" by noting that such an attitude was "contrary to 
the history of public education in the United S tates.The 
disruption, transportation problems, financing problems, and 
the loss in local control which would result from the inter-
district remedy were also noted.90 
The Chief Justice, in finding the desegregation plan to 
be unjustified, based his opinion upon the principle that "the 
scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of 
the constitutional violation."91 According to the Chief 
Justice, the record in this case showed no evidence of segre­
gation outside of the Detroit schools. This finding meant 
that a remedy involving outlying districts would be impermis­
sible based on standards set by the Court in Brown I and its 
subsequent holdings.92 in reference to the dissent of Justices 
White and Marshall, the Chief Justice stated that any inter­
pretation of prior Court decisions which would allow a cross-
district remedy would be supported "only by drastic expansion 
of the Constitutional right itself."93 
In Board v. Spangler (1976), the Court considered the 
question of whether a District Court could require a school 
district to rearrange its attendance zones annually in order 
90ibid., p. 743. 
91lbid., p. 744. 
92ibid. ,  p .  746. 
93ibid., p. 747. 
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to insure a perpetually desirable racial mix in its schools.^ 
Justice Rehnquist, as Circuit Justice, had granted a stay of 
the District Court's order in this case pending the Court's 
decision on a petition for certiorari.95 When the Court 
granted the petition for certiorari and heard the case, Justice 
Rehnquist, joined by six members of the Court, expressed the 
view that having established a racially neutral system in 1970 
by its order, the District Court "exceeded its authority" by 
requiring annual readjustments to insure that "there would not 
be a majority of any minority in any Pasadena public schools."96 
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented on the 
grounds that "racial discrimination through official action" 
had not been eliminated from the Pasadena system.^7 Justice 
Stevens did not participate in this case. 
Milliken v. Bradley appeared on the Court's docket a 
s e c o n d  t i m e  f o l l o w i n g  r e m a n d  t o  t h e  D i s t r i c t  C o u r t . T h e  
District Court ruled that remedial programs for students who 
had been subjected to past acts of de jure segregation be 
impelmented and that local and state officials, responsible 
for the unconstitutional actions, bear the costs of the pro­
grams. This case is known as Milliken II. 
9^Board v. Spangler, 437 U.S. 424 (1976). 
^Board v. Spangler, 423 U.S. 1335 (1975). 
^Board v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
97Ibid., p. 441. 
98Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
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Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Brennan, White, 
Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens, delivered 
the opinion of the Court. The Chief Justice noted that the 
Court had established the principle by which this decision 
was made in previous opinions.99 jn reviewing the District 
Court's action, the Court found no violation of these princi­
pals in the judgment to authorize remediation and compensatory 
programs as a part of the desegregation program for Detroit 
public schools. Further, the Court found no merit in peti­
tioner's claim that the plan "violates the Tenth Amendment and 
general principles of federation."100 
In Austin v. United States (1976) the Court heard an 
appeal of the desegregation plan for Austin, Texas, public 
schools.xn a seven-to-two decision, the Supreme Court 
vacated the lower-court judgment. In a memorandum decision, 
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Rehnquist, stated: 
I merely emphasize the limitation repeat­
edly expressed by this Court that the extent of 
an equitable remedy is determined by and may not 
properly exceed the effect of the constitutional 
violation . . . .102 
99lbid., p. 280. 
1 0 0Ibid., p. 291. 
lOlAustin v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976), 50 L. ED. 
2d at 604. 
102ibid., p. 605. 
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In Board v. Brinkman (1977) the Court was asked to review 
a desegregation plan that had been approved by the Court of 
Appeals.103 This plan called for districtwide racial distri­
bution of students in schools so that each would be brought 
to within fifteen percent of the black-white population ratio 
of Dayton, Ohio. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice 
Burger, and Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, and 
Stevens, delivered the Court's opinion, stating: 
. . . the case for displacement of the local 
authorities by a federal court in a school deseg­
regation case must be satisfactorily established 
by factual proof and justified by a reasoned state­
ment of legal principles. •'•04 
The Court found that the pupil population in some Dayton 
schools not being homogeneous was not a violation of the Four­
teenth Amendment in the absence of evidence showing segregative 
intent on the part of the board.105 The Court concluded that 
"the Court of Appeals had no warrant in our cases for imposing 
the systemwide remedy which it did."106 The case was remanded 
to the District Court for specific findings and judgment con­
sistent with this opinion. 
Upon reviewing the record, the District Court dismissed 
the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to 
prove that acts of intentional segregation over twenty years 
103]3oard v> Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977). 
104Ibid., p. 410. 
105Ibid., p. 413. 
106Ibid., p. 417. 
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old had caused any present segregative e f f e c t s .-^7 The Court 
of Appeals then reversed this decision on the grounds that 
the Dayton Board of Education was operating a dual school 
system in 1954 when the Supreme Court had ordered the desegre­
gation of public schools and that they had failed to disestab­
lish that dual system. 
This case was then returned to the Court on a petition 
for certiorari.^9 in an opinion by Justice White, joined by 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, the Court 
ruled that the reversal of the District Court was proper on 
the grounds that the Dayton Board of Education was operating 
a dual school system. 
Justices Powell and Rehnquist dissented. Justice Stewart, 
joined by the Chief Justice, dissented. These dissents re­
vealed a split in the Court over the issue of how far the 
courts should go in trying to desegregate schools. In his 
opinion, Justice Stewart stated his feelings about the impor­
tance of the federal district courts in desegregation contro­
versies, noting that District Court judges are "uniquely 
situated" to appraise the societal forces at work.This 
opinion also noted Justice Stewart's disagreement with the 
10?Board v. Brinkman, 466 F. Supp. 1232 (1978). 
lO^Board v> Brinkman, 583 F. 2d 243 (1978). 
lO^Board v. Brinkman, U.S. (1979). 
llOlbid. 
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Court's willingness to consider the fact that a dual school 
system existed in 1954. Justice Stewart contended that the 
burden of proof had been shifted to the school board by this 
consideration and "when the factual issues are as elusive as 
these, who bears the burden of proof can easily determine who 
prevails in the litigation."HI 
In Brennan v. Armstrong (1977) the Court vacated and re­
manded an Appeals Court ruling which called for the desegrega­
tion of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, schools.H2 This opinion, which 
expressed the views of Chief Justice Burger and Justices 
Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, directed the 
lower court to review the case in light of the Court's ruling 
in Arlington Heights v. Housing Development (1976) and the 
Brinkman decision.^3 in Arlington Heights the Court ruled 
that in the absence of discriminating intent, official action 
is not unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially 
disporportionate impact.^4 Justice Steven's dissent, joined 
by Justices Brennan and Marshall, stated that the Court of 
Appeals was "free to re-enter its original judgment."H5 
In Omaha v. United States (1977) the Court again vacated 
and remanded a case for reconsideration in light of Arlington 
Hllbid. 
H^Brennan v< Armstrong, 433 U.S. 672 (1977). 
l^Arlington Heights v. Housing Development, 429 U.S. 252 
(1976). 
114Ibid. 
115Ibid., p. 675. 
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Heights and Brinkman.This case concerned the court-
ordered desegregation of Omaha, Nebraska, schools. Again 
the per curiam opinion expressed the view of Chief Justice 
Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, and 
Rehnquist with Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dis­
senting. 
A number of rulings were made by justices acting as 
surrogates for the entire Court in Appeals Court cases. These 
rulings had an effect on the Court's desegregation policy and 
are reviewed for that reason. 
In Edgar v. United States (1971) Justice Black refused to 
grant a stay of a District Court order which would have forced 
the withholding of funds and accreditation for school districts 
failing to meet desegregation requirements.Justice Black 
was again asked to rule on a desegregation plan in Corpus 
Christi v. Cisneros (1971). in this case the stay was 
granted so that the confusion resulting from two District 
Court orders could be reconciled. 
In Winston-Salem v. Scott (1971) Chief Justice Burger was 
asked to stay a desegregation plan pending the Court's review 
of a petition for certiorari from Winston-Salem/Forsyth County, 
•l-l^Omaha v. United States, 433 U.S. 667 (1977). 
H^Edgar v. United States, 404 U.S. 1206 (1971). 
H^corpus Christi v. Cisneros, 404 U.S. 1211 (1971). 
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North Carolina, schools.The Chief Justice received the 
petition seven days before the school year was to begin and 
this fact alone probably predisposed him to refuse to grant 
the application.l2̂  In his memorandum on this case, the 
Chief Justice intimated that the District Court and Board of 
Education had done more than was legally required to create 
121 a unitary system. This threw the school system into chaos 
and led some to think the Court might modify the racial ratio 
system that had been prescribed by the lower courts. 2̂2 
In Gomperts v. Chase (1971) Justice Douglas denied an 
application for a preliminary injunction against a school 
board's plan for voluntary integration of certain California 
schools.1^3 jn Drummond v. Acree (1972) Justice Powell de­
nied the application for a stay of the desegregation order for 
Augusta, Georgia, public schools.^24 Justice Rehnquist granted 
a stay of an Appeals Court order for the desegregation of 
Columbus, Ohio, schools in Board v. Penick (1978).^25 The 
remaining applications for stays of desegregation orders 
H^Winston-Salem v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221 (1971). 
1 ° 0 
Howard Kalodner and James J. Fishnam, eds., Limits of 
Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Eallinger Publishers, 1973), p. 543. 
121Ibid., p. 547. 
122Ibid., p. 546. 
123Gomperts v. Chase, 404 U.S. 1237 (1971). 
l^Drummond v. Acree, 409 U.S. 1228 (1972). 
l^Board v. Penick, U.S. (1978). 
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received by individual justices in the 1978-1979 term were 
denied.126 
Analysis 
In order to analyze Chief Justice Burger's influence in 
desegregation cases, it is necessary to ascertain his philos­
ophical position with regard to school desegregation litiga­
tion. This task was made more difficult by the fact that the 
Court acted with more unity in desegregation cases than it did 
in church and state cases. In fourteen of the twenty school 
desegregation cases, the Court delivered unanimous decisions. 
The Chief Justice was joined concurring or dissenting by the 
associate justices more frequently in desegregation decisions 
than in church and state cases. The Chief Justice was joined 
in desegregation cases one hundred percent by Justices Black 
and Harlan, eighty-five percent by Justice Douglas, eighty 
percent by Justice Brennan, ninety-five percent by Justice 
Stewart, eighty-four percent by Justice White, eighty-two 
percent by Justice Marshall, ninety-three percent by Justice 
Blackmun, eighty-nine percent by Justice Powell, seventy-eight 
percent by Justice Rehnquist, and seventy-five percent by 
Justice Stevens. The Chief Justice voted with the majority in 
126£oard v> Brinkman, U.S. (1978); Buchanan 
v. Evans, U.S. (1978); School District v. Evans, 
U.S. (1978); Eishop v. Board, U.S. 
TT97S). 
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eighteen of twenty, or ninety percent, of the cases and 
dominated the majority opinion writing by writing six of four­
teen majority opinions. No other justice wrote more than two 
majority opinions. 
This situation makes it more difficult to ascertain the 
Chief Justice's position because his majority opinion may have 
reflected Court-conscious rather than his personal views. 
Chief Justice Burger did, however, write several concurring 
and dissenting opinions which serve to illuminate his feelings. 
In Carter v. Board the Chief Justice, in a memorandum, 
noted that the Court's summary reversal of a lower court de­
segregation decision with "opportunity for exploration" seemed 
"unsound."127 The lower court's familiarity with the situa­
tion was noted, and the Chief Justice, joined by Justice 
Stewart, seemed to be more sympathetic than his colleagues 
toward "situations" which might make desegregation more diffi­
cult. In Northcross v. Board the Chief Justice again expressed 
his desire to give a desegregation case a full hearing but re­
treated from that position due to the fact that only seven 
justices could have participated in the decision. 
In Swann v. Board the opportunity to give the full hearing 
advocated by the Chief Justice presented itself. This case was 
decided by a unanimous Court, and the Chief Justice wrote the 
majority opinion. This case is interesting because it is the 
127carter v. Board, 396 U.S. 294 (1970). 
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first desegregation case to receive a full hearing by the 
Burger Court." President Nixon had appointed Chief Justice 
Burger, and many had expected the Chief Justice to advocate 
a conservative judicial stance similar to that advocated by 
the President.^-28 jn the first desegregation case to come 
before the Court, Alexander v. Board, the "all deliberate 
speed" standard was replaced by "desegregation now. "^-29 This 
unsigned summary decision disappointed many conservatives who 
had hoped Chief Justice Burger could lead the Court away from 
the Warren Court's stand on desegregation.^30 ôw t̂ e Court 
would be giving full consideration to a case which would, as 
the Chief Justice stated: 
. . . review important issues as to the duties 
of school authorities and the scope of powers of 
federal courts under this Court's mandates to elimi­
nate racially separate public schools established 
and maintained by state action.131 
The unanimous opinion in Swann was written by the Chief 
Justice and served to advise the lower courts that they could 
use a variety of methods, including busing, to end segregation 
of public schools. James Simon noted that this opinion placed 
the responsibility of deciding the means by which desegrega­
tion \<ras to be achieved in the hands of the lower courts and 
James F. Simon, In His Own Image (New York: David 
McKay Co., 1973), p. 128. 
^^Alexander, p. 19. 
l ^ ^ S i m o n ,  p .  128. 
131]3oard v. Swann, 402 U.S. 5 (1971). 
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and that the Chief Justice intended only to "maintain the 
status quo."132 This case, however, started a political storm 
over its implications for Northern schools and the President's 
stand against busing. According to James Simon, Chief Justice 
Burger was "chagrined" by the controversy which developed over 
the Swann decision, but he was helpless to do anything as the 
lower courts seemed to hand down one busing order after another 
as if on direct order from the Supreme Court.133 The Chief 
Justice, however, in subsequent cases, did make clear his 
position on busing: the Court did not require busing to 
achieve a particular racial balance in every school. 
There is some evidence that Chief Justice Burger failed 
to influence the Court in this case. Nina Totenberg, reporter 
for the Washington Post, reported that six members of the Court 
had supported a decision against busing in the initial con­
ference on the Swann case.134 There is some question about the 
validity of this information, since the conference is held in 
secret; however, if the information is correct, it would indi­
cate a lack of ability on the part of the Chief Justice to 
influence the Court. The Chief Justice made it clear in sub­
sequent decisions that he believed busing had a very limited 
role in desegregation orders. 
132simon, p. 154. 
i33Ibid. 
13^William R. Thomas, The Burger Court and Civil Liberties 
(Brunswick, Ohio: King's Court Communication, Inc., 1976), 
p. 147. 
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In the other four desegregation cases reported with 
Swann, the Court, speaking through the Chief Justice in three 
of the four, affirmed its intent to desegregate public schools 
in the South through whatever means necessary. These cases do 
little to illuminate the Chief Justice's attitude or influence. 
In his denial of the application for a stay of the deseg­
regation order for the Winston-Salem/Forsyth school system, 
Chief Justice Burger intimated that a dual system might not be 
in operation and that the court-ordered desegregation plan 
might have gone beyond its constitutional bounds.^5 This 
attitude on the part of Chief Justice Burger demonstrated his 
desire to have the Court act with restraint in desegregation 
cases. As will be demonstrated in later cases, the Chief 
Justice did not want the Court to extend its rulings in deseg­
regation cases past the standards set in Brown. In the memo­
randum in this case, Chief Justice Burger stated: "Under Swann 
and related cases of April 20, 1971, as in earlier cases, 
judicial power can be invoked only on a showing of discrimina­
tion violative of the constitutional standards declared in 
Brown."136 
In Wright v. Council the Chief Justice filed his first 
dissent in a school desegregation case. This case reveals the 
135Kalodner and Fishnam, eds., p. 544. 
^•^Winston-Salem/Forsyth v. Scott, 404 U.S. at 1231. 
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difference between the Chief Justice and the justices voting 
with the majority. In his dissent the Chief Justice stated 
that he would unhesitatingly join the majority if the divi­
sion of Greenville County Schools would perpetuate a dual 
school system. 1^7 The record, according to the Chief Justice, 
did not support such a conclusion. He pointed to the fact 
that a division of this school system would produce a slight 
imbalance in the racial ratio of city and county students, but 
this imbalance would not prevent the existence of a unitary 
system.^38 The Chief Justice stated: 
Obsession with such minor statistical dif­
ferences reflects the gravely mistaken view that 
a plan providing more consistent racial ratios 
is somehow more unitary than one which tolerates 
a lack of racial balance.139 
The majority opinion, written by Justice Stewart, con­
ceded that racial ratios should not be the sole determinant 
in desegregation cases. In finding the separation of the 
system to be invalid, the Court pointed to several factors. 
First, the Court noted that the potential for white flight to 
private academies and to the city schools as tuition students 
could make the projected racial ratios invalid.140 Second, 
the Court noted the disparity between the school facilities 
located in the city and in the county. The city school 
137̂ ]̂̂  470. 
^ibid., p. 472. 
^39jbid., p. 474. 
140Ibid., p. 464. 
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buildings were significantly better than the county school 
buildings.Third, the Court noted that the timing of the 
request which came after the District Court had ruled that 
the system be integrated.1^2 
The difference between the majority composed of Justices 
Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall and the dis­
senting minority composed of the Chief Justice and Justices 
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist seems to be their respective 
attitudes toward the degree to which the Court should get 
involved in the implementation of the Brown decision. For 
Chief Justice Burger and those joining his dissenting opinion, 
desegregation efforts in public schools were adequate when a 
dual school system was dismantled. concern was expressed 
for racial balance, the potential for white flight, equality 
of facilities, or other factors which concerned the majority. 
The Chief Justice seemed to be saying that he supported the 
desegregation of public schools but only as far as ending dual 
system. This attitude would have carried the Court toward a 
nonactivist role in desegregation cases and would have left 
the lower courts with the responsibility to see that unitary 
school systems were achieved. 
In a similar case. United States v. Board, decided the 
same day as Wright, the Chief Justice concurred in the Court's 
141. Ibid. 
142Ibid. 
143Ibid., p. 474. 
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decision to bar the creation of a new school district. The 
Chief Justice noted that this division of Halifax County, 
North Carolina, schools would have resulted in a predominately 
white Scotland Neck city system. The fact that Scotland Neck 
was obviously trying to avoid desegregation efforts and create 
a predominately white system was also noted. This case serves 
to illustrate the Chief Justice's thinking. The Wright de­
cision was rejected by the Chief Justice because it went too 
far in expanding the desegregation order issued in Brown, 
while the decision in this case was accepted because it pre­
vented an obvious discriminatory act. 
In supporting an Appeals Court ruling that prevented the 
District Court from forcing the consolidation of Richmond, 
Virginia, schools with two joining systems, the Court split 
evenly. Since the Court does not report individual votes in 
tied decision, it is impossible to determine how the justices 
voted in this case. From the voting record in Wright and the 
attitudes expressed by the Chief Justice in other cases, it 
seems logical to assume that Chief Justice Burger was one of 
the justices voting in favor of the Appeals Court ruling. This 
conclusion is substantiated by other Court observers.This 
action would be consistent with Chief Justice Burger's belief 
that desegregation decisions should not exceed the standards 
set in Brown. 
l^Rhode and Spaeth, p. 153. 
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In Keyes the Court remanded the first desegregation suit 
outside of the South back to the District Court to determine 
if Park Hill should be considered as isolated from the rest 
of the Denver school system. In this case the Chief Justice 
concurred without written opinion. The division and inde-
cisiveness of the Court in this case is verified by the tone 
of the majority opinion and the number and diversity of the 
concurring and dissenting opinions. Chief Justice Burger may 
have worked for and been successful in obtaining this decision 
because it did not expand the standard set in Brown; however, 
it seems more likely that the Court was too divided to take a 
strong stand in this case and that the Chief Justice was un­
willing or unable to influence the Court. 
In Milliken v. Bradley the Court was faced with the 
question of whether cross-district busing could be used out­
side the South to integrate a city school system. Chief 
Justice Burger seems to have played a critical role in this 
decision as he cast the fifth and deciding vote in the five-
to-four decision and wrote the majority opinion. 
In writing the majority opinion in this case, the Chief 
Justice argued that since the record showed de jure segrega­
tion only in Detroit schools, the remedy was limited to the 
Detroit schools. The Chief Justice quoted from his majority 
opinion in Swann in pointing out the fact that no particular 
racial balance in schools, grades, or classrooms was required 
as evidence of successful integration. The administrative 
and legislative difficulties associated with mixing school 
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districts were also noted, by the Chief Justice. In short, 
this majority opinion appears to be the very argument that 
was used in conference against the dissenters in this case. 
The Chief Justice even mentions the dissenting opinions in 
his majority opinion and attacks their logic, calling their 
effort to gain approval for the lower court decision an 
attempt to drastically expand the Constitution. The fact 
that the Chief Justice wrote the majority opinion in this 
five-to-four decision seems to indicate that there was no 
need to select a more neutral justice to write the opinion 
for the purpose of attracting other moderate justices. 
If the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Burger 
was indeed essentially the same argument he used in conference, 
it would indicate that he was a major influencing factor in 
this case. The justices voting with the Chief Justice in this 
case included Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun, Stewart, and 
Powell. Justice Rehnquist had dissented in Keyes, stating 
that he did not believe that segregation in one part of the 
Denver school system proved the entire district to be segre­
gated. On the basis of his position in Keyes and his concur­
rence with the Chief Justice's dissent in Wright, it would 
appear logical to assume that Justice Rehnquist supported the 
Milliken I decision with no need of being influenced. Justices 
Blackmun and Powell also seem to have needed little persuasion 
based on their concurrence with Chief Justice Burger's dissent 
in Wright. Chief Justice Burger's dissent in the Wright 
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decision is significant to this case because it was in that 
dissent that he stated that adjustments in school racial 
balances to achieve specific ratios was not constitutionally 
required. This racial-balance issue was the rationale used 
by the lower courts to justify their order for cross-district 
busing in the Milliken I decision. The conclusion then follows 
that justices joining Chief Justice Burger's Wright dissent 
would be inclined to agree with this same reasoning as ex­
pressed in Milliken I. Justice Stewart, the author of the 
majority opinion in Wright, appears to be the justice who was 
influenced to join the already established opinions of the 
other four. The assumption that Chief Justice Burger was 
solely responsible for influencing Justice Stewart can not be 
substantiated; however, it would seem logical to assume that 
the Chief Justice, with whom the other justices had joined 
dissenting in Wright and with whom they now joined in a ma­
jority in Milliken I, was one of the most influential factors 
in this case. 
In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court, in Board 
v. Spangler, ruled that the District Court could not require 
annual readjustments to balance majority and minority enroll­
ments to maintain specific racial ratios in Pasadena city 
schools. This six-to-two decision seems to be an extenuation 
of the Court's reluctance to go further than the standards 
established in Brown. This decision seems to be in harmony 
with the Chief Justice's attitude concerning desegregation. 
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Drawing conclusions concerning Chief Justice Burger's influ­
ence in this case is difficult; some significance can be 
attributed to the fact that he voted with the majority and 
assigned the opinion to Justice Rehnquist who had consistently 
joined him in desegregation decisions. This decision may have 
resulted from more initial concurrence on the part of the 
justices than existed in previous cases, and this situation 
would have relieved the need for much of an effort to influ­
ence on the part of Chief Justice Burger. 
The Court unanimously approved a lower court ruling in 
Milliken II which called for the state to fund remediation 
programs designed to compensate for past segregation for 
Detroit city schools. Chief Justice Burger took this oppor­
tunity to write the majority opinion in which he once again 
affirmed the standards for desegregation which had been estab­
lished in his previous opinions. In reviewing these standards, 
he relied heavily upon his majority opinion in Swann. By 
writing the majority opinion in unanimous decision, the Chief 
Justice was able to control the content of the opinion, and 
in addition to giving the decision the added weight of his 
position, he was able to set a tone which might be repeated 
in later decisions and potentially influence them. This seems 
to be the situation with the Milliken II decision. 
Austin v. United States resulted in the Court issuing a 
memorandum decision (in which the Chief Justice joined) that 
emphasized that the remedy in a desegregation settlement was 
limited by the extent of the constitutional violation. The 
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hand of the Chief Justice can be seen in this case as the 
Court again refused to exceed the standards established in 
Brown. 
Board v. Brinkman was a case in which the Court again 
refused to step beyond the standards established in Brown. 
In this case the lack of specific findings showing segrega­
tive intent on the part of school authorities caused the 
Court to remand the case to the lower court. This decision, 
in which there were no dissenting opinions, demonstrates 
that the Court was following a path that the Chief Justice 
had advocated in earlier cases. 
When Board v. Brinkman returned to the Court following 
District and Appeals Court action, the Court delivered a deci­
sion approving the Appeals Court decision. Brinkman I was 
remanded to the lower court for the purpose of finding proof 
that a segregated system existed. The District Court could 
find no such evidence and dismissed the case. On appeal, how­
ever, the Court of Appeals ruled that a desegregation order 
was justified because a dual system existed in 1954 and this 
system had not been disestablished. When this case was pre­
sented to the Supreme Court for the second time, the Chief 
Justice was unable to maintain the restricted view of desegre­
gation that the Court had had in past cases. The influencing 
efforts which may have been exerted in this case seem to have 
produced little in the way of results. Chief Justice Burger 
joined in the dissent written by Justice Stewart. This dissent 
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stated that the Court had shifted the burden of proof to the 
school authorities by considering the system's segregation 
status in 1954 as relevant to the present case. The situation, 
according to Justice Stewart, was critical because the party 
bearing the burden of proof was likely to determine who would 
prevail in the litigation. This attitude was consistent with 
the Chief Justice's unwillingness to expand the standards 
established in Brown. This five-to-four decision indicates a 
break in the trend which seemed to be developing in the Court's 
attitude in desegregation decision. This decision indicates 
that the Chief Justice was unable to influence the Court as he 
seemed to have been able to do in past cases. The justice who 
is most conspicuous in his absence from the group joining the 
Chief Justice in this case is Justice Elackmun. The defection 
of this justice from the group of justices that had consist­
ently joined the Chief Justice in desegregation cases would 
have a significant impact on future cases. Such a defection 
would indicate a weakening in the Chief Justice's influencing 
powers. 
The Chief Justice seems to have had considerable influ­
ence over the Court in school desegregation cases. In his 
majority opinion in Swann, he established the fact that the 
Court would only maintain the status quo in school desegrega­
tion cases, and though the lower courts misinterpreted his 
intent, he was able to reorient them through later decisions. 
The Chief Justice seemed to have had the Court acting in 
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accordance with his desires until the Brinkcian decision was 
reviewed for the second time. This decision may have been a 
signal that the Chief Justice's influence in desegregation 
cases had weakened. Such a conclusion, however, must await 
additional school desegregation decisions to be verified. 
In the final analysis, Chief Justice Burger still falls short 
of the standards set by Chief Justice Warren in influencing 
the Court in desegregation decisions. Chief Justice Warren 
was able to mold an evenly divided Court into a united force 
behind the Brown decision. Chief Justice Burger has led a 
Court in which indecisiveness and dissent seem to be the rule 
rather than the exception. 
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TABLE XI 
VOTING RECORD OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BURGER COURT 
Justices and Terms 
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Voting Record in Relation to the Majority Opinion 
Alexander v. Holmes, 396 U.S. 19 (1969). per curiam 
Ordered immediate desegregation of Mississippi schools. 
C C C C c c c c X X X X 
Carter v. Board, 396 U.S. 226 (1969). per curiam 
Appeals court temporary injunction of desegregation plan 
overturned. 
C C C c c c c c X X X X 
Dowell v. Board, 396 U.S. 269 (1969). per curiam 
Ordered implementation of desegregation plan pending appeal. 
C C C c c c c c X X X X 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; N - Nonparticipant 
X - Retired or not yet seated; * - Announced decision 
187 
TABLE XII 
VOTING RECORD OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BURGER COURT 
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Voting Record in Relation to the Majority Opinion 
Carter v. Board, 396 U.S. 290 (1970). per curiam 
Ordered immediate desegregation of Louisiana schools. 
C C C C C C C c X X X X 
North Cross v. Board, 397 U.S. 232 (1970). per curiam 
Modified desegregation plan for Memphis City schools remanded. 
C C X C C C C N X X X X 
Swann v. Board, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) 
Established guidelines for lower courts in desegregation cases 
c* C C C C C C c c X X X 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; N - Nonparticipant 
X - Retired or not yet seated; * - Announced decision 
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Voting Record in Relation to the Majority Opinion 
Davis v. Board, 402 U.S. 33 (1971) 
Directed lower court to disregard zoning that interfered 
with desegregation. 
c* C C C C C c c c X X X 
McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971) 
State Supreme Court decision which interfered 
gation reversed. 
with desegre-
C* C C C C C c c c X X X 
Board v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971) 
State statute barring quotas and busing held unconstitutional 
C* C C C C C c c c X X X 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; N - Nonparticipant 
X - Retired or not yet seated; * - Announced decision 
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Voting Record in Relation to the Majority Opinion 
Moore v. Board, 402 U.S. 43 (1971). per curiam 
Remanded case for lack of controversy. 
C C C C C C C C C X X X 
Wright v. Council, 407 U.S. 451 (1972) 
Barred creation of city school district that would impede 
desegregation. 
D X C X C C* C C D D D X 
United States v. Board, 407 U.S. 484 (1972) 
Barred creation of city school district that would impede 
desegregation. 
C X C X C C* C C C C C X 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; N - Nonparticipant 
X - Retired or not yet seated; * - Announced decision 
190 
TABLE XV 
VOTING RECORD OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BURGER COURT 
Justices and Terms 
s 
• 
o 
• • 
w 
M . T3 • • 
^ 4J H 
• s • g pe5 o < fn • <0 H J rH c3 <* a rH <3 O 
:s <u •H r- r>. a> C tJOrH &§ CO i-l to b0 0 i—1 CD c rH 3 . 4J 4J o M fH •r-i rHiH ti CO • U I 00 I rH Cfl 1 ,2 a « 4-1  ̂1 H I 2 Ctf 1 u B 1 £rH 1 rH P 1 & a 1 
•"3 3 P J X  •rH i-H o n) •H n O >» a> JS M 0) i—1 •H D* o a> 
FQ tj\ 53 or-& Men t-3 rH tn ES Gv© £ CO W 4JCM H w oo t-J 0) CM T-J > LO VO cd co 3 CO JH in a) m a) m •H SO H vO £ a 
'Cr\ • i—1 Cf\ • O CTi • ctJ • i-i o> • +J <Ti •±i CTi • n) a\ •rl^ • OCT> . 0) o\ • -P <T> 
CJ W r-l hflH hffiH hWr) hWH >-i PQrH •"i P-l rH *"1 Pi rH *-} CO rH 
Voting Record in Relation to the Majority Opinion 
Keyes v. School District, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) 
Desegregation plan for Denver City Schools remanded. 
C X c X c* c N c c c D X 
Bradley v. School Board, 416 U.S. 646 (1974) 
Successful plaintiffs in desegregation suit awarded reasonable 
attorney fee. 
c X c X c c C N c* N C X 
Milliken v. Bradley. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Milliken I 
Interdistrict desegregation plan ruled to be beyond courts 
authority. 
c* X D X D C D D c C c X 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; N - Nonparticipant 
X - Retired or not yet seated; * - Announced decision 
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Voting Record in Relation to the Majority Opinion 
Board v. Spaugler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) 
Annual adjustments to maintain racial quotas unnecessary. 
C X X X D C C D C C C* N 
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). Milliken II 
State must help bear the cost of remedial education. 
C* X X X C C C C C C C C 
Board v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) 
Busing to correct racial balance disapproved. 
C X X X C C C N C C C* C 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; N - Nonparticipant 
X - Retired or not yet seated; * - Announced decision 
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Voting Record in Relation to the Majority Opinion 
Board v. Brinkman, U.S. (1979) 
Desegregation plan for Dayton City Schools upheld. 
D X X X C D c* C C D D C 
Board v. Denick, U.S. (1979) 
Desegregation plan for Columbus, Ohio, approved. 
C X X X C C c* C C D D C 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; N - Nonparticipant 
X - Retired or not yet seated; * - Announced decision 
CHAPTER V 
CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED FREEDOMS CASES 
Introduction 
The public education cases which have been brought before 
the Supreme Court questioning constitutionally guaranteed 
freedoms are of recent origin with most having been litigated 
in the post-World War II era. Academic freedom cases first 
came to the Court as a result of challenges to laws designed 
to keep undesirable persons out of public employment and to 
insure the loyalty of those already employed. 
In Garner v. Los Angeles (1951) the Court was asked to 
rule on the constitutionality of a Los Angeles city ordinance 
which required all public employees, including teachers, to 
sign a loyalty oath stating whether he had ever been or was a 
member of the Communist Party.^ In a five-to-four decision 
the Court ruled that the ordinance was constitutional and that 
dismissal from employment in public service was not punishment. 
Justice Tom C. Clark, writing the majority opinion, said: 
^H. C. Hudgins, The Warren Court and the Public Schools 
(Danville, Illinois: Interstate Printers and Publishers, 1970), 
p. 19. 
2 Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 
716 (1951). 
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Past conduct may well relate to present 
fitness. Past loyalty may have a reasonable 
relationship to present and future trust. Both 
are commonly inquired into in determining fitness 
for both high and low positions in private 
industry and are now less relevant in public 
employment.3 
In Adler v. Board of Education (1952) a New York City 
Civil Service Law, the Feinberg Law, was challenged.^ The 
Feinberg Law was designed to keep subversives out of the 
school system.^ In a six-to-three decision, the Court ruled 
that the oath was constitutional. Justice Sherman Minton, 
writing for the Court, said: 
A teacher works in a sensitive area in a 
schoolroom. There he shapes the attitudes of 
young minds towards the society in which they 
live. In this, the state has a vital concern. 
It must protect the integrity of the schools. 
That the school authorities have the right and 
the duty to screen the officials, teachers, and 
employees as to their fitness to maintain the 
integrity of the schools as a part of ordered 
society, can not be doubted. One's associates, 
past and present, as well as one's conduct, may 
properly be considered in determining fitness 
and loyalty.6 
Justice William Douglas dissented, saying: 
So long as she is a law-abiding citizen, 
so long as her performance within the public 
school system meets professional standards, her 
3Ibid., p. 720. 
^Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 
342 U.S. 485 (1952). 
^New York, Civil Service Law, Article 7, Title C 
Section 105. 
6Ibid., p. 493. 
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private life, her political philosophy, her 
social creed should not be cause of reprisals 
against her.7 
An Oklahoma loyalty-oath law was overturned by the Court 
in Weiman v. Updegraff (1952).® Wieman and twelve other em­
ployees of Oklahoma State Agricultural and Mechanical College 
tested the oath law by refusing to take it. They alleged 
that the oath law should be overturned on the grounds that it 
was a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law. In a unani­
mous decision, the Court found this oath law to be unconstitu­
tional. Justice Tom Clark wrote the Court's opinion. He 
stated that the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Court felt that a distinction should be drawn between member­
ship in an organization and active participation in it. The 
Court considered the possibility that one might join an organi­
zation that had been innocent when it started, only to turn 
subversive at a later date. 
The Supreme Court heard two cases concerning college teach­
ers that had implications for public school teachers. In 
Slochower v. Board (1956) the Court held that the summary dis­
charge of a teacher because he invoked the Fifth Amendment 
before an investigating committee of the United States Senate 
7Ibid., p. 511. 
8Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). 
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was a denial of his due process rights.^ in this case the 
Court, without indicating the proper components of a hear­
ing, stated that a teacher must have a hearing before being 
dismissed. 
The second case, Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957), con­
cerned the power of the State to compel a teacher to disclose 
the contents of a lecture and to delve into his political 
associations.^ The Court, with Chief Justice Warren giving 
the opinion, ruled that a teacher's constitutional rights can 
not be violated by a legislative investigation. However, the 
Court was careful to point out that teachers are not free of 
all investigatory actions simply because education is involved.H 
In Beilan v. Board (1958) the Court was asked to rule on 
the dismissal of a teacher who had refused to answer the super­
intendent's questions concerning his affiliation with the 
Communist Party.12 The superintendent made it clear that 
Beilan's loyalty was not an issue in his termination. The 
Court in a five-to-four decision upheld the dismissal. Writing 
for the majority, Justice Harold Burton said: 
The question asked of petitioner by his 
Superintendent was relevant to the issue of 
^Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of the City of 
New York, 350 U.S. 485 (1956). 
•^Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
HHudgins, p. 125. 
l^Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958). 
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petitioner's fitness and suitability to serve 
as a teacher .... We find no requirement 
in the Federal Constitution that a teacher's 
classroom conduct be the sole basis for 
determining fitness.13 
In giving the Court's opinion Justice Burton noted that 
Slochower and Beilan were different because in the Beilan case 
no inference was taken from the teacher's refusal to answer. 
In Barenblatt v. United States (1959) the right of Con­
gressional inquiry into alleged Communist infiltration into 
educational institutions was established.^ Speaking for the 
Court, Justice John Harlan said: 
An educational institution is not a con­
stitutional sanctuary from inquiries into 
matters that may otherwise be within the 
constitutional legislative domain merely for 
the reason that inquiry is made of someone 
within its walls.15 
An Arkansas statute requiring a teacher to list annually 
all organizations to which he had belonged during the past 
five years was tested in Shelton v. Tucker (1960).^ The 
Court in a five-to-four decision ruled that the statute re­
stricted the teacher's rights of association and unconstitu­
tionally deprived him of his right to academic freedom which 
was protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for the majority 
said: 
13Ibid., p. 405-406. 
^Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). 
15Ibid., p. 112. 
•^Shelton et al. v. Tucker et al., 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
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It requires him to list, without number, 
every conceivable kind of associational tie -
social, professional, political, avocational, 
or religious. Many such relationships could 
have no possible bearing upon the teacher's 
occupational competence or fitness.17 
During the 1960's, the Court considered several other 
*1 O 
cases in which teacher loyalty oaths were being challenged. ° 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court accepted a case, 
Pickering v. Board (1968) , in which a teacher had been dis­
missed for publishing an article that was critical of the 
Board of Education in a local paper.19 Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, speaking for the Court, said: 
Teachers are, as a class, the members of a 
community most likely to have informed and 
definite opinions as to how funds allotted to 
the operation of the schools should be spent. 
Accordingly, it is essential that they be able 
to speak out freely on such questions without 
fear of retaliatory dismissal.20 
In 1968 the Court denied certiorari in a case which con­
cerned the right of a student to wear his hair at any length 
desired.21 Justice William Douglas dissented in the case, 
saying: 
l^Ibid., p. 488. 
l^Camp v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, 
368 U.S. 278 (1961). Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). 
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966). 
^Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School 
District 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
20Ibid., p. 572. 
^Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 393 U.S. 
856 (1968). 
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It comes as a surprise that in a country 
where the States are restrained by an Equal 
Protection Clause, a person can be denied 
education in a public school because of the 
length of his hair.22 
Tinker v. Pes Moines (1969) the Court was asked to 
rule on the constitutionality of the suspension of students 
for wearing black armbands as a protest against the Vietnam 
War.^ The lower courts had upheld the school's disciplinary 
action. In a seven-to-two opinion the Court held that the 
wearing of armbands was protected by the First Amendment right 
of free speech. Justice Abe Fortas, writing for the majority, 
said: 
First Amendment rights, applied in light of 
the special characteristics of the school environ­
ment, are available to teachers and students. It 
can hardly be argued that either students or teach­
ers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.24 
In his dissenting opinion Justice Hugo Black warned of 
the possible consequences of the Tinker decision, saying: 
The Court's holding in this case ushers in 
what I deem to be an entirely new era in which 
the power to control pupils by the "elected 
officials of the state supported public schools" 
in the United States is in ultimate effect trans­
ferred to the Supreme Court.25 
These cases represent the collective precedents for the 
Burger Court in the area of constitutionally guaranteed rights 
22ibid. 
23john F. Tinker and Mary Beth Tinker, Minors, etc., et 
al. v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, et al. 
393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
24Ibid., p. 506. 
25Ibid., p. 515. 
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in education. These cases established that a teacher is pro­
tected by the constitution and may not be terminated because 
he has belonged to a particular organization, because he has 
invoked the Fifth Amendment, or because he has refused to 
take an unconstitutional oath. The Court also ruled that 
students do not lose their constitutional rights when they 
enter the schoolhouse gate. 
The Cases 
In Connell v. Higginbotham (1971) the constitutionality 
of a Florida loyalty oath required of all public employees 
was tested.^6 A three-judge District Court had declared three 
of the five clauses contained in the oath to be unconstitu­
tional. The Supreme Court's per curiam opinion expressed the 
views of five members of the Court. 
The Supreme Court rejected the portion of the oath stat­
ing: "I do not believe in the overthrow of the Government of 
the United States or the State of Florida by force or 
violence.The Court reasoned that this clause violated 
the employee's right to a hearing or inquiry prior to dismissal, 
a right which is guaranteed by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Marshall joined by Justices 
Douglas and Brennan, concurred in the result, but reasoned that 
^Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971). 
27Ibid., p. 208. 
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the "overthrow" clause should be struck on the grounds that 
"belief as such cannot be the predicate of government action."28 
Justice Stewart would have remanded the case to the lower 
court to determine if the "overthrow" clause embraced the 
teacher's philosophical or political beliefs. 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) the Court, speaking through 
Chief Justice Burger, affirmed the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin.29 The state court had ruled that Amish 
children could not be required to attend school upon reaching 
the age of fourteen since their religious beliefs prohibited 
such action. The Court found the Wisconsin statute which re­
quired school attendance by Amish children until the age of 
sixteen to be "undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of 
thier beliefs."30 
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred in 
the decision of the Court, noting that the record did not 
justify the "interesting and important issue" discussed in 
Justice Douglas's dissent.31 Justice White, joined by Justices 
Brennan and Stewart, concurred, stating: 
I join the opinion of and judgment of the 
Court because I cannot say that the State's 
interest in requiring two more years of compul­
sory education in the ninth and tenth grades 
2 8Ibid., p. 210. 
^Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
3°Ibid., p. 218. 
31lbid., p. 237. 
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outweighs the importance of the concededly 
sincere Amish religious practice to the sur­
vival of that sect.32 
Justice Douglas dissented on the grounds that the Court 
had not considered the constitutional rights of the child. In 
his dissent, Justice Douglas stated: 
It is the student's judgment, not his 
parent's, that is essential if we are to give 
full meaning to what we have said about the 
Bill of Rights and of the rights of students 
to be masters of their own destiny.33 
In Board v. Roth (1972), the Court ruled that an assist­
ant professor hired on a one-year contract was not deprived 
of constitutional rights when terminated without a hearing.34 
This ruling reversed the lower-court decision. The case 
holds significance for public education even though it deals 
specifically with a teacher at the university level because 
the opinion of Justice Stewart spoke of the rights afforded 
employees hired by the state. The decision, therefore, has 
significance for public school teachers who are hired by the 
state. On the record presented in this case the Court ruled 
that the respondent had not shown that he was deprived of any 
interest in liberty or property protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Chief Justice Burger emphasized in his concurring opinion 
that the relationship between a state institution and one of 
32Ibid., pp. 238-239. 
33Ibid., p. 245. 
34Board v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
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its teachers is essentially a matter of state concern and 
state law. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented 
in this case, with each justice expressing the view that the 
Court should have granted some form of hearing to the respond­
ent. 
In Ferry v. Sindermann (1972) the Court again considered 
a case dealing with the termination of a nontenured college 
teacher's contract.In this case the Court ruled in favor 
of the respondent teacher. The significant difference between 
this case and Roth may be found in the fact that this teacher 
had taught in the state college system for ten years. 
Justice Stewart, expressing the views of five members of 
the Court, delivered the Court's opinion in which he stated 
that the teacher should be granted a hearing by the college 
board. The teacher would then have the option of coming 
before the courts if he felt the board had not treated him 
justly. Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion, ex­
pressed the view that the relationship between a state insti­
tution and one of its teachers is essentially a matter of state 
law and state concern. In this concurring opinion which was 
written for both the Roth and Perry decisions, the Chief 
Justice made his feelings clear as he stated : 
Because the availability of the Fourteenth 
Amendment right to a prior administrative hearing 
35perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
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turns in each case on a question of state law, the 
issue of absention will arise in future cases con­
testing whether a particular teacher is entitled 
to a hearing prior to non-renewal of his contract. 
If relevant state contract law is unclear, a 
federal court should, in my view, abstain from 
deciding whether he is constitutionally entitled 
to a prior hearing, and the teacher should be left 
to resort to state courts on the questions arising 
under state law.36 
In Johnson v. New York State Education Department (1972) , 
the Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of New 
York education laws which required local school districts to 
furnish free textbooks to students in grades seven through 
twelve, but which provided free textbooks in grades ones 
through six only upon the vote of a majority of eligible 
voters to assess a tax for textbooks.37 The Court, in a per 
t 
curiam opinion, remanded the case to the District Court. The 
voters had elected a tax for the purchase of textbooks in 
grades one through six, and the Court directed the District 
Court to determine whether the case had become moot. 
The Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of 
a university's disciplinary action following the publication 
of what the university considered to be an obscene article. 
In this case, Papish v. Eoard of Curators (1973), the Court 
issued a per curiam opinion stating that the university had 
36ibid., p. 604. 
37Johnson v. New York Education Department, 409 U.S. 75 
(1972). 
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violated the student's constitutional rights.38 chief 
Justice Burger dissented, stating that he felt the Court's 
ruling was a "bizarre" extension of prior Court decisions. 
By saying that the university was impotent to deal with the 
conduct of its students, Chief Justice Burger felt the Court 
had erred in its judgment. Justice Rehnquist, joined by 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, dissented on the 
grounds that the Court had not made a prior ruling regarding 
the obscenity of the specific words in question. 
The Court was brought into the controversy over the fin­
ancing of public education in San Antonio v. Rodriguez(1973).39 
In an opinion by Justice Powell, expressing the views of five 
members of the Court, the Texas school finance system was 
called a practical and workable attempt to provide educational 
services for the children of Texas. The Court noted that the 
evidence did not show that any definable category of poor 
persons was discriminated against, that the Texas finance 
system furthered a legitimate state purpose, and that it did 
not violate the equal protection clause. Justices Douglas, 
Brennan, White, and Marshall dissented in this case with each 
noting that parents and children were being discriminated 
38papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973). 
39san Antonio v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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against because they had no means to supplement minimum state 
funds to the same degree as more affluent districts. 
In Board v. LaFleur (1974) the Court ruled that a 
Cleveland, Ohio, Board of Education and Chesterfield County, 
Virginia, Board of Education rule requiring a pregnant school 
teacher to take unpaid maternity leave five months before the 
expected childbirth to be unconstitutional.1̂  Justice Stewart, 
joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, 
delivered the opinion of the Court, stating: 
We conclude, therefore, that neither the 
necessity for continuity of instruction nor 
the state interest in keeping physically unfit 
teachers out of the classroom can justify the 
sweeping mandatory leave regulations that the 
Cleveland and Chesterfield County School Boards 
have adopted. While the regulations no doubt 
represent a good-faith attempt to achieve a 
laudable goal, they cannot pass muster under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, because they employ irrebuttable 
presumptions that unduly penalize a female 
teacher for deciding to bear a child.41 
Chief Justice Burger joined the dissent of Justice 
Rehnquist in this case. Justice Rehnquist, in referring to 
the majority opinion, states, "My Brother Stewart thereby en­
lists the Court in another quixotic engagement in his appar­
ently unending war on irrebuttable presumptions."42 chief 
Justice Burger's dissent in Vlandis v. Kline (1973) was quoted 
40Board v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
41lbid., p. 647. 
42ibid., p. 657. 
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by Justice Rehnquist as he noted that legislatures create 
thousands of statutes which might be improved if the Courts 
were to rule on each individually.^ 
An Ohio statute which allowed public school students to 
be suspended for up to ten days or expelled without a hearing 
at which they could challenge the suspension or expulsion, 
was tested in Goss v. Lop eg (1975).44 The Court, speaking 
through Justice White, in a five-to-four decision found the 
statute to be a violation of the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The majority opinion written by Justice 
White was joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and 
Marshall. In this opinion Justice White noted the importance 
of suspension as a "necessary tool to maintain order."45 The 
opinion further stated, however, that the requirements estab­
lished in regard to a student's right to have a hearing were 
"less than a fair-minded school principal would impose upon 
himself."46 The Court held that the student must "be given 
oral or written notice of the charges against hiir." and the 
opportunity to present his side of the story if he denies the 
charges.47 
43Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). 
44GOSS V. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
45Ibid., p. 580. 
46Ibid., p. 582. 
47ibid., p. 581. 
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Justice Powell's dissent in Goss was joined by the Chief 
Justice and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist. In this opinion 
Justice Powell stated: 
The Court holds for the first time that the 
federal courts, rather than educational officials 
and state legislatures, have the authority to 
determine the rules applicable to routine class­
room discipline of children and teenagers in the 
public schools. It justifies this unprecedented 
intrusion into the process of elementary and 
secondary education by identifying a new constitu­
tional right: the right of a student not to be 
suspended for as much as a single day without 
notice and a due process hearing either before or 
promptly following the suspension.43 
In Board v. Jacobs (1975) the Court was asked to rule on 
the constitutionality of regulations affecting the publication 
and distribution of a student newspaper.^ Due to the gradu­
ation of the students who had been plaintiffs in the case, the 
Court vacated the judgment of the Appeals Court and remanded 
the case with instructions to the District Court to dismiss 
the case. Justice Douglas dissented from this per curiam 
opinion, stating: 
Any student who desires to express his views 
in a manner which may be offensive to school 
authorities is now put on notice that he faces 
not only a threat of immediate suppression of his 
ideas, but also the prospect of a long and arduous 
court battle if he is to vindicate his rights of 
free expression.50 
48Ibid., p. 585. 
49Board v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975). 
50Ibid., p. 134. 
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In Wood v. Strickland (1975) the Court ruled that school 
board members were not immune from liability for damage if 
they knew or could have known that their actions in carrying 
out their official responsibilities would violate the consti­
tutional rights of a student.51 Justice White, joined by 
Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, delivered 
the opinion of the Court. The majority opinion stated: 
A compensatory award will be appropriate only 
if the school board member has acted with such an 
impermissible motivation or with such disregard of 
the student's clearly established constitutional 
rights that his action cannot reasonably be 
characterized as being in good faith.52 
Chief Justice Burger, accompanied by Justices Blackmun 
and Rehnquist, joined in the dissent written by Justice Powell 
in this case. In this dissenting opinion Justice Powell 
stated: 
The Court's decision appears to rest on an 
unwarranted assumption as to what lay school 
officials know or can know about the law and 
constitutional rights. These officials will now 
act at the peril of some judge or jury subse­
quently finding that a good-faith belief as to 
the applicable law was mistaken and hence 
actionable.53 
The claim that teachers who had been terminated should be 
guaranteed the right of review by a body other than the school 
51-Uood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
52ibid., p. 322. 
53ibid., p. 329. 
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board was rejected by the Court in School District v. 
Hortonville Education Association (1976).54 Chief Justice 
Burger delivered the opinion of the Court in this case, 
saying: 
The sole issue in this case is whether the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits this School Board from making the 
decision to dismiss teachers admittedly engaged 
in a strike and persistently refusing to return 
to their duties.55 
The Chief Justice justified the decision to allow the 
School Board to have the sole decision-making power by stat­
ing: 
Permitting the Board to make the decision 
at issue here preserves its control over school 
district affairs, leaves the balance of power 
in labor relations where the state legislature 
struck it, and assures that the decision whether 
to dismiss the teachers will be made by the body 
responsible for that decision under state law.5o 
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Erennan and Marshall, 
dissented, saying: 
I believe that there is a constitutionally 
unacceptable danger of bias where school board 
members are required to assess the reasonable­
ness of their own actions during heated contract 
negotiations that have culminated in a teacher's 
strike.57 
In School District v. Wisconsin (1976) the Court ruled 
that a nonunion teacher had a right guaranteed by the First 
54School District v. Hortonville Education Association, 
426 U.S. 482 (1976). 
55ibid., p. 488. 
56ibid., p. 488. 
57ibid., p. 499. 
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Amendment to speak at an open board meeting concerning a 
union proposal pending before the Board.58 Chief Justice 
Burger, joined by Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, 
and Stevens, delivered the Court's opinion in the case. The 
Chief Justice dismissed the contention that nonunion teachers 
be barred from speaking to the board by saying: 
Teachers not only constitute the over­
whelming bulk of employees of the school system, 
but they are the very core of that system; re­
straining teachers' expressions to the board on 
matters involving the operation of the schools 
would seriously impair the board's ability to 
govern the district.59 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented 
in this case stating: 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court was correct in 
stating that there is'nothing unconstitutional 
about legislation commanding that in closed 
bargaining sessions a government body may admit, 
hear the views of, and respond to only the 
designated representatives of a union selected 
by the majority of its employees.60 
In Mt. Healthy v. Doyle (1977) the Court was asked to 
rule in a case involving the termination of a teacher follow­
ing charges that he was unprofessional because he had communi­
cated the substance of his principal's memorandum on teacher 
dress to a local radio station and made an obscene gesture to 
a female student.^ Justice Rehnquist delivered the unanimous 
58school District v. Wisconsin, 429 U.S. 167 (1976). 
59ibid., p. 176. 
60Ibid., p. 178. 
^Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
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decision of the Court noting that: (1) the school board was 
not immune from suit; (2) the teacher was entitled to consti­
tutionally guaranteed rights even though he had not received 
tenure; (3) the teacher was not entitled to remedial action if 
the board would have reached the decision to terminate in any 
event; (4) the District Court erred in not finding whether the 
teacher would have been terminated in the absence of the con­
stitutionally protected conduct; (5) the case was remanded to 
the lower court so that it could determine the proper action 
consistent with this opinion. 
In Ingraham v. Wright (1977) the Court ruled that cor­
poral punishment in public schools did not constitute cruel 
6 9 
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
This five-to-four decision was delivered by Justice Powell, 
joined by Chief Justice and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and 
Rehnquist. In rejecting the petitioners' claim that corporal 
punishment violated their Eighth Amendment rights, Justice 
Powell stated: 
The openness of the public school and its 
supervision by the community afford significant 
safeguards against the kinds of abuses from 
which the Eighth Amendment protects the 
prisoner.63 
Petitioner's claims that corporal punishment deprived them 
of due process rights were rejected by Justice Powell who 
stated: 
62ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
63Ibid., p. 670. 
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In view of the low incidence of abuse, the 
openness of our schools, and the common-law 
safeguards that already exist, the risk of error 
that may result in violation of a schoolchild's 
substantive rights can only be regarded as 
minimal. 
Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, llarshall, and 
Stevens, dissented in this case. This dissent noted that cor­
poral punishment should be administered only after an informal 
hearing in which the student could plead his case before a 
neutral party. 
In Board v. White (1978) the Court considered the con­
stitutionality of a school board policy requiring employees 
to take unpaid leaves of absence while they campaigned for 
elective office.65 This policy had been adopted by the Board 
of Education of Dougherty County, Georgia, shortly after a 
Negro employee had announced his candidacy for the state legis­
lature. In an opinion written by Justice Marshall, joined by 
Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Stevens, the Court 
found the Board's action to be in violation of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965. The judgment of the District Court, which 
held that the Board's rule should have been submitted for fed­
eral approval under the requirements of the Voting Rights Act, 
was affirmed. The enforcement of the rule was enjoined pending 
compliance with the clearance required. 
64Ibid., p. 682. 
65l3oard v« White, U.S. (1978). 
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Chief Justice Burger joined in a dissent written by 
Justice Powell stating: 
The Court's ruling in this case is without 
support in the language of legislative history of 
the Act. Moreover, although prior decisions of the 
Court have taken liberties with this language and 
history, today's decision is without precedent.66 
Justice Powell further stated: 
But the notion that a State or locality imposes 
a "qualification" on candidates by refusing to sup­
port their campaigns with public funds is without 
support in reason or precedent.67 
In Carey v. Piplus (1978) the Court heard a case in which 
students claimed they had been suspended from school without 
procedural due process.68 Justice Powell wrote the Court's 
opinion in this unanimous case, stating that: (1) the princi­
ple of compensation should govern the amount of damage awards; 
(2) rules governing compensation for injuries should be tail­
ored to interests protected by the particular right in 
question; (3) awards for mental and emotional distress should 
be granted only upon proof of such injury; (4) if the suspen­
sions were justified, petitioners would nevertheless be en­
titled to recover nominal damages not to exceed one dollar.69 
In Ambach v. Norwick (1979) the Court was asked to rule 
on the constitutionality of a New York statute which forbade 
66ibid., p. 284. 
67Ibid., p. 286. 
68Carey v. Pipus, U.S. (1978). 
GSIbid. 
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the certification of any person who was not a citizen of the 
United States as a public school teacher unless that person 
had manifested intentions to apply for citizenship.70 Justice 
Powell, expressing the views of Chief Justice Burger and 
Justices Stewart, White, and Rehnquist, reported the Court's 
decision. The statute was judged not to be in violation of 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Justice Powell stated: 
The restriction is carefully framed to serve 
its purpose, as it bars from teaching only those 
aliens who have demonstrated their unwillingness 
to obtain United States citizenship.71 
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
and Stevens, dissented. These justices expressed the view that 
a state may not constitutionally deny teaching employment to 
resident aliens. 
In Givhan v. School District (1979) the Court was asked 
to rule on whether a teacher's criticism of school policy was 
subject to the protection of the First Amendment.72 jn a 
unanimous decision announced by Justice Rehnquist, the Court 
ruled that the teacher was protected by the First Amendment 
when she criticized the school district policies to her princi­
pal. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was vacated, and 
7®Ambach v. Norwick, u.s. 
71Ibid. 
7^Givhan v. School District, 
(1979). 
U.S. (1979). 
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the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
the Court's opinion in this case and in Mt. Healthy v. Doyle. 
In summary action the Court denied certorari in three 
cases dealing with due process rights in public education.74 
The Court also dodged the issue of homosexual rights in the 
context of public education by denying certorari in Gaylord v. 
Tacoma School District (1977).The Court denied a request to 
review a lower court ruling which had upheld a school board 
decision to deny students the right to distribute a questionaire 
surveying the sexual activities of high school students. 
Analysis of Chief Justice Burger's Influence 
The Burger Court had an interagreement rate of seventy-one 
percent in public education cases which dealt with constitu­
tionally guaranteed freedoms. The Court was moderately divided 
in these cases, recording only three unanimous decisions while 
six of the cases were decided by five-to-four votes and three 
were decided by six-to-three votes. Chief Justice Burger dis­
sented in five, or one-third, of the fifteen decisions in which 
votes were recorded. Chief Justice Burger's agreement with his 
associates ranged from a rate of zero in nine decisions with 
Justice Douglas, to five in seventeen with Justices Marshall and 
73Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
^^Staton v. Mayes 46 U.S.L.W. 3262 (1977). Ferguson v. 
Board, 46 U.S.L.W. 3303 (1977). Barthuli v. Board, 46 U.S.L.W. 
3433 (1978). 
^Gaylord v. Tacoma School District, 46 U.S.L.W. 3320 (1977). 
76Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F. 2d 512 (1977). 
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Brerman, to ten in seventeen with Justice White, to five in 
seventeen with Justice Stevens, to eleven in seventeen with 
Justice Stewart, to thirteen in sixteen with Justice Blackmun, 
to twelve in fourteen with Justice Powell, and, finally, to 
sixteen in sixteen with Justice Rehnquist. 
The majority opinion writing duty was much more widely 
distributed in these cases than in the church and state or 
desegregation cases just reviewed. Six different justices 
delivered majority opinions with Justice Powell delivering 
four, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart delivering 
three, Justices White and Rehnquist delivering two, and 
Justice Marshall delivering one. 
Three justices agreed with each other in these cases at 
a rate high enough to meet Sprague's criteria for identifica­
tion as members of a bloc.77 The members of this bloc were 
Justice Powell, who agreed with both Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice Rehnquist in eighty-six percent of the cases; Justice 
Rehnquist, who agreed with Chief Justice Burger in one hundred 
percent of the cases; and Chief Justice Burger. This bloc 
consistently supported opinions that restricted the Court's 
involvement in cases in which school board policies were chal­
lenged, and dissented from opinions which extended the Court's 
involvement in constitutional protections. 
A second voting bloc which also met Spraque's criteria 
consisted of Justices Erennan and Marshall who agreed in all 
7?Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, The Study of 
Public Law, (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 163-165. 
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seventeen of these cases. This bloc usually supported opin­
ions that extended the range of constitutionally guaranteed 
rights granted to teachers and students. These two blocs 
usually took opposing positions as is indicated by their 
interagreement rate of only thirty percent. 
The remaining justices, with the exception of Justices 
Douglas and Blackmun, fall into the category of swing justices 
by virtue of their swings from support of one bloc to support 
for the other. Justice Blackmun agreed with the Burger-Powell-
Rehnquist bloc only slightly less than enough to qualify as a 
bloc member. Justice Douglas almost qualifies as a member of 
the Brennan-Marshall bloc, having agreed with these justices 
in seventy-eight percent of the cases. 
Chief Justice Burger's opinions reveal his desire to re­
strict the Court's involvement in cases where challenges were 
made to school policy on the grounds that constitutionally 
guaranteed rights were violated. The Chief Justice consist­
ently advocated that the state courts were the proper courts 
to hear these cases, since they dealt with state laws. This 
attitude on the part of the Chief Justice can be clearly seen 
in his concurring opinions written for both the Roth and Perry 
decisions, in which he expressed his belief that the lower fed­
eral courts should reject appeals of this nature and force the 
state courts to take the responsibility for seeing that the 
state law was not violated. This attitude that the Supreme 
Court should restrict its involvement in public education cases 
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was evident in most of Chief Justice Burger's opinions and in 
the opinions in which he joined. A restrictionist attitude is 
also a characteristic of the Burger-Powell-Rehnquist bloc. 
The Yoder decision offers little evidence of the Chief 
Justice's influence or the lack of it. The decision was made 
by means of a six-to-one vote with two justices taking no part 
in the decision. The Chief Justice was among the majority in 
the case, and he did reserve the majority opinion for himself. 
Based on these two facts, it seems logical to assume that the 
Court supported the decision initially and that the Chief 
Justice had no need to attempt to influence his associates, 
since their initial thinking in the case was compatible with 
his thinking. This assumption can be justified on the grounds 
that the Chief Justice voted with the majority indicating his 
agreement with the decision, and he evidently felt that the 
majority was built upon a strong conviction on the part of 
each majority justice so that he could write the majority 
opinion himself rather than assigning it to a justice who could 
attract undecided votes. 
The Roth and Perry decisions seem to be consistent with 
Chief Justice Burger's restrictionist attitude. Eoth of these 
decisions limited the relief extended through the Federal court 
system to college teachers whose contracts were not renewed. 
In each of these cases the Court reached its decision by means 
of five-to-three votes. The Chief Justice, voting last, cast 
the deciding vote in each of these cases. Chief Justice Burger 
220 
may have also influenced these two cases by his assignment of 
the majority opinion. Justices White and Stewart both voted 
with the majority in these cases. The affiliation of these 
two swing justices with the Burger-Powell-Rehnquist bloc to 
form the majority may be the result of Chief Justice Burger's 
assignment of the majority opinion to Justice Ftevart. As 
has been noted in the analysis of other cases, the assignment 
of the majority opinion can be used to attract support for a 
position if the assignment is given to one of the uncommitted 
justices who writes an opinion which is acceptable to other 
uncommitted members of the Court.This seems to have been 
Chief Justice Burger's intent in these two cases, since he 
opted to assign the majority opinion to Justice Stewart and 
to write a concurring opinion rather than to write the major­
ity opinion himself which would have given his ideas more 
weight. 
The Chief Justice seems to have failed in any attempts he 
may have made to influence the Court in Papish. The Court's 
per curiam opinion stated that the university's disciplinary 
action following the publication of an obscene article was un­
constitutional. Chief Justice Burger indicated his displeasure 
with the ruling in a dissenting opinion which reaffirmed his 
desire to restrict the Court's intervention into the adminis­
tration of schools. This sharply-worded dissent, however, was 
78yalter Murphy and Kerman Pritchett, Courts, Judges, and 
Politics (New York: Random House, 1961), p~ 504. 
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ineffective, as the majority supported the "bizarre" exten­
sion of the Court's prior decisions, as the Chief Justice 
called the majority opinion, by a six-to-three margin. 
The Rodriguez decision represents what appears to be a 
victory for the Chief Justice and his efforts to restrict the 
Court. In this case the Court was asked to rule on the con­
stitutionality of the system by which public schools were 
financed in Texas. The lower courts had been hearing cases 
for some time that dealt with the inequalities produced by 
local funding of public education resulting from varying tax 
bases in wealthy and poor school districts within the same 
state or city. Because of the possible repercussions for pub­
lic education in the entire nation, this case was considered 
to be critical. The Chief Justice, having already expressed 
his feeling that petitions originating from institutions 
created by state law should be presented to state rather than 
federal courts, would have been expected to exert his influence 
in the direction of restricting the Court in this case. The 
Chief Justice was able to cast the fifth and deciding vote for 
just such a decision in this case. 
The degree to which Chief Justice Burger was able to in­
fluence the other justices in this case is difficult to deter­
mine. Since he assigned the majority opinion to Justice Powell, 
a member of his restrictionist bloc, there is no evidence to 
indicate that he used the power to assign the opinion to influ­
ence swing votes. There is little doubt, however, that the 
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Chief Justice worked for this restrictionist decision in con­
ference and that his vote was the difference in the decision. 
In LaFleur the Chief Justice was unable to marshal the 
support needed to obtain a decision which would have limited 
the Court's entry into an area he felt was more suited for 
state courts. In this decision which struck a school board's 
rule requiring maternity leave five months before the expected 
childbirth, the Chief Justice joined Justice Rehnquist's dis­
sent. Any attempt to influence the Court on the part of Chief 
Justice Burger in this case seems to have been futile. 
The Chief Justice found himself in the minority again when 
the Court ruled that a student must receive oral or written 
notice of the charges against him when he is suspended or ex­
pelled from school and must have an opportunity to present his 
defense in a hearing. The five-to-four decision in Goss v. 
Lopez was contrary to Chief Justice Eurger's desire to limit 
the Court's involvement in educational matters that he felt 
could best be handled by the school or the state. This attitude 
is expressed in Justice Powell's dissert which the Chief Justice 
joined. 
The majority in Goss v. Lopez was composed of the Erennan-
Marshall bloc, Justice Douglas who often voted with this bloc, 
and swing justices White and Stewart. The majority opinion was 
assigned by Justice Douglas, the senior justice voting with the 
majority. By assigning the majority opinion to Justice White, 
Justice Douglas may have been acting to consolidate the majority 
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by having this nonaligned justice write an opinion that would 
be acceptable to his nonaligned colleagues. 
The Court again issued a ruling which went beyond the 
bounds that Chief Justice Eurger felt were proper when it 
ruled that school board members were not immune from liability 
for damages resulting from their unconstitutional actions. In 
this case, Wood, v. Strickland, the majority opinion was 
written by Justice White who was joined by Justices Douglas, 
Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall. This majority is composed of 
the same group of justices that dissented in Goss v. Lopez. 
The Wood decision is another decision in which there seems 
to be little effect from any influencing efforts that the Chief 
Justice may have made. The tone of the dissenting opinion 
which Chief Justice Burger joined indicates that these dissent­
ing justices felt strongly that the majority opinion had placed 
an unfair burden on school officials and had extended the pro­
tection of the Constitution past the bounds that had been in­
tended by its framers. This situation would seem to lead to 
the conclusion that efforts were made to move the Court in 
another direction during the conference but were unsuccessful. 
In School District v. Hortonville Education Association, 
Chief Justice Burger delivered a majority opinion which gave 
school boards the right to terminate striking teachers. This 
six-to-three decision was consistent with Chief Justice 
Burger's feeling that the local school authorities should 
control their own affairs without interference from the fed­
eral courts. The dissenting members of the Court, Justices 
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Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall questioned the ability of the 
school board to make reasonable decisions in the context of 
heated negotiations. The Court, however, seems to have been 
fairly well unified in this decision, and since Chief Justice 
Burger wrote the majority opinion himself rather than assign­
ing it to a nonaligned justice, it would appear that little 
influence was needed in order to secure the majority behind 
this restrictionist decision. 
Chief Justice Burger again delivered the majority opinion 
in School District v. V7i scons in. This six-to-three decision 
granted a nonunion teacher the First Amendment right to speak 
about a union proposal being considered at an open board meet­
ing. The members of the majority and minority in this decision 
were the same as those in the majority and minority in School 
District v. Hortonville Education Association. The conclusion 
reached concerning the Chief Justice's influence in Hortonville, 
therefore, seems valid in this case also. 
In Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, a unanimous court set the stand­
ards under which a teacher could obtain remedial action if he 
had been terminated as a result of a constitutionally protected 
action. This decision, written by Justice Rehnquist, seems to 
have been consistent with Chief Justice Burger's restrictionist 
attitude about the involvement of the courts in educational 
matters. The degree to which he tried to influence or was 
successful in influencing the court is difficult to determine. 
The Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of 
using corporal punishment to discipline public school students 
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in Ingraham v. Wright. The Chief Justice was able to play a 
major role in the disposition of this case by casting the 
fifth and deciding vote for a decision which left the use of 
corporal punishment to the discretion of school officials. 
The degree to which Chief Justice Burger influenced the votes 
of other members of the court is difficult to determine. Since 
the majority opinion was assigned to Justice Powell, who is a 
member of the restrictionist bloc, there is little evidence to 
indicate an attempt on the part of the Chief Justice to win 
swing votes through the assignment of the majority opinion. 
There seems little doubt, however, that the Chief Justice 
worked to get this restrictionist decision in the conference 
and was able to cast the vote that sealed the decision. 
The Chief Justice seems to have been unsuccessful in any 
attempts he may have made in an attempt to influence the Court 
in Board v. White. This decision, which was made by a five-
to-one vote, struck school board restrictions placed on school 
employees who became candidates for public office. The major­
ity opinion in this case is contrary to the Chief Justice's 
feelings that the federal courts should leave public school 
problems to school officials and state courts. Chief Justice 
Burger indicated his inability to influence the Court and his 
displeasure with the majority by joining the dissent written 
by Justice Powell. 
The Court's unanimous decision in Carey v. Piplus appeared 
to maintain a restrictionist posture that was acceptable to the 
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Chief Justice. The degree to which the Chief Justice influ­
enced this unanimous decision is difficult to determine. The 
decision did place the Court in a position to interfere with 
school operations; however, the restrictions this decision 
established for the granting of compensations to students 
whose constitutional rights had been violated seemed to be 
consistent with the restrictionist posture of the Chief Justice. 
The Chief Justice may have worked to influence the Court to 
accept this decision, thinking it would soften the impact of 
previous decisions with which he had disagreed because they had 
drawn the court into this controversy. 
The Court again accepted a restrictionist attitude when 
it held, in Ambach v. Norwick, that the state of New York could 
withhold teacher certificates from aliens who refused to apply 
for citizenship. This decision was consistent with the Chief 
Justice's restrictionist attitudes and appeared to be one which 
he would have advocated in conference. 
The Chief Justice appears to have been able to influence 
the Court to deny certain petitions for certiorari. As was 
noted in Chapter I, the Court is able to have a major impact 
on public school issues by denying petitions for certiorari. 
This action on the part of the Court has the same impact as 
affirming the lower court decision because that decision stands 
when certiorari is denied. The Burger Court has received peti­
tions for certiorari from cases dealing with homosexual rights 
in the public schools, due process, and freedom of speech. In 
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each of these cases the Court, by denying the petition for 
certiorari, has affirmed a restrictionist lower court deci­
sion. Though it is difficult to determine the impact of 
Chief Justice Burger's influence in these decisions, it seems 
logical to assume, based on his restrictionist philosophy, 
that he advocated these denials. 
In cases dealing with constitutionally guaranteed rights, 
the Chief Justice seems to have tried to influence the Court 
to take a position that would restrict access for public edu­
cation cases which he felt were more properly handled by state 
courts. Ke seems to have been successful in leading the Court 
in a number of cases which resulted in five-to-four decisions. 
He also seems to have been successful in influencing a number 
of decisions by means of his assignment to the majority opinion. 
His efforts seem to have split the Court, and this served to 
make the decisions rendered in this area less influential than 
they would have been if the Court had been unified behind one 
philosophical position. 
228 
TABLE XVIII 
VOTING RECORD OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BURGER COURT 
Justices and Terms 
• 'o • 
o <! 
o 
£ &0T—t •> ti o hh n 3 
U i 3 d i n a i 
>N a XI J3 cq 4-1 cm B IDN W o o 
•h vo M <£> «d 
• x! on • co on • t—1 on 
l~3 »3 «—' »-> pq th 
• 
w 
|x4 a • c3 4-» Ph 
m tH 10 
t-t i—1 «H C to 
[5 r-1 1 r-t 3 1 -H c aj IH •H a* O 0) 
J aj cm ts pics 
S r>* rCJ 1̂ . a) r-
• O on . <u on • 4-1 on 
1-3 ̂  r-t pir-i 
g 
n 
n rt m 
£s a) 
t>o 
* h 1 
w on 
vo 
Xi ' on 
u wh 
•j 
o 
bO i 
3a1 
K or» 
rt co 
• r—i ON 
•"} PQ r-t 
co 
f-» 
i 
MOn 
CO 
o on 
oh 
£ h 
 ̂c i 
o ctf 
hHin 
m in ft) on 
s ,  
 ̂vo 
a) in 
}-i on pq i-l 
u 
0) 
4j 
4j 
o 
hi 
4j 
m i 
a 
s 00 
a) m 
4-1 on 
cfi i—l 
Voting Record in Relation to the Majority Opinion 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) 
Religious group granted exemption from compulsory attendance. 
C* X D X C C c c c N N X 
Board v. Roth. 408 U .S. 564 (1972) 
Teacher denied right of hearing following termination after 
one year contract. 
C X D X D C* c D C N C X 
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) r
Teacher granted right of hearing following termination. 
X D X C* N 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; N - Nonparticipant 
X - Retired or not yet seated; * - Announced decision 
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Voting Record in Relation to the Majority Opinion 
Papist v. Board, 410 U.S. 667 (1973). per curiam 
Regulation of speech by university ruled unconstitutional. 
D X C X C C C C D C D X 
San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) 
State system of financing education did not discriminate • 
C X D X D C D D C C* C X 
Board v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) 
Mandatory termination of pregnant teachers held 
unconstitutional. 
D X C X C C* C C C C D X 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; N - Nonparticipant 
X - Retired or not yet seated; * - Announced decision 
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Voting Record in Relation to the Majority Opinion 
Gross v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) 
Suspension of pupils up to ten days without hearing 
unconstitutional. 
D X C X C C C* C D D D X 
Board v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1974). per curiam 
Graduation o£ students involved in suit over newspaper 
rendered case moot. 
C X D X C C C C C C C X 
Wood v. Strickland. 420 U.S. 308 (1975) 
School board members not immune from liability. 
D X C X C C c* C D D D X 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; N - Nonparticipant 
X - Retired or not yet seated; * - Announced decision 
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Voting Record in Relation to the Majority Opinion 
School District v. Hortonville Education Association, 
426 lJ.5. 482 (T97F) 
Striking teachers granted only School Board review when 
terminated. 
C* X X X D D C D C C c c 
School District v. Wisconsin, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) 
Nonunion teacher granted First Amendment freedom of speech. 
C* X X X D D C D C C c c 
Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, 429 
Conditions under which an 
outlined. 
U.S. 274 (1977) 
untenured teacher can be terminate 
C X X X C C C C C C c* c 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; N - Nonparticipant 
X - Retired or not yet seated; * - Announced decision 
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TABLE XXII 
VOTING RECORD OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BURGER COURT 
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Voting Record in Relation to the Majority Opinion 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) 
Disciplinary paadling of students acceptable under certain 
conditions. 
C X X X D C D D c c* C D 
Board v. White, U.S. (1978) 
Board policy requiring political candidates to take leaves 
held invalid. 
D X X X C D C C* c D D C 
Carey v. Piphus, 93 S. Ct. 1042 (1978) 
Students suspended without justification entitled to recover 
damages. 
C X X X C C C c N c* C C 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; N - Nonparticipant 
X - Retired or not yet seated; * - Announced decision 
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TABLE XXIII 
VOTING RECORD OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BURGER COURT 
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Voting Record in Relation to the Majority Opinion 
Ambach v. Norwick, __ U.S. (1979) 
State statute barring noncitizens for teacher certification 
held valid. 
C X X X D C C D D C* c D 
Givhan v. School District, U.S • (1979) 
Teacher's right to criticize school board policy upheld. 
C X X X C C C C C C c* C 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; N - Nonparticipant 
X - Retired or not yet seated; * - Announced decision 
chapter vi 
summary and conclusion 
The cases reviewed in this study revealed that Chief 
Justice Burger's opinions were identifiable as to how the 
basic questions in church and state, desegregation, and con­
stitutional freedoms cases should have been resolved. The 
study has as its purpose the task of analyzing the Chief 
Justice's influence in Supreme Court cases affecting educa­
tion. Since Chief Justice Burger's philosophical position can 
be identified from his opinions , the analysis of his influence 
has consisted of reviewing the cases and evaluating his utili­
zation of the influencing powers and rights afforded the Chief 
Justice. 
This task was complicated by the shroud of secrecy which 
surrounds the justices' interactions. As a result of this 
secrecy, the analysis has been made using indirect means. 
Interviews, memoirs, biographies, and private papers have not 
been used in the analysis because they often represent the 
after-the-fact reconstructions of justices who were apt to 
report subjective recollections. The voting records and 
opinions of the justices have been used, however, because they 
appear to be the most objective indicators of the Court's 
behavior, though they too have been interpreted with care. 
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In all three classifications of cases, Chief Justice 
Burger supported a position which was opposed by an individual 
or group of justices. The Chief Justice supported the attempts 
of accommodationists who wanted the Court's approval of tax ex­
emptions and tuition reimbursements for parents of parochial 
school students. Justices White and Rehnquist joined Chief 
Justice Burger's position, and the three formed a voting bloc 
in church and state cases. This bloc was opposed by a sepa-
rationist bloc consisting of Justices Douglas, Brennan, and 
Marshall. The cases dealing with desegregation of the nation's 
schools were more unified than the cases in the other two areas; 
however, the Chief Justice was opposed by some justices when he 
attempted to restrict desegregation remedies to the limits 
established by the Brown decision. Though no blocs were identi­
fiable in desegregation cases, the philosophical differences 
between Chief Justice Burger and other members of the Court can 
be seen in the concurring and dissenting opinions written in 
these cases. The cases which dealt with constitutional freedoms 
also produced blocs. The Chief Justice, joined by Justices 
Powell and Rehnquist, advocated the position that the Court 
should restrict access to people who claimed that their consti­
tutional rights had been violated by state-governed educational 
institutions. This bloc felt that these cases could be handled 
more properly by state courts. Justices Brennan and Marshall 
were members of a bloc which opposed this position. 
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The Court's differences of opinion in education cases 
resulted in a divided Court. One of the major criticisms of 
the Burger Court has been its lack of unity, especially in 
major cases. This situation could be interpreted as an indi­
cation of Chief Justice Burger's lack of influence with the 
members of the Court. As was noted in Chapter II, the men 
who have served as Chief Justice have varied widely in their 
ability to influence the Court. When compared with men like 
Chief Justice Marshall and Chief Justice Warren, there seems 
little doubt that Chief Justice Burger has not been able to 
unify and persuade as they could. Chief Justice Burger has, 
however, been an influencing force on the Court. 
In evaluating Chief Justice Burger's influence, the 
conditions under which he has functioned must be considered. 
President Nixon appointed Chief Justice Burger because he felt 
his appointee's constructionist philosophy would constrain the 
liberal Warren Court and bring the Court back into line with 
the more conservative attitudes that the two men shared. The 
assumption, therefore, that the conservative new Chief Justice 
found himself in the minority as he assumed leadership of a 
Court that retained all but one member of the old Warren Court 
seems justified. The new Chief Justice wasted little time, 
however, in giving notice that he intended to reduce the Court's 
case load and limit access to the Court. When viewed in light 
of this situation, the lack of unity of the Burger Court could 
be interpreted to be an indication of the Chief Justice's 
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unwillingness to compromise with his more liberal colleagues 
and his lack of concern for a unified Court. The lack of Court 
unity has, in fact, had the effect of weakening the Court's 
rulings and this weakening could be one of the ways in which 
Chief Justice Burger has attempted to renove the Court from 
the activist stance it had assumed under Chief Justice Uarren. 
Chief Justice Burger seems to have failed in most attempts 
that he made to exercise social and task leadership to influ­
ence the decision of the Court. This conclusion seems to be 
justified by the lack of unity exhibited in the education cases. 
The lack of unity, however, allowed the Chief Justice to exert 
a different kind of influence. The polarization of justices 
around philosophical positions which resulted in the formation 
of voting blocs gave Chief Justice Burger an opportunity to 
utilize the influencing powers available to a Chief Justice 
when the Court is divided. Positioned somehwere between the 
voting blocs in the church and state cases and in the constitu­
tional freedoms cases was a group of nonaligned justices known 
as swing-vote justices. The possibility exists that these un­
committed justices could be attracted to support a decision 
when a middle-of-the-road opinion was written by one of their 
uncommitted colleagues. The Chief Justice had the right to 
assign the majority opinion when he was a member of the majority 
in a case. There is evidence to indicate that Chief Justice 
Burger may have used this right to assign the majority opinion 
in order to attract swing votes to the positions he supported. 
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Chief Justice Burger may have been the leader of the two 
blocs to which be belonged. This is a plausible contention 
because of the potential power he possessed as Chief Justice. 
No evidence, however, was found to indicate definitely who 
served as leader of the various voting blocs. The signifi­
cance of the Chief Justice in attracting swing votes is not 
diminished, however, even if he were not the leader of the 
bloc. 
Chief Justice Burger further utilized his right to assign 
the majority opinion on several occasions when he retained the 
opinion-writing task for himself. In a number of cases the 
Chief Justice was able to soften a decision which could have 
been written in a way that would have been contrary to his 
basic philosophical position. For example, in the Lemon de­
cision the Chief Justice was able to minimize the harm done to 
the accommodationist cause resulting from an unfavorable de­
cision. Chief Justice Burger softened the pro-separationist 
Lemon decision by writing an opinion stating that church and 
state were separated only by a "blurred, indistinct, and 
variable barrier" rather than the wall that the separationists 
would have built. The number and length of the concurring 
opinions written by the separationists in this case leave little 
doubt that the Chief Justice had succeeded in softening this 
decision far more than they had wished. There is some evidence 
to indicate that the Chief Justice attempted to accomplish a 
similar result when he wrote the Swann opinion; however, the 
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lower court busing orders which followed this decision seem to 
indicate his lack of success. By writing the Court's opinion 
in important precedent-setting cases, such as Lemon, Swann, 
and Milliken, Chief Justice Burger has influenced the Court in 
these specific cases and presumably in future cases by the 
precedents established. 
In eight cases the Chief Justice has been able to control 
the decision completely. The Chief Justice is afforded the 
privilege of voting last when the vote is taken in a case. On 
the occasions when the Court is split evenly with four justices 
favoring one decision and four justices favoring another, the 
Chief Justice is able to cast the deciding vote. Chief Justice 
Burger found himself in that position in these eight cases. Two 
of these decisions, Milliken and Rodriguez, were significant 
decisions which served to limit the Court's involvement in de­
segregation by busing and in school finance. 
When compared with Chief Justice Warren, Chief Justice 
Burger appears to be less able to unite the Court and to bring 
his influence to bear in persuading the Court to accept his 
position through social and task leadership as Chief Justice 
Warren was able to do. The Burger Court has delivered only 
nineteen unanimous decisions in education cases. This lack of 
unity seems to be partly due to the hard-line position of the 
Chief Justice. Chief Justice Burger seems to be unwilling to 
work for unity in the Court's decisions and his record of dis­
sents indicates his desire to depart from the majority when he 
240 
feels that they are following the wrong path. Chief Justice 
Warren was able to unite a Court that was divided in the Brown 
decision, and his effort to unify the Court behind a unanimous 
decision has been called the most significant factor in the 
decision. In comparison, Chief Justice Burger has not been 
able to influence the Court in this manner. An analysis of the 
decisions of the Burger Court which were favorable to the posi­
tion taken by the Chief Justice and those that were not shows 
that the Chief Justice had only moderate success in influencing 
the Court to adopt his position. Chief Justice Burger dissented 
in nine of the Court's education decisions and indicated dis­
pleasure with the majority in a number of concurring opinioifs. 
The Eurger Court seems to have gone through three cycles. 
During the early years of the Chief Justice's tenure, the Court 
seems to have been influenced only slightly by the Chief 
Justice. This can be explained by the fact that the Court was 
dominated by Warren Court holdovers. As the Court changed and 
President Nixon was able to appoint more constructionist jus­
tices, Chief Justice Burger's influence seemed to grow. In 
recent years, however, the Nixon justices seem to have broken 
away from the Chief Justice. The most significant indication 
of this split can be found in Justice Elaclcmun's lack of agree­
ment with the Chief Justice in recent education cases. These 
two justices had agreed so often in their early years that they 
were called the Minnesota Twins. If the Nixon-appointed justices 
who have supported the positions taken by Chief Justice Burger 
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in education cases during the middle seventies do not continue 
their support in future education cases, the Chief Justice's 
ability to utilize the influencing tactics he has used in the 
past would be affected.. 
Chief Justice Burger does not seem to have been able to 
guide the Court to accept his position in education cases. His 
influence has resulted mainly from his ability to attract swing 
votes by means of the majority opinion assignment, his ability 
to control an unfavorable decision by writing the majority 
opinion himself, and his ability to cast the deciding vote in 
five-to-four decisions. The erosion of his base of influencing 
power obtained through the support of those justices who have 
traditionally joined him in education cases could severely limit 
the Chief Justice's ability to utilize those influencing tactics 
in future education cases. Chief Justice Burger's influence 
could also be affected by retirements. The age of some Court 
members makes this a real possibility. The philosophical posi­
tion of the person chosen to replace a retiring justice could 
have a dramatic impact on the Chief Justice's ability to influ­
ence the Court. 
Questions which this study suggests for further research 
include: 
1. Have the interagreement rates between the Chief Justice 
and the associate justices changed since the October 1978 term? 
How has any change affected the Chief Justice's ability to 
influence the Court? 
242 
2. Has the Chief Justice been able to limit access of 
cases in education? What effect has this limitation, if any, 
had on the litigation of education cases? 
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